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Abstract 
Health worker motivation influences the performance of health services. In the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), not all health workers are remunerated by the 
government, negatively affecting their motivation. This leads workers to seek revenue 
from other sources, including user fees and private practice, but the extent to which 
different sources make up their total revenue has not been quantified. To improve 
motivation, donors have employed performance-based financing (PBF), which 
represents another, albeit unstable, source of income. 
The research for this thesis was set within a health systems strengthening programme 
called ASSP (access to primary health care) in the DRC, which phased out donor-
financed PBF from a previous programme and implemented a complex intervention 
aiming to increase the prevalence of government payments to health workers. Using 
mixed methods, this study: describes the sources and amounts of income making up a 
health worker’s total remuneration; develops and validates a tool to measure health 
worker motivation; compares differences in motivation amongst workers who 
previously received PBF with workers who never received PBF; and, evaluates the 
complex intervention described above. 
Several income sources make up a health worker’s total remuneration. A valid tool 
measuring health worker motivation was developed and indicated workers who 
previously received PBF scored significantly lower on almost all motivation dimensions 
compared to those who never received PBF. With respect to the complex intervention, 
an adaptive approach to implementation and evaluation was needed given the dynamic 
nature of the health system. 
The findings have important policy implications. Better coordination amongst actors 
involved in health worker remuneration is needed, and incentive structures should be 
based on dimensions of motivation relevant to workers. For fragile states, the 
implications of transitioning away from donor payments and the importance of 
continuing work on civil service pay reform are identified.  
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Preface 
In 2011, my husband who was working for the Department for International 
Development (DFID) secured his first overseas posting in Kinshasa, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). I was a public health registrar at the time, but the 
opportunity to work in Africa had been a joint dream of ours for a long time. The stars 
aligned, and I managed to find a job as a locally employed health adviser with DFID.  
I was completely new to the world of international development, and so very 
inexperienced. While working with the DFID DRC health team, I noticed the 
operational research plan for DFID’s new major health systems strengthening 
programme lacked a focus on human resources for health, despite a number of proposed 
interventions which would potentially affect their motivation and performance. 
I had always been interested in research and wanted to do a PhD (Doctor of 
Philosophy). So, I wrote and presented a research proposal to the Head of the DFID 
DRC Office at the time to work on the subject contained in this thesis. After some 
correspondence by email and a phone call, I gained the support of Dr Natasha Palmer at 
the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine to supervise me and started this 
PhD in October 2013.  
I conceived all of the studies contained in the thesis and was the principal investigator. I 
led on the planning, design of data collection, collection of all data from qualitative 
interviews, data analysis and write up of all of the studies. I was also responsible for 
managing the budget of this operational research component within the health 
programme as well as contracting and training local researchers. This PhD is the 
culmination of that work. I realise now there are a lot of things I would have done 
differently had I better understood the field when I began this undertaking. Hence, much 
of my thesis reflects on the challenges of working in a fragile state, limitations of the 
research, and what I could have done differently. 
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1.1 Health worker motivation and incentives 
Primary health care workers in low- and middle-income countries usually work in 
challenging environments (Vasan et al., 2016); typically, there is a shortage of workers 
as well as inequitable distribution of providers within the country (World Health 
Organization, 2006, Chopra et al., 2008). The health workforce has often received 
inadequate or incomplete education and training, and faces significant resource 
shortages within facilities (World Health Organization, 2013). Yet, health workers have 
a critical role with respect to health care delivery. 
Problems relating to service provision due to the poor performance of health workers in 
low- and middle-income countries are well documented in the literature (World Health 
Organization, 2006, Rowe et al., 2005, Garcia-Prado and Chawla, 2006), and include 
low uptake of health care due to poor health worker practices. Many of the causes are 
rooted in a failing health system, but also a poorly motivated workforce (Dieleman and 
Harnmeijer, 2006, World Health Organization, 2013, Chopra et al., 2008).  
Health worker motivation is defined as the level of effort and desire to perform well 
(World Health Organization, 2006). It is recognised in the literature as a critical 
influence of health worker performance (Franco et al., 2002, Rowe et al., 2005), thereby 
affecting the quality of health service delivery (World Health Organization, 2006). By 
understanding what drives motivation, strategies aimed at improving health worker 
motivation can be implemented which then have a bearing on performance.  
In general, policy-makers can influence motivation through the provision of incentives. 
These may either be non-financial incentives, such as career-development, supportive 
supervision and training (Agyepong et al., 2004, Manongi et al., 2006, Bailey et al., 
2016), or financial incentives, for example rural/hardship allowances or pensions (Reid, 
2004, Henderson and Tulloch, 2008).  
The next section specifically discusses performance-based financing (PBF) - which 
involves the transfer of funds (at least in part) to health workers on their attainment of 
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pre-defined outputs or quality indicators linked to performance (Meessen et al., 2011, 
Witter et al., 2013) - as it is a key financial incentive examined in this thesis. The 
evidence on the effects of PBF as well as other financial incentives on health worker 
motivation is expanded further upon in chapter 2. 
1.2 Performance-based financing in low-and middle-income countries 
and fragile states 
Particularly in fragile states, government payments to workers are insufficient and 
systems often dysfunctional; PBF is therefore often introduced as “top-up” rather than 
addressing underlying system constraints. PBF is based on a powerful assumption, 
which is that incentives motivate individuals and organisations to perform better. In 
theory, the approach has the potential to foster system-wide reforms in relation to: 
human resources, by clarifying roles and responsibilities, and increasing motivation and 
therefore productivity of staff; financial management, by increasing the autonomy of 
health structures as well as encouraging the provision of high priority and cost-effective 
services; service coverage and equity, by expanding services to hard-to-reach groups; 
and other aspects of health system governance, by increasing accountability to 
stakeholders (Meessen et al., 2011, Fritsche et al., 2014, Soeters, 2017). 
However, recent systematic reviews have concluded that there is limited and poor 
quality evidence on the effects of PBF on provider performance, the utilisation of 
services, patient outcomes, or resource-use in low-income countries (Das et al., 2016, 
Suthar et al., 2017, Eijkenaar et al., 2013, Wiysonge et al., 2017). PBF in low- and 
middle-income countries has usually been funded by donors and has not taken into 
account the complexity of the existing health system or given due consideration to 
sustainability (Paul et al., 2018); there is therefore a risk of creating a dependency on an 
income source which cannot be continued in the event that donor funding is withdrawn, 
with potential consequences for health worker motivation. This is in contrast to the 
implementation of PBF in high-income countries, where it is introduced as a purchasing 
mechanism embedded in existing financial arrangements, rather than as a top-up from a 
parallel funding stream.  
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Furthermore, in fragile states, PBF often occurs in the context of several other 
alternative revenue streams for workers; this phenomenon of ‘complex remuneration’ 
has been described in the literature (Bertone and Witter, 2015). These may include: per 
diems and allowances, which are payments for specified needs or expenses such as 
travel (Ridde, 2010); user fees, which are payments made at the point of service use by 
patients (Lagarde and Palmer, 2011); and informal payments, which are payments by 
patients to workers that are made outside official payment channels or for purchases 
meant to be covered by the health care system (Lewis, 2007). A thorough analysis of the 
overall financial environment of workers is therefore necessary to understanding the 
potential implications of any changes in different income sources on worker motivation 
(Bertone and Witter, 2015).  
1.3 Research gaps 
The literature review in chapter 2 points towards a number of research gaps: (1) PBF is 
often examined in isolation of other income sources which is problematic given the 
multiple players and lines of accountability linked to other income sources which may 
differently influence the activities performed by health workers (2) the multiple sources 
and amounts of income available to health workers in developing countries is rarely 
described in its entirety, and there is comparatively little research on the determinants 
and factors underlying their ‘complex remuneration’ (3) few academic studies have 
been published on the implications of withdrawing donor-funded financial incentives on 
health worker motivation, and (4) there is a lack of rigorous evaluative research on PBF 
alternatives within fragile states such as strengthening the systems for routine 
government payments to health workers. The body of work contained in this thesis 
therefore aims to address these substantial evidence gaps, in order to inform more 
effective policy measures which will improve the motivation and performance of health 
workers in low- and middle-income countries or fragile states.  
1.4 Study setting 
This thesis aims to address the research gaps outlined above within the context of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The DRC is a post-conflict and fragile country 
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(Fund for Peace, 2018). Political instability, poor governance, and weak state 
institutions are the main factors explaining the persistent poverty of the Congolese 
population. Elite capture leads to corruption at all levels, which takes a heavy toll on 
public service capacity to deliver key services. In addition, the national payroll system 
is widely acknowledged to be dysfunctional (Fox et al., 2013, World Bank, 2008), with 
few public sector health workers receiving any form of government payment, which can 
negatively affect their motivation and therefore performance.  
Between 2008 and March 2013, DFID (Department for International Development) 
provided funding towards a health systems strengthening programme called access to 
healthcare (ATH) in the DRC. The programme employed PBF at the facility-level as 
few workers were receiving a state salary. Under the PBF scheme, health workers 
received a regular fixed payment and a performance payment contingent on their facility 
achieving certain performance criteria. Further detail on this programme is given in 
chapter 3.  
In March 2013, the Department for International Development (DFID) started funding a 
new health systems strengthening programme called ASSP (accès aux soins de santé 
primaire or access to primary health care), which worked in Equateur, Kasai Occidental, 
Maniema, Province Orientale and South Kivu provinces of the DRC. Concerns around 
sustainability led to the decision to firstly phase out the payment of PBF - a legacy of 
the predecessor health programme – over the first year. During the first few years of 
ASSP, and only in the province of Kasai Occidental, DFID also financed a pilot for a 
complex intervention aiming to increase the proportion of health workers paid by 
government, recognising that this would not only contribute to state capacity building 
but address a major obstacle to staff motivation. 
Both of these interventions would likely have consequences for health worker 
motivation and performance. Further detail on these two programmes is offered in 
chapter 3.  
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1.5 Aim and objectives 
The aim of this PhD is to describe the remuneration and motivation of health workers in 
a sample of provinces in the DRC, exploring differences in motivation between workers 
who have recently had PBF removed and workers who have not been exposed to PBF. 
The implementation process and intermediate effects of an intervention to improve 
motivation by strengthening government payments to health workers will also be 
evaluated. The specific objectives are summarised below: 
Objective 1: To describe and quantify the sources and levels of income for health 
workers in a sample of public sector facilities in the DRC.  
Objective 2: To develop and validate a scale to measure dimensions of motivation 
among health workers in the DRC, and compare differences in motivation among health 
workers where PBF has recently been removed with those who never received PBF.   
Objective 3: To undertake a process evaluation of a complex intervention aimed at 
facilitating government payments to health workers. 
1.6 Structure of this thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews several areas of the literature pertinent to this thesis and the 
underlying conceptual framework. The literature review covers: theories of motivation, 
the role of incentives in influencing motivation, how different financial incentives may 
affect health worker motivation (in particular PBF), and how changes to income sources 
within overall remuneration structures may affect worker motivation. Chapter 3 
provides the contextual background to this research. Chapter 4 then goes on to provide 
an overview of the methods used to address the objectives of the thesis. Chapter 5 
describes a cross-sectional study of the income sources received by health workers in 
primary care facilities. Chapter 6 describes the composition and levels of motivation of 
health workers, providing results on the differences in motivation observed between 
workers who had never received PBF compared with those who had PBF recently 
withdrawn. A reflection on the methods employed to measure motivation is also 
described. Chapter 7 then goes on to detail the process evaluation of a complex 
intervention to improve government payments to health workers. It includes a reflection 
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on the process of developing the theory of change as well as a commentary discussing 
the importance of working on interventions which seek to sustainably strengthen 
payments to health workers as opposed to funding stand-alone PBF schemes. Finally, 
chapter 8 critically assesses the research, drawing together the major contributions of 
the thesis and its implications for future policy and research.  
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This literature review begins by describing some of the different theories of motivation 
which have been applied in low-income countries, and the role incentives play in 
influencing health worker motivation. As the focus of this PhD relates primarily to 
financial incentives, the literature on how different mechanisms of provider payment - 
with specific regard to PBF – as well as overall remuneration structures may affect 
worker motivation is summarised. Changes to income sources within health worker 
remuneration structures that are specifically relevant to this PhD are then discussed. 
These include: the implications of removing PBF payments on motivation, and evidence 
concerning the effectiveness of interventions to improve government payments to 
workers. Finally, knowledge gaps addressed by this thesis are identified. 
2.2 Health worker motivation 
Many health care reforms have sought to improve health system performance through 
changes that target resource availability, training of workers, and more effective 
management. Worker motivation, however, has rarely been an objective of reforms 
(Beaglehole and Dal Poz, 2003, Franco et al., 2002), despite poorly motivated workers 
having a negative impact on service quality and efficiency (Martineau and Martinez, 
1996). 
2.3 Definition and theories of motivation 
There is broad agreement on the definition of worker motivation, with one of the most 
commonly used being “an individual’s degree of willingness to exert and maintain an 
effort towards organisational goals” (Leonard and Masatu, 2010, Franco et al., 2002). In 
essence, motivation is important to bridging the gap between what health workers know 
they need to do, and what they actually do in practice (Leonard and Masatu, 2010, 
Leonard et al., 2007). 
As motivation cannot be directly observed, this has led to several different 
conceptualisations of motivation and the factors driving it (Pinder, 2008). The many 
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theories explaining work motivation have their origins in various disciplines including 
behavioural economics and psychology (Herzberg et al., 2011, Maslow, 1943, Kanfer et 
al., 1999, Franco et al., 2002, Deci and Ryan, 1985, Locke, 1997, Vroom, 1964). The 
two main lines of theories are content and process theories. The former is concerned 
with an individual’s needs and goals, and is concerned with “what” motivates people, 
while the latter is concerned with the process and “how” motivation occurs (Dolea and 
Adams, 2005). A recent article on good practice in measuring motivation offers a useful 
summary of the different types of theories (Borghi et al., 2017), as do Dolea and Adams 
(2005). 
Given many of these theories and conceptual frameworks of motivation have been 
developed within Western contexts, this section refers to those which have been 
consistently applied to inform the measurement of health worker motivation in low-
income countries.  
Herzberg two factor theory 
Herzberg’s two factor theory hypothesises that a worker’s motivation is influenced by a 
set of ‘hygiene’ factors, and a set of ‘motivator’ factors (Herzberg et al., 1966). Hygiene 
factors are what causes dissatisfaction amongst workers, and include: company policy, 
supervision, relationships with senior management, work conditions, salary and 
relationships with colleagues.  
Ensuring workers are satisfied with these factors is necessary for the existence of 
worker motivation, but is only one part of the equation; motivating factors are needed to 
enhance satisfaction of workers and relate to aspects such as opportunities for a worker 
to gain status, assume responsibility, and undertake important and meaningful work 
(Hackman and Oldham, 1976). To date, this theory has been used to understand factors 
affecting health worker motivation in Mali (Dieleman et al., 2006) and North Vietnam 
(Dieleman et al., 2003). 
Self Determination Theory 
Self Determination Theory builds on another theory known as Cognitive Evaluation 
Theory, which states that influences on worker motivation can be either “intrinsic” or 
“extrinsic”(Porter and Lawler, 1968, Deci and Ryan, 1985, Stilwell, 2001). Intrinsic 
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factors refer to the internal desire of health workers to perform a task. For example, 
health workers are guided by their professional conscience to do their job well. 
Extrinsic factors refer to the external characteristics of the organisation environment, 
community and health system. Examples include financial rewards, or praise from 
colleagues. According to motivation crowding theory, changes to extrinsic factors may 
also directly affect intrinsic motivation (Frey and Jegen, 2001). The basic assumption is 
that contingent rewards could undermine a person’s innate need to feel autonomous and 
competent (Borghi et al., 2017). 
Self Determination Theory extends Cognitive Evaluation Theory to characterise 
extrinsic motivation as a spectrum of four different types, each varying in terms of 
relative autonomy and distinguished by the extent to which they stem from outside a 
person or within the person (Deci and Ryan, 2000). ‘External regulated behaviour’ is 
the most controlled type of extrinsic motivation, and ‘introjected’, ‘identified’, and 
‘integrated’ are progressively more self-determined or autonomous. 
Recently, this theory has provided the conceptual basis for developing tools to measure 
the motivation of health workers in Burkina Faso (Lohmann et al., 2017), Afghanistan 
(Dale, 2014) and Malawi (Lohmann et al., 2018); these scales were subsequently used 
to evaluate the effects of introducing performance-based financial incentives on the 
composition of worker motivation.  
Kanfer’s motivation theory and the Franco framework of motivation 
Kanfer (1999) postulated that determinants affecting the alignment of an individual’s 
goals with that of the organisation will influence the “will-do” component of 
motivation, while the ability to mobilise resources to execute a task will influence the 
“can-do“ component of motivation. Distal determinants of the “will do” aspect of 
motivation, which cannot be directly influenced by human resource management 
strategies, are generally stable characteristics such as cultural values and personality. 
For example, in cultures where family time is important, workers are less likely to 
accept goals requiring that they work overtime. Proximal determinants, on the other 
hand, are more flexible and under the control of the organisation. For instance, 
organisations may attempt to enhance worker motivation by rewarding high-performing 
individuals. Distal determinants of the “can do” aspects of motivation relate to the 
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individual characteristics of workers: these include self-confidence, self-concept, work 
orientation, and self-regulation. Proximal determinants include the provision of 
complementary inputs (e.g. medicines) as well as clear systems and procedures by the 
organisation (Mathauer and Imhoff, 2006) which will enable workers to achieve their 
goals. 
Motivation outcomes at the individual level are the net result of the interaction between 
the “can-do” and “will-do” components of motivation. Outcomes can be affective, 
cognitive and behavioural. Affective outcomes concern health workers’ satisfaction, 
while cognitive outcomes relate to health workers’ perceptions of their job. Behavioural 
outcomes relate to the performance of health workers. 
Building on Kanfer’s work, Franco et al. (2002, 2004) developed a conceptual 
framework illustrating the levels of different determinants of health worker motivation 
(figure 1). The framework posits that motivation is the result of the interaction between 
the individual and their work/organisational environment, as well as the relationship 
between these elements and the broader social context.  
Figure 1: Franco's conceptual framework of motivation 
Source: (Franco et al., 2004). 
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The motivational processes operating at the individual level have been described above 
(Kanfer et al., 1999). Organisational structures and systems and the nature of feedback 
the worker receives from colleagues will affect workers’ experiences of outcomes, 
which can in turn impact on individual motivation. Community members will have 
expectations around health service delivery which they may communicate to health 
workers in order to influence their motivation and performance. Finally, both the 
communication and content of health sector reforms can influence worker motivation 
through their effects on organisational factors and/or community determinants.  
The Franco framework has now been extensively applied to motivation measurement of 
health workers in a number of developing countries, including: Kenya (Mbindyo et al., 
2009), Ghana (Bonenberger et al., 2014, Prytherch et al., 2012, Alhassan et al., 2013), 
Zambia (Mutale et al., 2013), Jordan (Franco et al., 2004), Georgia (Franco et al., 2004), 
Tanzania (Prytherch et al., 2012, Chandler et al., 2009), Burkina Faso (Prytherch et al., 
2012), Ethiopia (Hotchkiss et al., 2015), Nepal (Morrison et al., 2015), and South Africa 
(Penn-Kekana et al., 2005). 
Although the theories above have been applied in low- and middle-income country 
settings, it is still important to ensure they are adapted as needed to the setting (Dolea 
and Adams, 2005), as interpretations of motivation are known to vary across contexts 
(Rowe et al., 2005, Machungwa and Schmitt, 1983).  
2.4 The role of incentives 
One way of influencing motivation is to employ incentives. Incentives are tools used to 
motivate health workers to perform in a way that is in the interest of both patients and 
the organisation (Adams and Hicks, 2000, Locke, 1968), and can either be financial or 
non-financial. Non-financial incentives don’t involve direct transfers with monetary 
value or equivalent to an individual or group (Adams and Hicks, 2000). They may 
operate through a moral imperative, which may be in the form of social pressure or 
altruism (Hanson, 2012). Important non-financial motivators include: career 
development, resource availability, hospital management, supervisory support and 
recognition (Willis-Shattuck et al., 2008, Dieleman and Harnmeijer, 2006, Stilwell et 
al., 2004, Dieleman et al., 2003).  
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Financial incentives are defined as monetary benefits given to a worker, the amount and 
type or feature of which varies (Lemière, 2011). Direct financial incentives include 
salaries, pensions, and allowances e.g. for housing and transport (Willis-Shattuck et al., 
2008, Dambisya, 2007) while indirect financial incentives include subsidised child-care 
and transport (Dambisya, 2007). 
(Buchan et al., 2000) recognises that a combination of non-monetary and monetary 
incentives are highly important in creating a reward strategy that meets the needs of 
individuals as well as the organisation. Although this PhD focuses primarily on the 
different types of financial incentives paid to workers, this duality is borne in mind 
throughout. 
2.5 Remuneration of health workers and agency theory 
Financial incentives make up a health worker’s remuneration, which refers to their total 
income. Remuneration structures may therefore comprise a range of payments 
determined according to different rules (Buchan et al., 2000). According to economic 
theory, different mechanisms of paying health workers can vary in terms of the 
incentives they provide (Prendergast, 1999, Robinson, 2001, Barnum et al., 1995). 
Consequently, the way in which health workers are paid may influence their motivation 
and performance in the workplace (Lagarde et al., 2010, Gosden et al., 2000).  
How remuneration and incentives may affect health worker behaviour can best be 
explained through agency theory. Agency theory describes a relationship between a 
“principal” who delegates a task or authority to an “agent” who performs or makes 
decisions on behalf of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Usually the principal 
(who is the employer e.g. the government for public sector health care) requires health 
workers to act on their behalf (i.e. in treating patients) in an agency relationship 
(Buchan et al., 2000). An asymmetry of information exists between the two parties; the 
health worker agent is well informed about how to best deliver health services, while 
the principal (government) is relatively uninformed and relies on the agent to act in their 
best interests (Eisenhardt, 1989, Kiser, 1999). However, the interests of the two parties 
are divergent as the task should benefit the government, while the agent incurs a cost 
due to the effort to perform it. As the government principal cannot perfectly monitor the 
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agent’s behaviour, the health worker agent will maximise their own utility by 
undertaking less work than is desirable, giving rise to the classic principal-agent 
problem (Eisenhardt, 1989). The question is therefore how to motivate the agent to act 
in the best interest of the principal. 
At the individual level, increasing health workers’ productivity and performance 
translates into creating an incentive structure which motivates workers to exert the 
maximum amount of effort, in order to ensure the highest quantity and quality of service 
provided. According to incentive theory, the purpose of an incentive is to align the 
interests of the agent (health worker) with those of the principal (the government) 
(Hockenbury and Hockenbury, 2000). This can be achieved by the principal devising 
effective mechanisms of paying the agent, which often give the agent a stake in some 
observable measure of performance, provided the agent is able to influence this measure 
through their own behaviour.  
2.6 Provider-payment mechanisms – what is and what isn’t known 
In terms of mechanisms of paying health workers, salaries are the most common, where 
a guaranteed fixed sum is paid irrespective of the amount of services provided. 
However, workers can be paid in other ways, including: fee-for-service, whereby they 
are paid for each service administered; and capitation where workers are paid a pre-
determined amount per member of a defined population during a fixed period of time 
(Lagarde et al., 2010).  In theory, salaries provide no incentive to increase effort but also 
do not encourage the provision of unnecessary services. A fee-for-service model can 
lead to supplier-induced demand, while capitation aims to counteract this but bears a 
risk of workers providing lower quality care and cream-skinning i.e. choosing less ill 
patients (Lagarde et al., 2010). Empirical studies suggest that salaries are associated 
with the lowest use of tests and consultations (Gosden et al., 1999, Brekke et al., 2018), 
followed by capitation and fee-for-service methods (Krasnik et al., 1990, Davidson et 
al., 1992, Brekke et al., 2018). However, the difference in the use of resources and 
number of consultations between workers paid either by capitation or salary is thought 
to be trivial (Lagarde et al., 2010). 
27
Nonetheless, amongst these standard ways of paying workers, there is no mechanism, or 
blend of mechanisms, which is deemed to be superior; all have different benefits and 
disadvantages which can impact on the quality and provision of health care (Barnum et 
al., 1995). The resulting choice of provider payment approach is therefore usually 
influenced by the economic, social and institutional context of a particular setting 
(Barnum et al., 1995).  Furthermore, most of the research evaluating the effectiveness of 
these different types of payments in increasing health worker productivity and 
performance has been undertaken in high-income countries (Bertone and Witter, 2015), 
with their effects on motivation of workers in low- and middle-income countries less 
well understood.  
One mechanism of provider payment which is particularly common in fragile states and 
is usually externally financed by donors in these settings is PBF (Bertone et al., 2018a). 
PBF can be introduced alongside or in addition to other routine payment mechanisms 
such as salaries or fee-for-service, and entails health workers being paid – at least in part 
- on the basis of their performance (Meessen et al., 2011). The financial incentive is paid
on a fee-for-service basis which is also contingent on the quality of services being 
provided (Musgrove, 2011). The assumption underlying PBF is that it will motivate 
health workers to change their behaviour in order to achieve results (Basinga et al., 
2011), yet more research is needed on the exact mechanisms through which PBF 
operates (Renmans et al., 2016).   
Despite the approach having been introduced in many countries, with several pilots also 
underway (World Bank, 2018), the effects of PBF on quality of care, health worker 
performance and motivation remain limited and results are mixed (Witter et al., 2012, 
Renmans, 2016, Eijkenaar et al., 2013, Wiysonge et al., 2017).  For example, in Burundi 
and Rwanda, PBF was reported to improve quality of health care (Bonfrer et al., 2014, 
Janssen et al., 2015), while in Tanzania, significantly positive effects in service 
coverage were observed for only two out of eight performance indicators (Binyaruka et 
al., 2015).   
Very few studies have attempted to understand how PBF affects motivation (Basinga et 
al., 2011, Witter, 2013). Lohmann et al. showed that PBF had both positive and 
negative effects on workers’ intrinsic motivation in Malawi (Lohmann et al., 2018). In 
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Nigeria PBF successfully increased motivation but it was recognised that addressing 
other non-financial factors such as the distribution of staff would further improve 
motivation levels (Bhatnagar and George, 2016). Other studies have indicated that the 
design and implementation of PBF has important implications for motivation; PBF 
could have limited effects on motivation, or may even be de-motivating in cases if staff 
perceive the distribution of payments is not transparent, equitable or timely (Witter et 
al., 2011, Kalk et al., 2010, Bertone et al., 2016, Ssengooba et al., 2012).  
 
With respect to the DRC, one study showed that PBF led to efficiency gains and 
improvements in service quality (Soeters et al., 2011), while another study 
demonstrated that although PBF increased efforts to target service provision, it did not 
stimulate demand for services, and even resulted in a reduction of intrinsic motivation 
in workers (Huillery and Seban, 2015).  
 
A more recent paper has concluded that some of the conditions of fragile states, such as 
low levels of trust within the public system and the greater role of external actors and 
donors, appear to favour the emergence of PBF approaches (Bertone et al., 2018b). Yet, 
whether PBF has either led to an improvement in the conditions of fragility or simply 
circumvented them is still unclear. Given the weak evidence on the effects of PBF, its 
rapid expansion has not been without debate. While proponents argue that PBF has the 
potential to foster system-wide reforms and accountability (Meessen et al., 2011, 
Fritsche et al., 2014, Soeters, 2017), others argue that it has been predominantly donor-
driven with a lack of government ownership (Gautier and Ridde, 2017), and may even 
weaken health the health system (Paul et al., 2018a). Negative unintended effects have 
been described in Italy, where performance-related pay led to the manipulation of data 
and provider moral hazard, whereby doctors recommended a higher number of 
consultations and tests to artificially raise demand for services (Adinolfi, 1998). 
 
In particular, concerns around the financial sustainability of this approach have been 
raised, as it is often financed through multilateral, bilateral or global initiatives (Fritsche 
et al., 2014). To date, the government’s adoption and scale-up of PBF in Rwanda has 
been touted as evidence testifying to PBF being sustainably implemented (Meessen et 
al., 2011). However, this has not been the case for most contexts. A few articles have 
indicated challenges in other countries such as Benin and Burundi in transitioning from 
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donor to domestic financing of PBF, as well as integrating PBF into the existing health 
system (Paul et al., 2018b, Falisse et al., 2014, Peerenboom et al., 2014). 
There are no studies which have evaluated the effects of withdrawing PBF schemes on 
service access and quality in low-income countries (Suthar et al., 2017). This should be 
a research priority given external grants for PBF are usually of a short duration; 
furthermore, the cessation of such incentive schemes could result in even lower levels of 
quality compared to before the introduction of PBF due to newly found expectations 
from health workers. Consequently, more research into the withdrawal of PBF in these 
settings is needed given concerns around its sustainability (Paul et al., 2018a).  
There is mixed evidence from high-income countries on the effects on service quality 
when performance-based incentives are removed. In the United States (US), an 
observational cohort study found that improvements in the management of three 
common medical conditions were sustained for up to three years after performance-
based incentives were removed (Benzer et al., 2014). However, another study from the 
US indicated that screening rates for diabetic retinopathy and cervical cancer were 
sensitive to both the introduction and withdrawal of performance-based incentives; 
screening rates rose for both conditions when incentives were attached, but once 
removed annual screening rates reduced year on year for both conditions with losses 
exceeding the gains made during the incentivisation period (Lester et al., 2010). 
Similarly, quality declined following the removal of incentives in a sample of US health 
facilities participating in a randomised, controlled trial of incentives to improve 
hypertension control (Petersen et al., 2013).  
Studies in the United Kingdom (UK) have also yielded conflicting results. These have 
been conducted on the UK’s Quality and Outcomes Framework, which constitutes the 
largest health-related pay-for-performance scheme in the world that has been 
implemented since 2004. One study found immediate reductions for twelve quality of 
care indicators in the first year after the removal of financial incentives (Minchin et al., 
2018) while another study showed that incentive removal had little effect on 
documented quality for eight quality outcome framework indicators (Kontopantelis et 
al., 2014). 
30
Even if PBF could eventually be financed by low-income country governments, there is 
little evidence on the long-term effectiveness of PBF on health system performance in 
low- and middle-income countries. However, evidence is becoming increasingly 
available from developed countries. For example, in the UK, the evaluation of the 
Quality and Outcomes Framework indicated relatively limited additional improvements 
in quality and some negative effects, including reduced patient choice (Roland and 
Guthrie, 2016). Moreover, the UK hospital pay for performance programme Advancing 
Quality was associated with a short-term (18 month) reduction in mortality, but the 
decline in mortality was not significant compared to the baseline mortality a further 24 
months into the programme (Kristensen et al., 2014). The structure of financial 
incentives linked to performance did change during the study period from bonuses for 
good performance to the withholding of a percentage of reimbursement for poor 
performance. Nonetheless, when using an alternative evaluation method which 
employed a synthetic control, there was no longer any statistically significant effect 
even in the short-term (Kreif et al., 2016), calling into question the cost-effectiveness of 
such strategies.  
2.7 Complex remuneration of health workers 
A key focus of this PhD concerns the remuneration of workers in the DRC, and in 
particular, how financial incentives affect motivation. Post conflict states present a 
particularly interesting context within which to examine health worker remuneration. In 
contrast with most other countries, the government’s ability to remunerate health 
workers is often poorly functional; few public sector workers receive their state salary at 
all, the amount received is insufficient and paid on an irregular basis.  
Evidence suggests that the level and regularity of payment to health workers can affect 
both the quality and quantity of healthcare provided (Henderson and Tulloch, 2008, 
Willis-Shattuck et al., 2008, Lu et al., 2005, Hickson et al., 1987). Underpayment and 
low frequency of payment to health workers is associated with reduced health worker 
performance (Langenbrunner et al., 2005). This in turn stimulates a proliferation of 
income sources, as health workers devise alternative “financial coping strategies” 
increasing opportunities for corruption (Macrae et al., 1996); these include informal 
payments and predatory mechanisms such as pilfering drugs (Ferrinho et al., 2004, 
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Mcpake et al., 1999, Akwataghibe et al., 2013, Van Lerberghe et al., 2002). It is also not 
uncommon for workers to engage in dual-practice, where they may be engaged in health 
work outside of their main employment. They may even choose to undertake income-
generating activities unrelated to healthcare (Ferrinho et al., 2004). Such practices can 
potentially have negative implications for health care provision (Ferrinho et al., 2004), 
including high worker absenteeism rates as alternative jobs compete for their time 
(Alcázar and Andrade, 2001, Jaén and Paravisini, 2001). Donors may further exacerbate 
the fragmentation in the income received by health workers by providing programme-
related performance payments and per diems (Fox et al., 2013).  
The multiplicity and fragmentation of income streams has recently been referred to in 
the literature as the “complex remuneration” of workers (Bertone and Witter, 2015). 
Within a small sample of African doctors, Roenen et al. identified the receipt of 28 sub-
categories of sources of revenue from both medical and non-medical income-generating 
activities (Roenen et al., 1997), yet little published quantitative data describing this 
phenomenon is available (Mccoy et al., 2008, Witter et al., 2007, Bertone and Witter, 
2015). There is also little conclusive evidence on the effects of these different sources of 
income on health worker behaviour (Uzochukwu and Onwujekwe, 2005, Ditlopo et al., 
2011, Lindkvist, 2013, Stringhini et al., 2009). Yet, examining the incentive 
environments of health workers in such contexts is especially important given post 
conflict states tend to suffer from the worst health indicators globally (Bornemisza et 
al., 2010, Roome et al., 2014) and thus are in great need of improving the quality of 
health care provided by the workforce. Bertone and Witter (2015) have recommended 
as an area of further research that a more complete analysis of health worker incomes’ 
in these settings is needed in order to more fully understand health workers incentives’ 
and therefore devise more effective incentive packages. 
2.8 Strengthening state systems to remunerate workers 
In the immediate post conflict period, the state often requires external financial 
assistance as its own economy is likely to be unstable with limited ability to rapidly 
mobilise resources (Roome et al., 2014). Donors therefore play an important role in 
helping to rebuild health systems (Roome et al., 2014). However, they are often 
reluctant to invest in strengthening systems, favouring “quick fix” solutions such as 
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PBF, and differing agendas and priorities can result in a lack of coordination (Tulloch et 
al., 2011); in Sierra Leone, with respect to donor programming, the early years post 
conflict were often described as chaotic (Bertone et al., 2014). Governance in post-
conflict countries is also weak, with the likelihood of budget support being available to 
strengthen the system being low, causing a proliferation of vertical programmes1 and 
increasing the fragmentation of financing and services (Martineau et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, an increase in unregulated private sector practice is usually observed given 
the absence of functioning public sector systems and institutions (Bertone et al., 2018b, 
Roome et al., 2014). As described in section 2.7 above, this can lead to workers 
sourcing a multitude of alternative income sources, each of which may influence health 
worker accountabilities and incentives in different ways resulting in wide-ranging 
consequences for health worker motivation and performance (Bertone and Witter, 
2015). Another feature commonly observed in fragile states is the rapid deterioration of 
information on human resources for health used to inform the payroll. During the 
conflict period, a number of workers may have emigrated, died, retired, or changed 
employment. In a disrupted health sector where health worker information systems are 
not updated regularly, this leads to a phenomenon known as ‘ghost workers’, which are 
employees included in the payroll, but who no longer work at the institution where they 
are recorded. This results in pay being granted to inactive workers, limiting the 
government’s ability to pay new, active workers. Vested interests prohibit reform of the 
payroll; for example, corruption has allowed the proliferation of unofficial 
appointments, and many registered workers are now of retirement age but in the absence 
of a pension system, continue to receive either a salary and/or risk allowance instead. 
Another challenge to rebuilding the system is that the availability of large amounts of 
aid in the immediate post-conflict period can create a moral hazard, whereby 
governments are “insured” by donors for their actions and become less likely to pay 
health workers and transition away from this dependence, thus perpetuating weak 
leadership and accountability (Bräutigam, 2000, Wagstaff, 2004, Ooms et al., 2007). 
Donors therefore have a responsibility to work closely with government to create long-
term plans for graduating from aid to a situation of sustainable development. Censuses 
1 Vertical programmes are those relating to a single condition or small group of health programmes. 
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are often viewed as a preliminary step for generating information crucial to making 
necessary changes in public pay policy. In principle, they are able to distinguish those 
actually working from fictitious or ‘ghost’ workers on the staffing list of the relevant 
Ministry. In some countries, this information can be directly fed into the government 
payroll and have an immediate impact on the payment of salaries (Goldsmith, 2011, 
Simson, 2013). 
Frequently external resources from donors are channelled into improving Human 
Resource Information Systems (HRIS) using census data, as opposed to reforming the 
payroll itself which is more politically sensitive (Goldsmith, 2011). Although HRIS 
make it possible to improve workforce planning and the processing of payments 
(Ferrinho and Omar, 2006, Gilson and Erasmus, 2005, Perry, 2008), a recent review 
identified a lack of research on HRIS implementation and use of the data generated in 
decision-making over human resources (Riley et al., 2012).  
Nonetheless there is little evidence on how poorly functioning public sector wage 
systems can be strengthened in post conflict states. Most have been documented as case 
studies (Simson, 2013, Pavignani, 2011, Friedman, 2011), in the grey literature, and so 
don’t seek to systematically identify the different factors which would enable successful 
replication in another setting.  
2.9 Knowledge gaps 
In summary, various gaps in the literature have been identified. These include a lack of 
understanding of the complex financial environment in which health workers operate, 
particularly in fragile states where the state system to remunerate workers is inadequate 
and/or dysfunctional. In addition, health worker motivation is being increasingly studied 
in low- and middle-income countries (Borghi et al., 2017) as it is known to influence the 
practices and behaviours of health workers (Rowe et al., 2005), however it has not yet 
been studied in the DRC. Gaining an understanding of the drivers of motivation in post 
conflict states such as the DRC is particularly important given the challenges faced by 
workers as well as poor health outcomes experienced by the population in these 
settings.  
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The effects of withdrawing certain income sources on motivation has also not been 
explored in-depth in post-conflict states. This is important given the volatility of 
external funding relative to domestic sources. In particular, the effects of withdrawing 
PBF on motivation has been identified as a key area for future research given concerns 
about sustainability (Suthar et al., 2017, Paul et al., 2018a). Finally, given the state’s 
ability to remunerate its workers influences whether workers actively seek out 
alternative sources of income and/or if donor financing is required to fill a gap, evidence 
on successful interventions to improve government payments to workers becomes even 
more critical.  
2.10 Aim and objectives of this thesis 
This thesis aims to address each of the knowledge gaps identified above. The main 
objectives are summarised below: 
Objective 1: To describe and quantify the sources and levels of income for health 
workers in a sample of public sector facilities in the DRC.  
Objective 2: To develop and validate a scale to measure dimensions of motivation 
among health workers in the DRC, and compare differences in motivation among health 
workers where PBF has recently been removed with those who never received PBF.   
Objective 3: To undertake a process evaluation of a complex intervention aimed at 
facilitating government payments to health workers. 
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This chapter will begin with a brief overview of the DRC, including its geography, 
history and how it came to be a fragile state. The status of the population’s health, the 
health system and its workforce will then be described. This is then followed by a 
detailed description of the two DFID funded health care programmes (ATH and ASSP) 
within the context of which this research has been undertaken.  
3.2 Geography 
The DRC, previously known as Zaire, is the second largest country in Africa, with an 
estimated population of over 78 million (United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, 2017). Located in central Africa, it is bordered by nine countries: the 
Central African Republic and Southern Republic of Sudan to the north; Uganda, 
Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania to the east; Zambia and Angola to the south; and the 
Republic of Congo and Atlantic Ocean to the west (see figure 2). Up until late 2015, the 
DRC was made up of eleven provinces, but has recently been divided into 26 provinces 
following a decision to implement ‘découpage’ as foreseen in the 2006 Constitution. 
Kinshasa is the capital, and the official language is French, although other recognised 
national languages include Lingala, Kikongo, Tshiluba and Swahili. Just over 40% of 
the population live in urban areas, almost double the proportion compared to 50 years 
ago, indicating a trend of increasing urbanisation (Knoema, 2017). 
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Figure 2: Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
Source: (Encylopaedia Britannica, 2018). 
3.3 A fragile state 
A former Belgian colony, the DRC officially gained independence on the 30th of June, 
1960. Through a series of shifts in power, Joseph Mobutu became president in 1970, 
and quickly established a one-party state (Davis and Hayner, 2009). His rule, often 
referred to as a ‘kleptocracy’, was characterised by extreme economic exploitation and 
corruption; he gained significant notoriety internationally for having embezzled billions 
of dollars’ worth of aid, which led the DRC to becoming an almost bankrupt state 
(Solomon, 1997). 
The Rwandan exodus after the genocide in 1994 precipitated the First Congo War 
(1996–1997) (Ndikumana and Emizet, 2005), which was largely between a Rwandan 
political faction led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, and the existing Congolese regime under 
Mobutu. Mobutu was deposed in 1997, at which point additional African nations 
entered the Second Congo War, which became the largest war in the history of Africa. 
Although it officially ended in 2003, the war and its aftermath was estimated to have 
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caused over five million deaths by 2008 (Moszynski, 2008). Since the formation of a 
transitional government in 2003, the government has tried to stabilise the country 
(Vinck et al., 2008), however, active fighting in the country is still prevalent today.  
On account of the ongoing conflict and political instability, the DRC has the attributes 
of a fragile state, which refers to a low-income country characterised by weak state 
capacity and/or weak state legitimacy leaving citizens vulnerable to a range of shocks 
(Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2006). It is currently 
seventh on the fragile states index, which ranks countries according to twelve indicator 
scores pertaining to state vulnerability (Fund for Peace, 2018). 
3.4 Health indicators 
The DRC has many of the worst health indicators in the world. According to the most 
recent Demographic Health Survey in 2014, maternal mortality is 846/100,000 live 
births and the mortality rate for children under five is 104/1000 live births (United 
States Agency for International Development, 2014). Life expectancy is also very low, 
with women estimated to live on average 52 years and men 48 years (Population 
Reference Bureau, 2014).  Malaria is the leading cause of mortality and morbidity in the 
DRC, killing 1.2 million people every year (World Health Organization, 2015b). Ebola, 
cholera, malaria, and measles outbreaks are endemic. Forty three percent of children 
under the age of 5 suffer from moderate or severe stunting, as a result of chronic 
malnutrition (United States Agency for International Development, 2014).  
The table below provides some comparison of health indicators across provinces where 
the research for this thesis has been carried out, and how they compare to the national 
average. It shows that for the most part, health outcomes were worse in the sampled 
provinces compared to the DRC average; exceptions were Equateur for rates of stunting 
in children under five, and Province Orientale and Equateur for rates of anaemia 
amongst women of reproductive age. However, most provinces had a better than 
average rate of deliveries taking place in health facilities, apart from Equateur and Kasai 
Oriental. 
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Maniema Equateur Kasai 
Oriental 
Children under 
age five who are 
stunted2 (%) 
43 52 43 46 38 46 
Under-five 
mortality (per 
1000 live births) 
58 72 69 62 65 63 
Women age 15-
49 who are 
anaemic (%) 
38 47 37 50 35 41 
Births delivered 
in a health 
facility (%) 
80 84 83 88 60 72 
Data source: Demographic Health Survey, DRC, 2013-14 
3.5 The health system 
The DRC was once renowned in Africa for its network of clinics, quality of physicians, 
and the organisation of its primary health care (United States Agency for International 
Development, 2018). However, over the past three decades, the political and economic 
collapse of the country has led to a dramatic deterioration of the health system; hospitals 
and clinics lack personnel and equipment, and often run out of critical medicine and 
supplies (Kalisya et al., 2015).  
The following sections briefly describe the organisation of the DRC health system 
according to the six “building blocks” of health systems as defined by the World Health 
Organization and illustrated in figure 4 below (World Health Organization, 2007). 
These include: i) service delivery, ii) leadership/governance, iii) health information 
systems, iv) access to essential medicines, and v) financing. The final building block, 
the health workforce, will be considered separately and in more detail as it is the main 
area of focus of this PhD. 
2 Stunting is a marker of chronic malnutrition, characterised by a child having a low height for their age. 
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Figure 3: Six building blocks of health systems 
Source: (World Health Organization, 2010b). 
i) Service delivery
The health system has three levels of administration: the national level which 
corresponds with the Ministry of Health and defines national health policy; an 
intermediate level composed of provincial health departments and administrative health 
districts which is responsible for technical and logistic support; and a peripheral level 
which is the operational unit providing health care activities (World Health 
Organization, 2015a).  
At the peripheral level, the basic unit of the primary care health system is the health 
zone. A health zone is a defined geographical area with a population of between 
100,000 to 150,000 people, with urban areas more likely to have a higher population 
density than rural areas (Johnson and Stoskopf, 2010). In theory, each health zone 
should have a reference hospital providing services in the following fields: general 
medicine, paediatrics, obstetrics and gynaecology, emergency medicine, and surgery. 
Hospitals also provide other specialist services such as blood transfusions. Health zones 
are further divided into health areas which typically serve 10,000 to 15,000 people. 
According to the Ministry of Health Standards (Ministère De La Santé, 2012), each 
health area should have a health centre providing an essential minimum package of 
preventative (e.g. immunisation) and curative (e.g. malaria treatment) primary 
healthcare activities. Some of the health centres are termed reference health centres, the 
main difference being that reference health centres are equipped to carry out certain 
minor surgical operations while health centres are not. Occasionally, if there is no health 
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centre or reference health centre for a designated health area, there is a health post. 
Health posts are more similar to health centres but offer mainly curative primary 
healthcare services. They have often been created to serve populations in remote and 
less accessible areas (Ministère De La Santé, 2012), and so tend to be manned by fewer 
staff. The management of health facilities within each zone is overseen by a team of 
officials in a central health zone office.  
Overall, the coverage of basic public services is very limited and piecemeal, with 
substantial regional and rural/urban disparities (Newbrander et al., 2011). Health 
facilities are either owned by the state or by not-for-profit private actors (Muyembe et 
al., 2013). Faith-based organisations are major implementing agencies in the health 
sector, providing around 50% of health services (Olivier et al., 2015). 
ii) Leadership/governance
Weak leadership and poor governance explains much of the decline that has been 
observed in the health sector in recent years (Weijs et al., 2012).  The 2016-2020 Health 
Development Plan aims to provide a framework for health system reforms to overcome 
inefficiencies in the sector (Ministère De La Santé, 2016). However, today there 
remains a large gap between government policies and the reality on the ground. External 
investments in health from donors which are fragmented and uncoordinated can also 
sometimes undermine opportunities to build an effective and sustainable system.  
iii) Health information systems
The national health information system is known as the Système National 
d’Informations Sanitaires. However, routine information at the level of the health zone 
is often collected through a paper-based system, which inhibits the ability to assimilate 
data in a timely manner for strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation.  
iv) Access to essential medicines
The DRC has a national pharmaceutical policy, strategic plan, and essential medicines 
list. The Système National d’Approvisionnement en Médicaments Essentiels is the 
essential drug procurement agency and functions as a public-private partnership with 
support from the international community (Kohler et al., 2012). However, the regulation 
and supply of essential medicines to the health system remains weak; and, there is still 
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insufficient participation by development partners, who prefer to use their own supply 
chains. 
v) Financing
With government resources concentrated on the conflict in the East, little progress has 
been made on maintaining basic services such as primary healthcare (Weijs et al., 
2012). The proportion of the national budget allocated to health is very low; in 2013, 
public investment in health was only 4.5% of the national budget falling far short of the 
Abuja commitment of 15% (Secrétariat Général, 2013). The budget execution rate was 
also low, averaging only 50% between 2001 and 2011 (Ministère De La Santé, 2013). 
However, there are positive signs of health becoming more of a priority, with the 
allocation of the budget to health reportedly having increased to 8.6% in 2015 (United 
States Agency for International Development, 2016).  
Despite increases in budgetary allocations to health, providers still rely heavily on a 
system of cost recovery through user fees, which are prohibitive to the majority of the 
population who live in extreme poverty. While external assistance was the leading 
source of health financing between 2008 and 2013 and accounted for 40% of total 
health expenditure, out-of-pocket payments are the second largest at 39%, with less than 
15% coming from the government (Barroy et al., 2018).  
A system of reverse financial flows – sometimes referred to as “financement ascendant” 
or “la pompe” (Fox et al., 2013, Bertone et al., 2016) - has therefore developed whereby 
part of the user fees collected by health facilities is channelled to the district offices and 
from there to the intermediate and national administrative and governance levels (World 
Health Organization, 2015a). This practice has been declared illegal by the Ministry of 
Public Health, as the funds are only meant to be distributed amongst workers at 
facilities (Bertone et al., 2016). Furthermore, the system of user fee payments remains 
unregulated, with no accepted national tariff for consultations allowing facilities to have 
autonomy over the setting of tariffs.  
As described in chapter 1, section 1.4, donors have been providing workers with 
financial incentives, most notably in the form of PBF. There are several bilateral and 
multilateral donors in the DRC health sector; important agencies include: DFID, the 
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United States Agency for International Development, the World Bank, the European 
Union, the Global Fund, and Global Alliance for Vaccination and Immunisation (World 
Health Organization, 2015a). However, the provision of financial incentives is poorly 
coordinated amongst the donor community, and approaches used are often inconsistent 
(Fox et al., 2013). Figure 4 illustrates the plethora of donors operating in health in the 
26 provinces of the DRC. 
Figure 4: Map of donor programming in health in DRC (2017) 
Efforts have been attempted to encourage donor alignment. For example, in 2014, the 
Ministry of Health was requested to establish a harmonised system amongst donors for 
paying incentives. When this condition was not met, the Global Fund froze its incentive 
payments to workers, however these were reinstated only months later as it was risking 
the implementation of projects (Aidspan, 2016).  
3.6 The health workforce 
There is known to be great provincial variation in terms of poverty and the availability 
of staff and health services between the DRC provinces as illustrated in table 1, with the 
nursing cadre making up the majority of health workers in state health facilities. The 
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World Health Organisation recommends 23 doctors, nurses and midwives per 10,000 
population to achieve sufficient coverage of primary healthcare needs (World Health 
Organization, 2006). However, none of the sampled provinces or the national average 
meets this criterion in the DRC.  


































0.43 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.29 
*Poverty defined as living on less than 1 United States Dollar (USD) per day
†Information for state health facilities only (primary and secondary)
‡The category of nurses includes midwives
Data sources: (Direction Des Services Generaux Et Ressources Humaines, 2013, United
Nations Development Programme, 2009a)
Another key challenge relates to the payment of health workers, which is complex and 
fragmented. In the DRC, salaries for health workers were nominal following the 
economic crisis and conflicts during the 1990s, so in order to increase wages, 
occupational risk allowances or “primes de risque” were introduced (Verheijen and 
Mulumba, 2008). Occupational risk allowances are allocated to workers delivering 
clinical services, as they may be exposed to certain health risks (e.g. infectious diseases 
such as Ebola). The occupational risk allowances are managed by the Ministry of Health 
while salaries are controlled by the Ministry of Public Sector Reform. This system of 
dual payment has led to much confusion amongst health workers around what they 
should receive from the government, and has important implications for health worker 
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motivation and performance (Agyepong et al., 2004, Ferrinho et al., 2004, Mccoy et al., 
2008).
Few public sector health workers currently receive any government payments because 
of out of date payrolls and widespread corruption (Fox et al., 2013, World Bank, 2008). 
Part of the problem is due to new workers not being registered onto the payroll which is 
plagued by “ghost workers”, a phenomenon common to post-conflict states and 
described in chapter 2 (World Bank, 2008). Many workers have therefore either gone 
private, emigrated or become an employee of one of the international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) providing health care support (Murru and Pavignani, 2012). 
3.7 DFID health programmes in the DRC of relevance to the thesis 
This research was carried out within the context of two DFID funded health care 
programmes, which sought to tackle the remuneration of health workers among other 
initiatives to strengthen the health system.  Outlined below is a brief description of these 
two programmes and the context of their implementation.  Firstly, how both 
programmes affected the use of PBF and other health worker income sources are 
described.  Secondly, an intervention within the second programme seeking to improve 
the government system for health worker remuneration is described. Finally, more depth 
on the social, cultural and economic contexts of each sampled province is provided as 
well as a brief description of the characteristics of the study facilities.  
Programmes affecting health facility financing 
3.7.1 Introducing PBF: The Access to Healthcare Programme 2008-2013 
Between 2008 and March 2013, DFID provided funding towards a health systems 
strengthening programme called access to healthcare (ATH) in the DRC. ATH was 
implemented by International Rescue Committee and Medical Emergency Relief 
International, and supported health centres and hospitals to deliver a package of basic 
primary health services (which included both preventative and curative services) in 20 
health zones in the provinces of Kasai Occidental, Province Orientale, Maniema, and 
South Kivu, reaching approximately two and a half million inhabitants (Department for 
International Development, 2008). The interventions of ATH included: heavily 
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subsidising user fees in order to encourage uptake of services; training health workers; 
constructing and rehabilitating facilities; and providing free drugs and medical 
equipment to facilities. Fixed amounts of money were also paid to health facilities each 
month to cover running costs.  In an effort to improve retain and motivate health 
workers within facilities, DFID also introduced a PBF scheme, as few workers were 
consistently receiving any payment from the state. A fixed amount of 75 United States 
Dollars (USD) was provided to workers each month based on their attendance at health 
facilities, while an additional performance-based payment of 25 USD was allocated to 
workers if their facility attained a minimum score at its quarterly performance review. 
The criteria used to calculate this facility-based score are given in appendix 1.3 
Verification checks were carried out in facilities by the implementing partners to ensure 
reporting was robust.  
3.7.2 Removing PBF: Accès Aux Soins de Santé Primaire programme, 2013 
onwards 
Following the end of ATH in March 2013, DFID commenced a follow-on health 
systems strengthening programme called Accès Aux Soins de Santé Primaire (access to 
primary healthcare or ASSP) (Department for International Development, 2012). The 
NGO Interchurch Medical Assistance (IMA) was appointed as the lead implementing 
partner of this programme, and sub-contracted other NGO partners Caritas, World 
Vision and Santé Rurale to help implement the programme. ASSP continues to support 
many of the same interventions in the 20 health zones of ATH, namely: the treatment of 
infectious diseases, nutrition, obstetric and neonatal care; family planning; 
immunization; and water, hygiene and sanitation. It also extended support to a further 
36 health zones, including eleven zones in the province of Equateur and 25 zones in the 
province of Kasai Occidental (figure 5). In total, 56 health zones are now receiving 
support from ASSP, representing a population of almost 9 million. In addition, ASSP 
targeted zones where few other donors are implementing vertical or horizontal health 
initiatives. 
3 As one of the objectives of this PhD is to examine the effects of removing this payment on the 
motivation of health workers, the criteria for the facility-based score has been provided in appendix 1. 
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However, unlike ATH, ASSP does not include a PBF scheme. During the first year of 
ASSP, PBF (both the supplemental fixed payment and performance payment) to health 
workers was gradually phased out in the 20 health zones of the previous ATH 
programme, with all performance payments having ceased by March 2014.  
 
The approach to user fees in the ASSP programme was also different compared to ATH. 
On account of the removal of performance-based payments, user fees were no longer 
subsidised within previous ATH health zones. New user fee tariffs in all ASSP zones 
were decided locally by health providers and beneficiary committees with the help of 
health zone and provincial health authorities. More detail on these two programmes is 
provided in research paper 3 within chapter 6.  
 









Addressing national level systems for paying workers 
3.7.3 Intervention within ASSP to improve systems for paying workers 
In order to work on a sustainable approach to financing health workers, with DFID 
funding, IMA also piloted a human resources intervention in all of Kasai Occidental4  in 
an effort to facilitate government payments to health workers. IMA sub-contracted the 
technical partner IntraHealth to assist with the implementation of this pilot intervention.  
Broadly, the intervention involved two components. The first component involved 
undertaking a census of health workers, where information on legitimate workers would 
be recorded onto a Human Resources Information System (HRIS). This information 
would then be compared with the list of workers on the staff payroll and who are 
receiving a government occupational risk allowance. Following approval of the relevant 
Ministries, the information from the census would be used to update the lists with more 
accurate information on legitimate versus illegitimate workers. The salaries and risk 
allowances of several “ghost” workers would be reallocated to workers who should be 
receiving them. 
The second component involved assessing the staffing needs of health facilities using 
the Workload Indicator of Staffing Needs methodology (World Health Organization, 
2010a), in order to update guidelines from 2006 (Ministère De La Santé, 2006) on the 
normal numbers of staff required per facility. More detail on these components, which 
are the subject of a process evaluation within this thesis is provided in chapter 7. 
3.7.4 Social, cultural and economic contexts of sampled provinces 
Kasai Occidental 
Kasai Occidental is a land-locked province sharing a border with four other Congolese 
provinces: Bandundu to the west, Equateur to the north, Kasai Oriental to the east and 
Katanga to the southeast. It also shares an international border with Angola to its south. 
Kasai Occidental has two districts, Kasai and Lulua. Five million people live in this 
province, and the population density is the same as Kasai Oriental at approximately 28 
4 Kasai Occidental became subsequently known as Kasai and Kasai central following découpage on July 
16 2015 
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inhabitants per km2, which is the highest compared to the rest of the sampled provinces. 
Over half of the population is aged 15 years and under. The majority of the population 
is from the Lulua tribe who exclusively speak Tshiluba. The rest of the population is 
divided up amongst a dozen smaller ethnic groups with their own native language in 
addition to Tshiluba (United Nations Development Programme, 2009b).  
Although Kasai Occidental is rich in natural resources such as diamonds and gold, only 
a few companies control industrial concessions, while the majority of mining practised 
in the region is artisanal. Agriculture is practised by 77% of the population, yet most of 
this is subsistence farming with little investment in mechanised agriculture (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2009b). Rates of unemployment are high, with few 
job opportunities for educated young people. There are few vocational jobs aside from 
those within institutes and government offices in the main towns, and very few private 
sector businesses exist. The majority of households do not have electricity and only 7% 
have access to safe drinking water, while over a quarter do not have a toilet (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2009b). 
Province Orientale 
Province Orientale lies in the northeast of the country. It borders Equateur to the 
west, Kasai Oriental province to the southwest, Maniema to the south, and North 
Kivu to the southeast. It also borders the Central African Republic and South Sudan to 
the north, and Uganda to the east. The provincial capital is Kisangani. It has a 
population of over 8 million and population density of 16 habitants per km2 (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2009c). 
Compared to most other provinces, there is a fair degrees of heterogeneity in ethnic 
groups; with dominant ethnic groups smaller than elsewhere the province tends to 
attract domestic migrants to their relative economic opportunities (Secure Livelihoods 
Research Consortium, 2018).  
Since 2008, the north-eastern regions in Province Orientale, which lies in the northeast 
of the country, have been facing a guerrilla war of the Lord’s Resistance Army. This 
militia has killed more than 2,300 people and abducted more than 3,000 into slavery or 
forced recruitment (United Nations Refugee Agency, 2010). Even before the invasion of 
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the Lord’s Resistance Army, this province was among the least developed parts of the 
country. Basic infrastructure such as road networks, electricity supply, communication 
network coverage, and access to essential services such as health centres and hospitals 
are poor (Zarocostas, 2009). Less than 2% of the population have access to electricity or 
tap water (United Nations Development Programme, 2009c). However, the capital 
Kisangi is strategically placed at the junction of the Congo, Tshopo and Lindi rivers, 
making it the country’s major inland port after Kinshasa. The city is today an important 
centre of commerce, finance, industry, metallurgy, panning, real estate, hydro 
industries, agriculture, breweries, technology, culture, media, and arts. 
Maniema 
Maniema borders the provinces of Kasai Oriental to the west, Province Orientale to the 
north, North Kivu and South Kivu to the east, and Katanga to the south. Similar to 
Province Orientale, Maniema is sparsely populated compared to most other provinces; 
approximately two million people live in Maniema with a population density estimated 
to be 15 habitants per km2 (United Nations Development Programme, 2009d).
Maniema is populated only by the Bantu tribe which is composed of three ethnic groups 
according to anthropologists and historians (Congovirtual, 2020). Languages spoken 
include Tshiluba and Swahili. 
Agriculture remains the main activity of the province. Despite favourable conditions for 
diverse production, the population mainly cultivates staple foods like rice, plantain, corn 
and cassava using subsistence practices. The province also has important mineral 
potential, ranking fourth in position after Katanga, Province Orientale and Kasai 
Oriental provinces. Mineral resources include gold, diamond, cassiterite, coltan, 
malachite, iron, lead, manganese, platinum, and silver. 
Health indicators are better compared to most other provinces as shown in table 1. 
However, only 1.8% of households are connected to electricity compared to the national 
average of over 10% (United Nations Development Programme, 2009d). 
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Equateur 
Equateur is land-locked, but shares a border with three other Congolese provinces: 
Bandundu to the south, Kasai Occidental to the southeast, and Province Orientale to the 
east. It also shares two international borders with Central African Republic to the north 
and Republic of Congo to the west.  Equateur is the third-largest province in terms of 
surface area in the DRC; as such, it is sub-divided into five districts: Equateur, Tshuapa, 
Mongala, Sud-Ubangi, and Nord-Ubangi. The population of Equateur is similar to 
Kasai Occidental and is estimated at 5.8 million inhabitants but with a lower population 
density of 14 inhabitants per km2, well below the national average (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2009e). Again, a large proportion of the population is young; 
in 2005, more than half of Equateur’s population was under the age of 20 years (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2009e). The principal ethnic groups are the Bangala 
in the north, most of which are comprised of tribes which migrated centuries earlier 
from Chad and Sudan, and the Mongo and pygmies in the south (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2009e). 
The local economy in Equateur is comparable to Kasai Occidental; 76% of employment 
is in subsistence agriculture. The second greatest source of employment is the informal 
retail sector (16%) (United Nations Development Programme, 2009e) and there is 
minimal formal employment or private sector development.  
In Equateur, the last known poverty rate was 93.6% making Equateur the poorest 
province in the DRC .Only 1% of households enjoy access to electricity, and 6% have 
access to safe drinking water (United Nations Development Programme, 2009e).   
Kasai Oriental 
Kasai Oriental borders the provinces of Kasai Occidental to the west, Equateur to the 
northwest, Orientale to the northeast, Maniema to the east, and Katanga to the south. 
Kasaï-Oriental is one of the richest diamond producing regions in the world. The 
provincial capital is Mbuji-Mayi and the province is inhabited by members of 
the Luba tribe. 
Diamonds are the main resource mined in the province but production has reduced in 
recent years. Agriculture remains the principal activity but is often subsistence; there are 
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some industrial crops such as coffee and cotton but their production is poorly developed 
and has little significant impact on the economy of the province or household income.  
Similar to the other sampled provinces, less than 1% of households have access to 
electricity and over 27% drinking water from unprotected water sources (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2009f) i.e. sources with no barrier or other structure 
to protect the water from contamination. 
3.7.5 ATH facilities versus ASSP new/control facilities 
Some of the facilities sampled in the study included previous ATH facilities as well as 
new ASSP or non-ASSP health centre facilities. The ATH facilities usually had a 
superior infrastructure and were better resourced than the new ASSP or non-ASSP 
facilities on account of the rehabilitation which had taken place under previous DFID 
support. For example, they were more likely to have an electricity supply due to the 
provision of solar panels under the ATH programme. In contrast, other facilities 
sampled in the study tended to lack an electricity supply and buildings were generally 
very dilapidated. The photographs below provide a visual example of an ATH facility 
compared to a new ASSP facility sampled in the study.  
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Photographs of the exterior and interior of an ATH facility 
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Photographs of the exterior and interior of a new ASSP facility 
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This chapter describes the methods used to address the aim and objectives of this thesis 
as set out in chapters 1 and 2. Table 3 provides an overview of which methods were 
used to achieve each objective, and the corresponding papers. The rationale behind the 
choice of method used for each objective is discussed and then followed by a 
description of methods of sampling, data collection, analysis and timelines for the 
different studies. Finally, a conceptual framework clarifying what is being evaluated 
and how different programme interventions may influence motivation is presented. 
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Table 3: Objectives, methods and results papers 
Objective Methods Papers (context, methods and results outputs) 
1. To describe and quantify
the sources and levels of
income for health workers in
a sample of public sector
facilities in the DRC.
Qualitative interviews 
with nurses. 
Health worker and 
health facility survey.  
Research Paper 1: Maini R, Hotchkiss D, Borghi J. A cross-sectional study of the income sources of workers 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 2017.  
Status: Published in Human Resources for Health.  
Chapter: 5 
2. To develop and validate a
scale to measure dimensions
of motivation among health
workers in the DRC, and
compare differences in
motivation among health
workers where PBF has
recently been removed with




Health worker and 
health facility survey.  
Research Paper 2: Measuring the motivation of health workers: an analysis of methodological issues and 
lessons learnt 
Status: Submitted to Human Resources for Health. 
Chapter: 6 
Research Paper 3: What Happens When Donors Pull Out? Examining differences in motivation between 
health workers who recently had performance-based financing (PBF) withdrawn with workers who never 
received PBF in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
Status: Published in International Journal of Health Policy and Management 
Chapter: 6 
3. To undertake a process
evaluation of a complex
intervention aimed at
facilitating government
payments to health workers.
Qualitative interviews 
with key stakeholders. 
Theory of change 
workshops.  
Document review. 
Research Paper 4: Maini R, Mounier-Jack S, Borghi J. How to and how not to develop a theory of change for 
a complex intervention: reflections on an experience in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 2018. 
Status: Published in BMJ5 Global Health. 
Chapter: 7 
Research Paper 5: Performance-based financing versus improving salary payments to workers: insights from 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. 2018.  
Status: Published in BMJ Global Health. 
Chapter: 7 
Research Paper 6: A process evaluation of a complex health systems intervention to improve the payment and 
distribution of health workers: the need for systems thinking and an adaptive, politically-informed approach 
Status: Submitted to Implementation Science. 
Chapter: 7 
5 BMJ refers to the British Medical Journal family of publications 
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4.2 Rationale for study methods 
4.2.1 Choice of method for objective 1 
In this study, we used a health worker and health facility survey to obtain data on 
different sources of income and their amounts as both surveys were being undertaken as 
part of a larger baseline evaluation of the ASSP programme. Survey data were 
complemented by a series of qualitative interviews with health workers carried out by 
myself and a local researcher, and are described in more detail in section 4.4 below. 
Direct questioning was employed, however, measuring the remuneration of health 
workers can be challenging as certain sources of income may be sensitive, particularly 
informal revenues. It can therefore be difficult to obtain truthful responses. Alternative 
methods which could have been employed are discussed in detail below. 
A way of allowing respondents to answer sensitive questions truthfully is the 
Randomised Response Technique (RRT)  (Londino and Waung, 2004). It uses a 
randomization device, such as a coin flip, but the interviewer is blinded to the outcome. 
For example, the respondent may answer “yes” regardless of the truth if the coin comes 
up tails, and truthfully, if it comes up heads. By introducing random noise, this method 
helps to conceal an individual’s responses from the interviewer, thereby protecting their 
privacy (Blair et al., 2015). However, the RRT is less efficient than direct questioning 
as estimates need to be drawn from a large sample in order to maintain statistical power, 
and designs are also complex to administer (Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005). Another 
technique designed to overcome the high levels of non-response associated with 
sensitive income questions is by using income “brackets” (Paulin, 2003).  With this 
method, respondents are given the opportunity to provide an income range when they 
are unable or unwilling to give a specific value. The “unfolding” bracket technique asks 
respondents a series of yes/no questions designed to narrow down the respondent’s 
income range (Schwartz and Paulin, 2000). For example, a respondent may be asked: 
“Is your salary greater than $20,000/year?”. If the answer is positive, the interviewer 
may then ask: “Was it greater than $30,000?”. The conventional bracketing technique 
differs in that respondents are presented with a number of predetermined data ranges 
upfront. However, a limitation of the bracketing technique is that it leads to a loss of 
precision. Furthermore, the choice of starting values in unfolding brackets sequences 
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can lead to “anchoring bias” (Winter, 2002); which is when respondents think their 
answer should be closer to the presented starting value than they would have said had 
they not seen the anchor. Other studies have also found that a mixed method approach is 
useful in better understanding the level of each income and the perceptions and views of 
health workers on their different revenues (Akwataghibe et al., 2013, Mcpake et al., 
1999).  
Although RRT and bracketing would have helped to limit social desirability bias of 
responses in the health worker survey, the sample size requirements for analysis would 
not be adequate and complexity of administration meant that direct questioning would 
be easier to implement. 
4.2.2 Choice of method for objective 2 
Motivation is an internal psychological process which cannot be directly observed 
(Pinder, 2008). Measuring motivation can therefore be challenging, and as yet there is 
no “gold standard” method or approach.  
For this study, a mixed methods triangulation design to collecting data through a 
quantitative survey and qualitative interviews was selected in order to directly inquire 
about health worker motivation. Both methods, including the design and data collection 
and analysis methods are outlined in detail in section 4.4. Principles and approaches to 
measuring motivation as well as alternative methods to those used in this thesis are 
presented below.  
Irrespective of the method chosen, the first step is to conceptualise motivation, and there 
is an abundance of motivation theories to inform this as described in chapter 2. The 
choice of approach taken will be influenced by the research question (Borghi et al., 
2017). For instance, where the focus may be on measuring overall motivation, a 
unidimensional conceptualisation of motivation may be preferred; on the other hand, if 
the focus is on understanding the composition of motivation i.e. the different 
dimensions which may contribute to overall motivation, it may be conceptualised as 
being multidimensional. For this objective, the Franco framework of motivation (as 
described in chapter 2) was applied which identifies a range of motivational 
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determinants and consequences at the individual, organisational and societal level 
(Franco et al., 2002). 
Once a clearly defined conceptual framework for motivation has been selected, it can 
then inform the design of tools with which to measure motivation. Usually, either direct 
or indirect methods are applied (Borghi et al., 2017). Direct methods attempt to measure 
motivation itself, while indirect methods aim to measure those aspects which are 
affected by motivation. Surveys and qualitative methods can be used to measure 
motivation either directly or indirectly. Other indirect methods include experimental 
games (Camerer et al., 2011) and observations of behaviour (Leonard and Masatu, 
2010). 
An advantage of using surveys to measure motivation is that they can cover a large 
number of respondents compared to in-depth interviews alone, thus making conclusions 
more generalisable. In addition, surveys permit systematic and standardised 
comparisons. On the other hand, qualitative data provide rich, in-depth detail which 
cannot be captured by quantitative data. Therefore, more insights can be gained by 
combining quantitative and qualitative methods to provide a more expanded 
understanding of the issue under investigation (Creswell and Creswell, 2017). 
Nonetheless, both methods rely on self-report by respondents and such measures are 
subject to several errors, including response bias (Coolican, 2004) and attribution error 
(Kelley and Michela, 1980). 
Behavioural measures are often desirable as they enable researchers to quantify what 
workers do (Kanfer, 1990). However, a limitation of such measures is that motivation is 
often only a partial determinant of job performance (Kanfer et al., 1999). Specifically, 
motivation affects aspects of performance that can be brought under the worker’s 
personal command. For example, if facilities are poorly resourced, workers may be 
limited in their ability to accomplish their job for reasons beyond their control. Direct 
observation of health worker performance is also not practical on a large scale as data is 
time-consuming and resource-intensive to collect. Moreover, health workers may 
change their behaviour when they are being monitored (the Hawthorne effect) 
(Wickström and Bendix, 2000). 
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4.2.3 Choice of evaluation method for objective 3 
The last objective of this PhD was to undertake a process evaluation of a complex 
intervention aimed at facilitating government payments to health workers. Complex 
interventions are those which tend to have multiple components which act both 
independently and in conjunction with one another (Craig et al., 2008). A theory of 
change approach to the evaluation was chosen to understand whether implementation of 
the intervention occurred as intended and any factors affecting implementation, in order 
to better inform how the intervention may be replicated in other settings. This was 
achieved through: theory of change workshops, qualitative interviews with key 
stakeholders, and document reviews. The rationale for choosing this particular approach 
is expanded on below. 
In the past, evaluations of complex interventions have mainly assessed progress on 
achieving stated outcomes or impacts. In particular, randomised controlled trials have 
been regarded as a robust evaluation design for establishing the effectiveness of 
complex interventions (Moore et al., 2015, Campbell et al., 2000). However, this “black 
box” approach fails to explain how and why the intervention had certain effects, and 
limits understanding on how to successfully replicate it in a different setting (Pawson et 
al., 2005, Stame, 2004, Bonell et al., 2012).  
Process evaluations, on the other hand, determine the extent to which an intervention is 
implemented as intended (Carroll et al., 2007, Adam et al., 2012, Oakley et al., 2006b, 
Rychetnik et al., 2002). In so doing, they can distinguish between problems with 
interventions where the theory underpinning the intervention is incorrect (concept 
failure), or the implementation of the intervention is poor (implementation failure) 
(Oakley et al., 2006a). Early indication of such issues permits investigators to adapt the 
intervention as necessary, thus potentially limiting a waste of resources as well as 
increasing chances of intervention success (Hawe et al., 2004).  
Theory-based process evaluations start by clarifying the ‘programme theory’, which is 
how programme activities are understood to cause (or contribute to) outcomes and 
impacts. Two common types of theory-based evaluations are theories of change and 
realist evaluations (Pawson and Tilley, 1997).  
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The theory of change method is often used by the international development community 
to articulate the sequence of events linking activities, outcomes and context of an 
intervention (Green, 2000). It also explores the conditions and assumptions needed for 
the change to take place (Connell and Kubisch, 1998). It is best to develop the theory of 
change with other stakeholders in order to build consensus, as they often have different 
ideas on how an intervention should work (Weiss, 1995). Identifying the agendas, 
perspectives and influences of key individuals or groups through a stakeholder analysis 
can also yield valuable information on how stakeholders perceive the intervention and 
how their actions may moderate it (Brugha and Varvasovszky, 2000). The systematic 
documentation of the contextual environment is key as certain events may influence 
implementation (Adam et al., 2012); for instance, changes in political appointments 
may affect government buy-in and the effectiveness of implementation which could 
affect its impact. 
Realist evaluations are most appropriate for evaluating programmes that seem to work 
but the “where” and “for whom” is not well understood (Pawson and Manzano-
Santaella, 2012), and so assume that context makes a significant difference to 
programme outcomes. The approach differs from theory of change evaluations in that 
the theory is articulated through general conversations and interviews with a selection of 
stakeholders (Blamey and Mackenzie, 2007). It is often applied when evaluating 
programmes that have previously demonstrated mixed evidence of effectiveness, in 
order to understand how and why differences occur (Westhorp, 2014).  
Both theory of change and realist evaluations are concerned with understanding the 
theory of an initiative. Each approach requires that the intervention’s theory be used to 
inform the evaluation’s purpose and focus, and the key questions that it will address. To 
date, complex health systems interventions aimed at improving government payments to 
health workers have only been reported in the form of case studies (Goldsmith, 2011, 
Simson, 2013). Therefore, given there was little robust evidence on the effectiveness of 
this type of intervention, a theory of change approach was selected as the preferred 
evaluation method. 
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4.3 Epistemological approach to in-depth interviews 
Semi-structured, in-depth interviews were undertaken for each objective as they allow 
for an in-depth exploration of pre-defined topics (Green and Thorogood, 2013). The 
flexible nature of interviews also allowed the discussion of any new ideas or issues, 
whilst still ensuring that each interview covered comparable topics under each objective 
(Bernard, 2017). 
There are several different philosophical approaches to qualitative inquiry. Being clear 
about my own epistemological approach was important in understanding how the 
knowledge for the research undertaken for this thesis was produced. The underlying 
philosophy of the qualitative approach adopted in this thesis was that of “subtle 
realism”. Subtle realism is an important epistemological perspective within health care 
research (Duncan and Nicol, 2004). It posits that all theories about the world are 
grounded in a particular perspective and worldview, and all knowledge is partial and 
incomplete. However, it assumes there is an underlying reality that can be studied – a 
view which is rejected by anti-realists (Ayer, 1988).  
In essence, ‘subtle realism’ approaches attempt to represent reality from our perspective 
of it, rather than to attain ‘the truth’ (Mays and Pope, 2000). I acknowledge that in 
attempting to understand the remuneration and motivation of workers, there was a 
reliance on the participants’ own accounts of their practices, and the knowledge 
generated reflected the dynamic of the interview setting and both my characteristics and 
those of my research assistant’s. Consequently, reflexivity - where the role and 
perspective of the researcher in the research process is acknowledged – was considered 
throughout data collection and analysis (Primeau, 2003). More detail on how this was 
undertaken is provided under section 4.4.2 on qualitative data collection and analysis.  
4.4 Design, collection and analysis of data for objectives 1 and 2 
The design, collection and analysis of quantitative data for objectives 1 and 2 are 
described together in the following section, as the sources of data for these objectives 
were the same.   
76
Although quantitative data collection preceded qualitative data collection for objectives 
1 and 2, the overall design strategy used was concurrent triangulation, with mixing of 
methods occurring at the interpretive stage. Both quantitative and qualitative data were 
used to confirm or corroborate findings.   
4.4.1 Quantitative data for objectives 1 and 2 
Design of data collection tools 
The quantitative data for objectives 1 and 2 were derived from questions incorporated in 
health worker and health facility surveys. I helped to design and finalise both 
questionnaires which are included in appendices 2 and 3. These surveys were being 
conducted as part of a larger impact evaluation (before and after study) of the ASSP 
programme, which was measuring the programme’s effects on healthcare utilisation and 
health outcomes. Objectives 1 and 2 draw on the baseline study of this impact 
evaluation before ASSP was implemented.  
Objective 1: Questions on remuneration within the health worker survey were adapted 
from the Health Worker Incentive Survey, which was developed to collect data on 
health workers’ remuneration in Ghana, Indonesia and Burkina Faso (Ensor and Witter, 
2007). The survey identified income sources received and income levels for government 
payments (salaries, occupational risk allowances), performance payments and per diems 
from non-governmental partners, private clinical work, user fees from patients, informal 
payments,6 or “gifts”, allowances, and income from non-clinical activities. Workers 
were also asked whether government payments were received on time, if there were 
delays receiving these payments, and amounts received compared to expectations. 
Income levels were recorded in Congolese Francs. Recall was for “last month received” 
for all incomes with the exception of per diems which was for the “last year”.  
Objective 2: 47 questions on motivation within the health worker survey had already 
been selected by the principal investigators of the evaluation based on previous surveys 
they had been involved in which were conducted in other countries (Khan et al., 2013, 
Banteyerga et al., 2010, Hansen et al., 2008). These questions were grounded in the 
6 Informal payments are defined as payments made by patients which are outside of official channels 
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Franco conceptual framework of motivation described in chapter 2, (Franco et al., 2002, 
Franco et al., 2004) given its extensive use in other low- and middle-income countries. 
Answers were to be provided on a five-point response scale ranging from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree.  
A month prior to finalisation of the survey, I had the opportunity to review, modify and 
add questions to the tool as needed. A rapid review of the motivation literature was 
undertaken and further questions which were relevant to the Franco framework selected. 
In order to ensure questions were relevant to the context, all questions relating to 
motivation were discussed with partners implementing ASSP.  Eleven additional 
questions were eventually added so as not to overburden the survey, making a total of 
58 questions.  A not applicable option was also added to the Likert scale for certain 
questions which may not have applied to all workers, in order to mitigate against any 
missing responses. A list of questions and the final dimensions relating to the Franco 
framework used in the survey can be found within the research paper in chapter 6 and 
appendix 2.  
Relevant to both objectives were a set of explanatory variables key to understanding the 
determinants of income and motivation measured within the health worker and health 
facility surveys.  Appendix 1 of research paper 1 and supplementary file 3 of research 
paper 3 refer to the global evidence which led to the selection of these explanatory 
variables, which included demographic data from health workers and certain 
characteristics of health facilities. Demographic data from the health worker survey 
included: age, sex, cadre, marital status, educational attainment, number of years in 
current position, and number of financial dependents. From the health facility survey, 
relevant explanatory variables included: provincial location, urban-rural status, the total 
number of staff present on the day, facility type, distance of the facility from the village, 
and the number of primary healthcare services provided. A unique facility identifier also 
enabled linking of the health worker survey to the health facility survey. With respect to 
objective 2, facility exposure to PBF was also measured as the motivation of workers 
who had experienced PBF withdrawal was going to be compared with workers who had 
never received PBF; in other words, those who had been working in ATH areas prior to 
ASSP constituted a previous PBF group, while workers who had not been covered by 
the ATH programme constituted the non-PBF group.  
78
Pre-testing of Tools 
Tulane University subcontracted the Kinshasa School of Public Health (KSPH) to 
conduct the pre-test of tools, carry out training, supervise facility and health worker data 
collection and enter the data for the baseline evaluation of ASSP. 
Once the survey questions had been finalised, the tool was translated into French and a 
pre-test of the entire health worker and health facility survey was conducted over 4 days 
by the KSPH team with heads of facilities and health workers in two non-study primary 
healthcare facilities nearby in Kinshasa and Bas-Congo. The purpose of the pre-test was 
to identify questionnaire problems, assess non-response rates, test the consent form and 
estimate the length of time to administer the survey. Following the pre-test, only minor 
changes to the phrasing of two motivation questions within the health worker survey 
were made to make them clearer to respondents. The only changes made to the health 
facility survey was modifying the ordering of questions, so that questions relating to 
infrastructure which required an assessment against an inventory were addressed last.  
Sampling of health facilities and health workers 
The sampling frame included all facilities in provinces covered by ASSP with the 
exception of South Kivu, as the programme was in the process of exiting this province 
(figure 6). Three survey domains were defined: Province Orientale and Maniema were 
combined to make one survey domain, Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental was 
another, and Equateur constituted its own survey domain. It was more efficient to 
combine certain provinces into one domain on account of the way health zones were 
clustered under ASSP. 
The sample size for the health facility survey was derived from the household survey 
sampling approach for the ASSP evaluation.  Therefore, no specific sample size 
calculation was carried out for the facility or health worker survey as main outcomes for 
the evaluation were being measured within the household survey. The first step within 
each survey domain was to use probability proportional to size to sample villages in 
areas supported by ASSP, also known as “intervention” sites. “Control” sites where 
ASSP was not operating, were then matched with intervention sites by geographic 
location (urban/rural and provincial location) and village population size. The health 
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facility officially designated to serve households for a selected village was then chosen 
for the facility survey.  
For each survey domain, data were collected from 35 ASSP-supported facilities 
(intervention sites) and 35 facilities where ASSP was not operating (control sites). 
Therefore, in total 210 health facilities were sampled. The inclusion criteria for facilities 
were those which were public primary care facilities; secondary care or private health 
facilities were excluded. For the health facility survey, the head of the facility was 
interviewed on the day of the survey. All health workers on duty in a selected health 
facility on the day of the survey were interviewed using the health worker survey.  
Figure 6: Survey domains for ASSP impact evaluation 
Training and data collection 
Twelve data supervisors were first recruited, many of whom had recently worked on the 
last Demographic Health Survey and so were well versed in undertaking large-scale 
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surveys. They were trained over 7 days in Kinshasa by the study coordination team 
from Tulane University and the KSPH. 
A total of 121 data collectors were then hired; all of them came from each of the 
provinces to be sampled in order to ensure familiarity with the cultural context. Again, 
priority was given to data collectors who had been involved in the recent Demographic 
Health Survey while remaining data collectors were recruited based on their previous 
experience of working on KSPH data collection projects. Given the large geographical 
areas to be covered by the surveys, training of 11 days duration was conducted 
concurrently across four different sites by data supervisors as well as members from 
Tulane University and the KSPH. In order to ensure consistency, the same training 
materials, presentations and exercises were used in each site. I helped to oversee the 
training of data collectors in Equateur province.  
During April to May 2014, the health worker and health facility surveys were conducted 
within each of the three survey domains described above (appendices 2 and 3 
respectively). Consent was obtained from all participants prior to undertaking each 
survey using the consent form in appendix 4, and interviews were conducted in a private 
room of the facility or outside to maintain confidentiality. Section 4.7 provides detail on 
the ethical approvals sought for the study. 
Data Entry 
Following data collection, twenty data entry clerks were recruited by the KSPH to 
process questionnaires. Ten were assigned for the verification and coding of the 
questionnaires and ten were assigned for data entry. There was a supervisor for 
verification and coding and another one for data entry. The Census and Survey 
Processing System software was used to enter data from the health facility and health 
worker surveys into separate databases. Data were double entered by separate 
individuals to minimise data entry errors.  Coding consistency was verified by myself 
and inconsistency across coding groups was documented due to the absence of a pre-
agreed code-book for the questionnaires. I subsequently developed a code-book with the 
Tulane University team which I then applied to consistently code and clean the data. 
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Data Analysis 
Objective 1: Data were analysed in Stata 13. Income data were collected in Congolese 
Francs and converted into USD using the current exchange rate at the time of analysis.7 
Grubb’s test (Grubbs, 1950) was applied to detect outliers in the income data, which 
were removed prior to analysis. Descriptive statistics were then generated for health 
worker characteristics, whether workers received a given income source, the frequency 
of receipt of government payments and in comparison to expectations, and the mean and 
median amount of each income source received.  Logistic regressions using maximum 
likelihood estimation were run to examine the facility and health worker characteristics 
associated with receiving a given income source and linear regressions were run to 
identify the factors determining the level of income received, measured as the log of 
income. Individual health worker characteristics included: age, marital status, sex, 
health worker cadre, education, years worked in position, and the number of financial 
dependents. Facility level factors included: provincial location of the facility, urban-
rural status, facility type, number of staff present on the day of the survey, distance of 
the facility from the nearest village, and the number of primary healthcare services 
offered. Presence of the ASSP programme was included as an explanatory variable in 
all of the models. I also examined whether receipt of certain income sources affected the 
receipt of others by including them as explanatory variables in regression models.  For 
example, when examining the determinants of receiving user fees, receipt of any 
government payment was included as an explanatory variable. 
For each regression model, a general to specific regression specification method was 
used whereby explanatory variables were excluded from the regression in a stepwise 
manner if the probability that the coefficient on that variable was zero was greater than 
or equal to 0.10 – as indicated by the F-statistic (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). All 
regression analyses were performed excluding any missing values (list-wise deletion) 
and standard errors were clustered at the health facility level. Multiple imputation of 
missing values was not applied as only five variables had missing data and this was less 
than 4%. Regression diagnostics for each model were also applied and adjustments 
7 Exchange rate as of 26 June 2015 using forex (foreign exchange) currency converter: 923 Congolese 
Francs to 1 USD.  
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made to produce unbiased coefficients. These are described in appendix 2 of research 
paper 1.  
Objective 2: Data were analysed in Stata 13 and R 3.4.2 statistical software. Descriptive 
statistics were used to explore the demographic characteristics of health workers and 
facility characteristics overall, while differences in characteristics between the previous 
and non-PBF groups were assessed using Chi-squared and t-tests for binary/categorical 
and continuous variables respectively. As explained above, workers in the previous PBF 
group were those who had been exposed to ATH, while non-PBF workers were those 
who had not been exposed to ATH; the latter non-PBF group included workers covered 
by ASSP as well as those working in non-ASSP or “control” health zones. Given the 
ASSP programme had not fully commenced implementation when sampling occurred, 
amalgamating these two groups enabled a larger sample for comparison against the 
previous PBF group. 
With regards to measuring motivation, psychometric item analysis, examining item 
distributions, summary statistics, and correlation patterns, was undertaken in Stata 13 
for both the overall sample and the previous PBF and non-PBF subgroups. Items which 
clearly did not correspond well with the other items pertaining to their intended 
dimension i.e. had low loadings or were loading on other dimensions, were dropped.  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was chosen to validate the motivation scale, and 
confirm the initial hypothesis on the underlying dimensions of motivation as related to 
the Franco framework (Franco et al., 2002) and specified in table 1 of research paper 3; 
these included dimensions at the individual, organisational and community levels, as 
well as behavioural outcomes. Prior to factor analysis, in the few cases where one or 
several individuals missed a response to an item, missing responses were replaced by 
imputation of the median value of their responses to other items pertaining to the same 
dimension. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test was also applied to determine the factorability 
of the data, with a value exceeding 0.5 deemed acceptable (Field, 2009). CFA using a 
robust maximum likelihood estimator was then executed in R software using the lavaan 
package (Rosseel, 2012). During CFA, some of the items relating to certain dimensions 
had to be dropped as they did not correlate well, meaning their scores were not similar 
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to one another (see supplementary table 2 in research paper 3). The final dimensions 
and associated items are presented in table 4 below. 
Table 4: Final motivation dimensions linked to Franco framework and associated 
items 







I am confident about my ability to handle my work 
I effectively cope with any new challenges that occur 
in my work life 
At work you can always depend on me 
My work is always of high quality 
I am a hard worker 
I always arrive on time to work 
I spend my time at work on work-related activities 
I am careful not to make mistakes at work 
When I am not sure how to treat a patient’s condition I 
look for information or ask for advice 
I do things which need to be done without being asked 
or told 
Pride This facility has a good reputation in the community 
It is a source of pride to work here 
I feel I am doing something important in this work 








Training How do you rate your opportunities to upgrade your 
skills and knowledge? 
How do you rate your ability to put into practice what 
you have learned from training?  
How do you rate how you and your colleagues are 
chosen to attend training? 
I have received sufficient training to do my job well 
Tasks How do you rate the description of your job role and 
tasks? 
How do you rate satisfaction with your workload? 
How do you rate the division of work between you and 
your colleagues? 
How do you rate the division of work between caring 
for patients and other tasks? 




How do you rate the availability of medicines in the 
health facility? 
How do you rate the availability of equipment in the 
health facility? 
How do you rate the availability of medical supplies in 
the health facility? 
Income 
reflects effort 
The effort that we at this facility put into this job is 
reflected in our pay 
My job offers adequate pay compared with similar jobs 
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The income I receive is a fair reflection of my skills, 
knowledge and training 
Sufficiency of 
income 
The income that I receive from working at this facility 
more than covers my basic needs such as food, 
transport, and accommodation 
Organisational 
culture  
How do you rate your working relationships with 
upper-level staff? 
How do you rate your working relationship with 
colleagues? 
How do you rate the transparency of the management 
of financial resources by the facility? 
How do you rate your participation in decision-making 





How do your rate your relationship with local leaders 





I intend to leave this facility as soon as I can find 
another position 
Scores for each dimension were then calculated as unweighted means of responses to 
items within each dimension, as within each dimension, item loadings were of 
approximately the same magnitude. Multiple OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) regression 
models were used to test for significant differences in motivation scores between 
workers from the non-PBF group and workers in the previous PBF group, controlling 
for health worker and facility characteristics including: age, gender, health worker 
cadre, education, years worked in current position, location, type of facility, and 
presence of the ASSP programme. The dependent variable was the score on each 
dimension. Standard errors were clustered at facility level and OLS assumptions 
checked using regression diagnostics as performed in objective 1.  
Dimensions measured with more than one item were also tested for measurement 
invariance across both PBF groups. Measurement invariance testing was undertaken to 
assess whether the motivation scale had the same measurement properties (scores and 
variances) in a sample of health workers which had been previously exposed to 
performance-based financing (PBF), compared to those who had never received PBF. 
Confirming that the motivation scale exhibits the same measurement properties in 
different groups means that their scores can be reliably compared. Given workers who 
had previously received PBF were not distributed at random and worked in a relatively 
small defined geographical area; this meant relatively fewer of these workers were 
eventually sampled. To avoid having an unbalanced sample for measurement invariance 
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testing, the previous PBF group was tested alongside a random sample of workers not 
exposed to PBF.  
4.4.2 Qualitative data for objectives 1 and 2 
Design and piloting of interview guides 
Interviews were undertaken face-to-face using a semi-structured guide, which was first 
translated into French and then independently back-translated into English to check for 
consistency with the original tools. The guide was then pre-tested in a primary health 
centre in Kinshasa with two nurses before being finalised. For objective 1, interviews 
examined the sources and amounts of income, and factors influencing their receipt. For 
objective 2, perceptions and differences in the pre-identified dimensions of motivation 
were explored between the previous PBF and non-PBF groups. Interviews started with 
an explanation of the interview purpose, reassurance on confidentiality and seeking of 
respondents’ written informed consent (see appendices 5a and 5b for the consent form 
and interview guide respectively). 
Sampling and collection: 
Qualitative research was carried out in November 2014 in four health zones supported 
by ASSP in the province of Kasai Occidental that were not included in the survey. Four 
health zones were purposively selected: two health zones where workers had previously 
received PBF under the ATH programme, as well as two health zones where workers 
had never received PBF. Two public health centres in each health zone that were easily 
accessible by road were then chosen by the researchers.  Two nurses (one female and 
one male) were purposively selected from each health centre on the day of the 
interview, making a total of 16 nurses. Nurses were selected on the basis that they had 
been working at the same health facility for at least 1 year. Workers identified for 
interview in the non-PBF group were excluded if they had previously received PBF 
over the past 5 years. In-depth interviews were conducted in French by myself and a 
male local researcher who had qualified as a medical anthropologist, and was familiar 
with the local context. Interviews were undertaken between participants and 
interviewers in a private room of the health facility and audio-recorded upon gaining 
respondent consent. At the outset, consent was gained to record all interviews and 
rapport established by interviewers asking some general questions about the reasons 
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why participants had chosen nursing as a career. Interviews lasted between one to two 
hours. Demographic data including age, sex, PBF status of the facility, urban-rural 
status, nursing grade and number of years working in the facility were collected for each 
respondent. No nurses refused to participate in the study and no repeat interviews were 
required.  
Data analysis 
I took several steps during fieldwork and analysis to maximise the reliability of the 
study. These included: taking careful notes during non-participant observation and 
during interviews; typing up notes immediately to ensure accuracy; and reviewing 
each interview transcription to ensure accuracy.  
The local researcher transcribed audio recordings of the interviews into French.  
As transcripts were faithfully transcribed from audio-recordings, they were not returned 
to nurses for comment or correction. I then checked each transcript against the original 
recording and subsequently translated them all into English. Data were managed using 
NVivo 108 software. For both objectives, a coding system was developed by myself 
based on initial research themes, with deductive coding based on concepts measured in 
the quantitative analysis as codes (the interview guide in appendix 5b provides the 
questions and themes explored). Inductive coding was also employed to allow the 
framework to evolve as interviews were analysed. Thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 
2006, Boyatzis, 1998) was then applied after the coding process to aggregate similar 
codes into major concepts or themes.  
The application of the coding system was undertaken by both myself and the local 
researcher independently. We then met for an analysis session which involved 
discussing the themes generated. Any differences in interpretation were resolved 
through detailed discussion. Participant feedback on the findings was not actively 
sought but a summary of the findings from the study were disseminated to health zones 
by the implementing partners at the end of the programme. 
8 NVivo is a qualitative data analysis computer software package 
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Reflexivity 
From the outset, I was conscious that I needed to reflect on my own personal 
characteristics and perceived identity in the field. Having qualified as a medical doctor 
and specialised in public health, I could relate to an extent on a professional level to the 
participants of the study. However, being from a developed country often meant that 
respondents – mainly nurses interviewed for objectives 1 and 2 –initially assumed that I 
worked for a donor or NGO. Once I had carefully explained my position as an 
independent researcher as well as our strict code around maintaining confidentiality of 
their responses, this seemed to reduce the likelihood of social desirability bias of 
responses as there was a concern that complaining to an external partner could result in 
withdrawal of support. Occasionally, there were circumstances where I acknowledged 
that my presence was perhaps inhibiting respondents as I was still regarded suspiciously 
being a foreigner; in those instances, I trusted my fellow research assistant who had 
over ten years of experience in undertaking interviews with medical professionals in the 
DRC, to undertake the interview in my absence and then followed-up with him 
afterwards. 
4.5 Design, collection and analysis of data for objective 3 
Design: Conceptual framework and theory of change  
The process evaluation of the intervention to facilitate government payments to workers 
under objective 3 focused on measuring implementation fidelity, potential moderators 
of implementation, including contextual factors supporting or impeding progress.  The 
assessment of implementation fidelity was based on a framework of implementation 
fidelity developed by Carroll et al. (Carroll et al., 2007) which seeks to identify the 
extent to which the intervention had been implemented as planned (implementation 
adherence) by measuring its coverage, execution and duration (figure 7). Potential 
moderators of implementation of the intervention identified in the framework were also 
examined; these included: participant responsiveness, which measures to what extent 
participants respond to, or are engaged by, an intervention; facilitating strategies, which 
are measures put in place to optimise the level of fidelity achieved, and; contextual 
factors external to the intervention which may have acted as either barriers or 
facilitators to implementation.  
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Figure 7: Caroll's framework of implementation fidelity 
Source: (Carroll et al., 2007). 
Data sources and tools for the process evaluation were informed by a theory of change 
for the intervention. The theory of change was developed during two stakeholder 
workshops facilitated by myself in October and November 2014. Prior to undertaking 
these workshops, I attended a one-day training course at the Wellcome Trust on how to 
develop a theory of change with stakeholders. The theory of change workshops were 
attended by those directly involved in implementing the intervention. Stakeholders 
included representatives from: IMA WorldHealth, DFID, Intrahealth, and government 
officials from the DRC Ministries of Health, Public Service, Finance and Budget. 
Reflections on the process and lessons learned from the experience of running theory of 
change workshops to inform a process evaluation of a complex intervention are 
described in research paper 4 within chapter 7. 
Data sources 
The process evaluation relied on two main data sources: a document review and in-
depth interviews as outlined below.  
Document review 
Information on the execution, coverage and duration of intervention activities was 
obtained from relevant project documents: ASSP quarterly progress reports to DFID 
which required IMA to summarise all activities undertaken by Intrahealth, Intrahealth 
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reports and presentations to IMA and DFID, and minutes of any meetings held between 
Intrahealth, IMA, DFID and government Ministries.  
Documents for analysis were identified through regular monthly meetings between 
myself and Intrahealth. Completeness was ensured as Intrahealth had to ensure all of its 
activities were documented in the quarterly reports as part of their sub-contract with 
IMA.   
Specifically, quantitative data relating to the health worker census was collected by six 
trained four-person teams consisting of Ministry of Health and IntraHealth personnel. 
These teams aimed to identify health workers in each health zone in person. Health 
workers were requested to present themselves to data collection points with relevant 
supporting documents regarding their education and employment. The census teams 
then compared names against the lists of health workers available. When health workers 
who were not on the list showed up for interviews, the identity of the health worker was 
sought from their direct supervisor and/or the health zone’s chief medical officer. The 
data collection teams also carried out rigorous data quality checks on a daily basis, 
including physically reviewing presented documents and comparing uploaded data 
against existing health worker records. A second round of data collection and 
verification was held to provide health workers who had missed the first visit with a 
final opportunity to present themselves for inclusion in iHRIS. Health workers who 
could not be located or confirmed after these two attempts or who presented improper 
documentation (including falsified documents) were excluded from iHRIS. Data was 
subsequently triangulated with the Ministry of Finance’s payroll system using in-house 
software to compare names.  
I was not granted access to the iHRIS data underpinning the analysis nor the payroll 
data, so was unable to determine the accuracy and validity of reported information. 
Therefore, a limitation was that I had to rely on the implementing partners providing 
factually correct information. 
Key informant interviews 
The purpose of interviews was to record fidelity of intervention implementation with 
respect to intervention execution, coverage and duration, against the developed theory 
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of change. The influence of moderating factors such as participant responsiveness and 
context was also examined as well as any wider unintended consequences of the 
intervention. We conducted three rounds of semi-structured interviews with a range of 
stakeholders (see table 5).  
Table 5: List of stakeholders interviewed and rationale for their selection during 







Rationale for interviewing 
Intrahealth 2 Non-governmental organisation responsible for 
implementing the technical aspects of the 
intervention. 
IMA Worldhealth 3 Lead implementing partner of ASSP 
DFID 2 Funding the ASSP programme 
World Bank 1 Previous involvement in civil servant censuses, and 
in implementing governance strengthening 
programmes in the DRC. 
Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency 
2 Involved in programmes to strengthen Human 
Resources for Health in the DRC. 
DRC Ministry of 
Health (central and 
provincial levels) 
3 In charge of administrative management of health 
personnel and the list of workers receiving 
occupational risk allowance payments. 
DRC Ministry of 
Public Sector Reform 
(central and provincial 
levels) 
3 Charged with recruitment and management of civil 
servants, including the list of workers to receive 
payment of salaries. 
DRC Ministry of 
Budget 
(central and provincial 
levels) 
3 In charge of validating any payroll expenditure 
(both salaries and occupational risk allowances). 
DRC Ministry of 
Finance 
(central and provincial 
levels) 
3 Ministry responsible for releasing the payment 
order (for salaries and occupational risk 
allowances).  
Health zone workers 2 Beneficiaries of the intervention. 
As can be seen from table 5, interview participants included those involved in the initial 
theory of change workshop and others either involved in, able to influence, or benefit 
from the intervention, and were also identified at different levels of the health system. 
Most were recruited and selected following preliminary discussions with implementing 
partners with the purpose of giving a range of views from each agency.  
To mitigate against a biased representation of true stakeholder groups, all respondents 
were asked if there were any other stakeholder who should be interviewed as part of the 
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process; six stakeholders within each of the existing organisations were identified in this 
way. Therefore, a purposive sampling approach with some snowball sampling was 
employed.  
The first two rounds of interviews occurred during execution of the intervention in order 
to capture any dynamic changes in implementation; the first round was between January 
to February 2015 and the second round took place between April and May 2016. The 
last round was conducted in March 2018, once most of the intervention activities had 
been completed. A total of 24 different participants were interviewed, some of whom 
had repeat interviews at different rounds of data collection. 
I undertook the interviews alongside another male local medical anthropologist with 
over 15 years of experience of interviewing health workers in the DRC. All interviews 
were face-to-face and started with an explanation of the interview purpose, reassurance 
on confidentiality and seeking of respondents’ written informed consent. None of the 
interviewees declined to participate and interviews were undertaken in a private room to 
maintain confidentiality. On gaining consent, all but one stakeholder agreed to be audio-
recorded (see appendices 6a-c for consent form and interview guides). In some cases, I 
already knew the interviewees but in instances where I was meeting the interviewee for 
the first time, I established rapport at the outset by asking them general questions about 
what they thought about the ASSP programme and how it affected their day to day role. 
Interviews varied between 45 minutes to one and half hours in duration and were 
conducted either in French or English according to the language preference of the 
interviewee. Demographic data of respondents was not collected but field notes 
capturing any relevant observations as well as my own personal reflections on the 
experience of interviews were taken.  
Data analysis 
Depending on the interviewee, audio recordings were transcribed in French or English 
by the local researcher and myself (each of the researcher’s first languages respectively) 
to maximise accuracy. I then reviewed all transcripts and managed the data using NVivo 
10 software. As transcripts were faithfully transcribed from audio-recordings, they were 
not returned to stakeholders for comment or correction. 
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I was the only researcher coding the transcripts for this study, and developed and 
applied codes using the framework by Carroll et al. (2007) as the main deductive 
framework. The theory of change was also used to guide coding, providing the basis to 
compare whether activities planned under the intervention had been executed as 
intended, and whether consequences of the intervention had been anticipated or not. 
Interviews were coded iteratively at each round so that themes emerging in early 
interviews could also be explored in later ones.  
Overall feedback from stakeholders on the findings of this study was positive during a 
meeting in September 2019 between DFID, IMA, Tulane University, the DRC Ministry 
of Health and other donors. All agreed the results were useful in understanding the 
process of implementation and where lessons could be learnt. 
Reflexivity 
Given the research I was undertaking belonged to a portfolio of studies agreed by the 
ASSP programme, I was afforded easy access to key stakeholders to be interviewed, 
including government. However, I also acknowledged that this would influence how 
stakeholders discussed the successes and challenges under this objective; external 
partners may have an optimism bias around the potential success given they were either 
commissioning or implementing it, while government may not have been as 
forthcoming around the political issues. 
4.6 Chronology of intervention implementation and data collection 
Figure 8 below provides an overview of the timing of implementation of interventions 
and data collection. 
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Figure 8: Time-frames for interventions and data collection 
4.7 Conceptual framework 
I have developed a conceptual framework which identifies the different components of 
ATH and ASSP and how they may influence health worker motivation (figure 9). Red 
boxes indicate interventions in previous ATH zones, green boxes indicate interventions 
in new ASSP zones, and blue boxes describe interventions happening in all ASSP 
zones.  
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Similar to Franco’s framework, it illustrates that factors at the individual, 
organisational, community and health system levels directly affect health worker 
motivation (Bennett, 2000, Franco et al., 2002), which in turn influence health worker 
performance. Sources of revenue received by workers to make up their total income 
originate at the organisational, community or health system level. The phasing out of 
PBF will affect workers’ motivation at the organisation level whereas an intervention to 
strengthen government payments will be operating from a health policy reform level. In 
this thesis, the phasing out of PBF and its effects on motivation is specifically being 
evaluated; the effects on motivation of all other sources of revenue including improving 
government payments and the changes in user fees is not. However, the conceptual 
framework recognises that all of these financial incentives will likely affect the extrinsic 
motivation of workers. The dotted line represents any potential interaction between 
extrinsic and intrinsic factors affecting individual worker motivation.  
Finally, although also not measured within this thesis, the framework recognises that 
performance is also mediated by the availability of resources in the work environment, 
and the competence and skills of the worker (Rowe et al., 2005). 
Figure 9: Conceptual framework for research 
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4.8 Ethical considerations 
To ensure confidentiality, all data were stored under lock and key or password protected 
computers. Only key personnel and data managers had access to collected data. The use 
of unique identifiers further ensured that no data were directly linked to individuals.  
Obtaining consent from participants was an important part of the ethics process in this 
research study. Prior to data collection, all researchers undertook Research Ethics and 
Compliance training run by the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative Program 
(Braunschweiger and Goodman, 2007). 
During data collection, the study team obtained oral informed consent from each 
research participant as well as provided contact information to each participant. The 
consent procedures followed those that are approved by the Ministry of Health and 
institutional review board of Tulane University (appendix 7) and KSPH (appendix 8). 
Ethical approval was also granted by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine (appendix 9). 
During the research, some participants disclosed information regarding corruption 
within the programme, however, in these instances, the anonymity of respondents was 
respected. 
4.9 Funding 
This PhD was in part undertaken as part of a research secondment from DFID to Tulane 
International (a wholly owned subsidiary of Tulane University based in the DRC). 
Tulane University was the technical partner conducting the impact evaluation and 
operational research on the ASSP programme. The PhD researcher was line-managed 
by Tulane International but received a salary from DFID covering the cost of course 
fees for the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and living expenses in 
the DRC.  
Other institutions involved in the research included the KSPH, who supported data 
collection for the baseline survey. Field costs of data collection were covered within the 
operational research budget for ASSP.  
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PART III: RESULTS 
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5. Remuneration of health workers in the DRC
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed in chapter 2, financial incentives play an important role in influencing 
motivation. In order to design effective incentive packages to improve motivation and 
performance it is important to understand overall revenue levels as well as the full range 
of income sources available to workers. Fragile states such as the DRC provide valuable 
contexts for examining health worker remuneration as the state system of salary 
payment is often poorly functional, encouraging the diversification of income sources.  
Some of the issues with health worker remuneration in the DRC have been described in 
the study setting in chapter 3. However, an understanding of the availability and relative 
levels of each source of income, as well as the processes underpinning their receipt, are 
not well understood.  
The research paper in this chapter employs a mixed methods approach to explore the 
financial environment of health workers in public primary care facilities of the DRC, 
thus addressing the first research objective. As well as quantifying the amount received 
by health workers from each income source, this paper also investigates associations 
between sources of income and various individual, facility and geographical factors. 
Qualitative insights provide a deeper understanding of the role of context in determining 
attitudes as well as levels and availability of different sources of income.  
This paper has been published in Human Resources for Health, and is presented in this 
format here. 
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5.2 Research paper 1 
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Health workers play a central role in the delivery of
health care, and their remuneration influences their
motivation and workplace performance [1–4]. Post
conflict states present an interesting context for
examining health worker remuneration as the state
system of salary payment is often poorly functional,
encouraging a diversification of income sources [5].
Donors may exacerbate income fragmentation by pro-
viding programme-related performance payments and
per diems [6]. Evidence from these settings has shown
that income received from different sources varies ac-
cording to individual worker and health facility char-
acteristics, with female workers receiving significantly
less salary and total income than male workers of the
same cadre in Sierra Leone [7], and rural workers
having less access to user fee revenue and income
from non-clinical activities to those in urban areas in
Zimbabwe [8]. A study by Bertone et al. in four prov-
inces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
identified individual, facility and provincial determi-
nants of variation in total income received [9]. How-
ever, the Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe studies were
descriptive and did not comprehensively examine the
determinants of receiving each income source and
none of these studies looked at how receipt of one
income source affects the likelihood of receiving other
sources, or compiled qualitative data to obtain more
in-depth insights into remuneration practices. More-
over, Bertone and Witter have advocated for more
empirical research on the overall revenue or “complex
remuneration” of health workers, in order to devise
effective incentive packages [10].
This study aims to address this gap by examining the
remuneration structure of health workers in five prov-
inces of the DRC,1 assessing the determinants of receiv-
ing income by source and the inter-dependency of
different sources of income, as well as the determinants
of total income received. Qualitative methods are also
used to substantiate the quantitative findings and help to
discover the processes and mechanisms that underpin
the quantitative results.
DRC context
In 2013, public investment in health was only 4.5% of
the national budget falling far short of the Abuja com-
mitment of 15% [11]. Although all public sector health
workers should receive a salary and occupational risk
allowance (or “prime de risque”) from the government,
not everyone receives these. Services therefore rely heav-
ily on cost recovery through user fees, with no accepted
standard national tariff for consultations. Health workers
have also become dependent on performance-based
payments and/or per diems from external partners.
The public care system accounts for about half of all
facilities in the country [12]. The basic unit of the pri-
mary care health system is the health zone [13]. Health
zones are divided into health areas serving 10,000 to
15,000 people. Each health area should have a health
centre providing an essential package of primary health-
care activities. Health centres equipped to carry out cer-
tain minor surgical operations are termed reference
health centres. In the absence of a health centre or refer-
ence health centre, there is a health post.
Methods
Health facility and health worker surveys were con-
ducted as part of a baseline survey linked to an evalu-
ation of a health systems strengthening programme
funded by the Department for International Develop-
ment (DfID) called ASSP (Accès Aux Soins de Santé
Primaires) in April–May 2014 [Keating J, Hotchkiss D,
Eisele T, Kitoto AT, Bertrand J. Evaluation of the impact
of the ASSP project in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, unpublished].
Data collection was carried out by data collectors hired
from each of the provinces to ensure familiarity with the
cultural context. Participation of health workers in the
survey was voluntary. To minimise the potential for social
desirability bias, the interviewer explained the purpose,
confidentiality and anonymity of the study to each pro-
vider before seeking consent to begin the survey.
Surveys were carried out in Equateur, Kasai Occidental,
Kasai Oriental, Province Orientale, and Maniema prov-
inces in 105 intervention villages selected using probability
proportional to size (PPS), and an equal number of con-
trol villages matched on geographic location and popula-
tion size. In total, 210 facilities were selected and all
workers providing clinical services and on duty the day of
the survey were interviewed.
The health worker survey measured age, sex, cadre,
marital status, educational attainment, number of
years in their current position, and number of finan-
cial dependents. The survey identified income
sources received and income levels adapted from the
Health Worker Incentive Survey [14] for government
payments (salaries, occupational risk allowances),
performance payments and per diems from non-
governmental partners, private clinical work, user
fees from patients, informal payments2 or “gifts”, al-
lowances, and income from non-clinical activities.
Respondents were asked whether government pay-
ments were received on time, if there were delays
receiving these payments, and amounts received
compared to expectations. Income levels were re-
corded in Congolese Francs (FC). Recall was for “last
month received” for all incomes with the exception
of per diems which was for the “last year”. A facility
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survey was also carried out to measure the total
number of staff, distance of the facility from the vil-
lage, and the number of primary healthcare services
provided. Both surveys were piloted in two health fa-
cilities in Kinshasa and one facility in Bas Congo.
Qualitative research was carried out in November
2014 in four urban and four rural health zones sup-
ported by ASSP in the province of Kasai Occidental
that were not included in the survey. Two nurses
(one female and one male) were purposively selected
from a health centre in each health zone, making a
total of 16 nurses. Interviews examined the sources
and amounts of income received, and factors influen-
cing their receipt and were audio recorded in French
by RM and a local researcher. Hand written notes
were also taken.
Data analysis
Survey data were double entered into CSPro and
imported into STATA 13.0 for analysis. Income data
were converted into United States dollars (USD) using
the exchange rate of 923 FC to 1 USD.3 Grubb’s test was
applied to detect outliers in the income data, which were
removed prior to analysis. Descriptive statistics were
generated for health worker characteristics, receipt of in-
come by source and mean and median income levels.
The frequency of receipt of government payments and
income compared to expectations are also reported. Lo-
gistic regressions examined facility and health worker
characteristics associated with receiving a given income
source and linear regressions identified determinants of
the level of income received, measured as the log of in-
come. Presence of the ASSP programme was included as
an explanatory variable in all of the models. Health
worker explanatory variables were health worker age,
marital status, sex, cadre, education, years worked in
position, and the number of financial dependents;
facility-level factors were provincial location, urban-rural
status, facility type, number of staff, distance from the
nearest village, and the number of services offered. We
also examined whether receipt of certain income sources
affected the receipt of others. The hypothesised relation-
ships between the independent variables and income
sources are given in Appendix 1.
In total, 18 models were run and regression diagnos-
tics applied and adjustments made to produce unbiased
coefficients (Appendix 2). A general to specific regres-
sion specification method was used, excluding explana-
tory variables in a stepwise manner. All regressions were
performed excluding any missing values (list-wise dele-
tion) with clustering at the facility level.
Audio recordings of the interviews were tran-
scribed and a coding system was developed by RM
from the initial research themes and concepts that
emerged during data collection. Data was managed




Three facilities were private clinics and so did not meet
the inclusion criteria of being public sector primary care
facilities. This left 207 facilities for analysis.
Twenty three health workers did not meet the in-
clusion criteria, leaving 453 respondents for analysis.
No health workers declined to participate in the
survey.
Health workers were mainly located in rural facilities
(80.6%) and were based in health centres (81.7%)
(Table 1). Most workers were in Kasai Occidental
followed by Maniema and Equateur. Most of the
workers were in facilities located within 5 km of the
nearest village (79.9%), and over 75% offered between six
and nine services.
Most respondents were male and between 30 and
45 years old (Table 2). Ninety percent of staff were
nurses, and only four doctors were identified across all
facilities. The majority had some secondary level educa-
tion and a third had been to university. Most workers
were married and had worked a median of 6 years in
their current position.
The analysis of income sources and levels focuses on
nurses.
Income sources and levels
Only one third of nurses reported receiving a salary
while over half received the occupational risk allow-
ance (Table 3, Fig. 1). A third of nurses did not re-
ceive any form of government payment and 18%
received both an occupational risk allowance and a
salary (Fig. 1). Of non-governmental payments, the
most frequently reported were user fees, followed by
per diems. Just under half of the sample (47%) re-
ported receiving income from supplementary non-
clinical activities. Of these most worked in agriculture
(68%), followed by trade (28%). A minority of nurses
(7%) reported receiving allowances for uniforms,
housing or transport. Less than 10% of workers (n =
29) reported receiving income from private clinical
practice, mostly practising at home (n = 24).
The highest median monthly income was for non-
clinical work outside the facility ($119), followed by the
government salary ($58). The lowest median monthly in-
come came from per diems ($9) and informal payments
($9). The median monthly income across all sources was
$85 but the mean was almost double at $165.
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Over two thirds of nurses receiving the salary and the
occupational risk allowance payments reported they
were paid on time. Seventeen percent of nurses re-
ported receiving salaries between 1 and 3 months in ar-
rears and 24% reported doing so for occupational risk
allowances. Only 2% reported receiving salaries and/or
occupational risk allowances more than 3 months in ar-
rears (Fig. 2).
Despite the overall timeliness of payments, the amounts
received from government were less than expected (Fig. 3).
Nurses complained more about the frequency of salary
payments, than of occupational risk allowances, stating
irregular salary payment with no set day of the month.
Many had to regularly request an advance from the






Facility location (n = 453)
Rural 80.6
Urban 19.4






Type of facility (n = 453)
Health centre 81.7
Reference health centre 17.2
Health post 1.1
Distance of facility from the
village (n = 443a)
Less than 1 km 31.6
Between 1 and 5 km 48.3
Between 5 and 10 km 12.0
Greater than 10 km 8.1
Number of services provided
by facility (n = 435a)
3 to 5 services 12.2
6 to 9 services 76.1
Over 10 services 3.0
Total clinical staff present on








Population catchment for area (n = 430a)
Less than 5000 48.9
5000 to 10,000 21.6
10,001 to 15,000 17.4
Greater than 15,000 12.1
aLess than 453 due to missing values for those variables
Table 2 Characteristics of health workers





Sex (n = 453) (n = 407)
Male 69.3 70.3
Female 30.7 29.7
Age (n = 453) (n = 407)
<30 years 11.5 12.3
30–44 years 59.7 60.7
45–60 years 26.1 24.6
>60 years 3.1 2.5






Education (n = 453) (n = 407)
Primary school 0.4 0.3




Not specified 6.2 1.7





Traditional birth attendant 2.9
















aLess than 453 for all workers or less than 407 for nurses due to missing
values for those variables
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facility as they usually ran out of money before their
next pay day. It was also common for nurses to borrow
from their family or friends to pay the rent or school
fees. Nurses reported huge variability in user fee revenue
as it was dependent on the number of patients seen at
the facility.
None of the in-depth interview respondents reported
engaging in private practice or receiving performance
payments from partners. A few reported receiving per
diems for training or vaccination campaigns. Informal
payments or gifts from patients were often in the form
of soap, fabric, or food. All nurses were dissatisfied with
total compensation received.
Income determinants
The likelihood of receiving a salary increased with
every year worked at the facility (OR 1.06, p < 0.000)
and was greater for staff working in urban facilities
(OR 2.48, p = 0.021). Nurses were more likely to re-
ceive a salary if they were in Equateur than Maniema
(0.22, p = 0.014).
The odds of receiving the occupational allowance were
greater if the nurse had more years of experience (OR
1.20, p < 0.000) and a higher number of dependents (OR
1.12, p = 0.001. The odds of receiving the occupational
allowance were highest in Province Orientale (OR 9.58,
p = 0.001) compared to Equateur, but lower in Kasai Oc-
cidental (OR 0.17, p < 0.000) or Kasai Oriental (OR 0.05,
p < 0.000) (Table 4).
In the in-depth interviews, nurses who did not get a
salary stated it was because they started working after
the last census of workers in 2006, which was used as a
basis for payroll. Some nurses felt health zone officials
discriminated against workers from certain tribal or eth-
nic backgrounds in the payment of the occupational risk
allowance.
Table 3 Proportion of nurses receiving sources of income and mean and median values of income received
Source of income Overall proportion of workers
who received source of income
Median income per month among
those receiving income in USD (IQR)
Mean income per month among those





31.2% 52.76 (23–75) 58.06 (60.45)
Occupational risk allowance
from government (n = 407)
53.8% 12.46 (11–16) 36.57 (73.38)
Payments from other sources
Performance pay (n = 407) 24.1% 16.25 (9–46) 35.79 (48.81)
User fees (n = 406) 74.6% 19.50 (11–38) 71.02 (157.95)
Gifts/informal payments from
patients (n = 406)
16.8% 4.60 (2–11) 8.73 (10.43)
Per diems (n = 406) 51.7% 4.06 (2–8) 8.56 (26.35)
Income from private clinical
practice (n = 407)
7.1% 21.67 (11–54)a 34.02 (34.05)a
Income from supplemental
(non-clinical) activities (n = 400)
46.8% 65.01 (33–114)a 119.27 (154.62)a
Total income (n = 300a) N/A 85.05 (36–176)a 165.26 (227.55)a
N.B. For the occupational risk allowance, one outlier income was dropped from the analysis; no outliers were detected for any other income amount
aGreater than 10% of data missing as respondents had missing values for some of the amounts of income
Fig. 1 Proportion of nurses receiving: both government payments, one government payment only, or no government payments
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According to the quantitative analysis, compared to
Equateur, nurses in Maniema were more likely to receive
all other sources of income, with the exception of per
diems (Table 5). Only those with a higher number of de-
pendents were significantly more likely to receive user
fees (OR 1.07 p = 0.038).
During in-depth interviews, all nurses reported re-
ceiving income from user fees. The process for allocat-
ing user fees within the facility was usually overseen by
the head of the facility. However, record keeping was
often poor meaning the total revenue generated from
user fees and allocation process was unclear to some
nurses.
The way in which we divide (user fees)…I don’t know if
I receive the same thing. The IT (head nurse) and IA
(assistant nurse) and me, I don’t know if they give the
same thing. They give it to me, I sign, that is all.
Female, 60 years
As shown in Table 5, nurses were more likely to re-
ceive informal payments if they were not based in Equa-
teur. Staff at facilities with a higher number of personnel
were less likely to report receiving informal payments
(OR 0.67, p = 0.07) and facilities supported by ASSP re-
ported a lower likelihood of informal payments (OR
0.48, p = 0.039). Older workers were less likely to receive
informal payments (OR 0.96, p = 0.08).
The qualitative findings revealed that many nurses were
reluctant to charge informal fees, as patients were usually
so poor that they struggled to pay user fees. Nurses were
less likely to charge informal fees where communities
were well informed about the facility user fee tariff, for ex-
ample, in ASSP areas where community health commit-
tees (CODESAs) and facilities were involved in setting and
publicising tariffs, meaning nurses could be chastised by
the public for asking for informal payments.
Fig. 2 Frequency of government payments to nurses
Fig. 3 Median and mean amounts of expected and actual salary and occupational risk allowance for nurses
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…everyone knows, that if you are going to ask for
something someone will tell on you, you will be
humiliated all the same, instead of asking, you must
leave it.
Male, 42 years
Receiving income from private practice was more
common in urban than rural areas (OR 2.44, p = 0.029)
and facilities close to the village. Older workers were
also less likely to receive income from private practice
(OR 0.92, p < 0.000) and staff receiving government pay-
ments were more likely to receive income from private
practice (OR 2.76, p = 0.036). Workers in Kasai Occiden-
tal and Maniema were more likely to work privately
compared to those living in Equateur.
Reasons given by nurses for not engaging in private
practice during interviews included being based far from
private clinics, a perceived reduction in job security, and
risks of losing the chance of becoming registered with
the state and therefore receiving future government pay.
However, some admitted that those currently receiving
government pay may have been more likely to work pri-
vately to supplement their income, which is consistent
with the quantitative analysis. Some nurses voiced that
the private sector was superior to the public sector, as it
was better resourced, staff were better paid and more
motivated. However, many criticised the private sector
for poor management and a lack of accountability, with
patients not being treated according to best practice,
and no focus on preventative care.
Table 4 Logistic regressions for salary and occupational risk allowance
Odds ratio for dependent variables (SE)
Explanatory variables Salary Occupational risk allowance
Full model Reduced model Full model Reduced model
Years in position 1.06 (0.02)*** 1.06 (0.02)*** 1.19 (0.04)*** 1.20 (0.04)***
(p < 0.001)
Kasai Occidental (vs Equateur) 1.48 (0.69) 1.46 (0.64) 0.17 (0.07)*** 0.17 (0.07)***
(p < 0.001)
Kasai Orientale (vs Equateur) 1.02 (0.89) 0.71 (0.48) 0.03 (0.02)*** 0.05 (0.04)***
(p < 0.001)
Maniema (vs Equateur) 0.20 (0.13)** 0.22 (0.14)***
(p = 0.014)
1.56 (0.76) 1.30 (0.63)
Province Orientale (vs Equateur) 0.69 (0.43) 1.05
(0.52)
11.07 (7.28)*** 9.58 (6.33)***
(p = 0.001)
Population served 1.00 (0.00)** 1.00 (0.00)**
(p = 0.043)
1.00 (0.00)
Total personnel 1.43 (0.25)** 0.94 (0.19)
Urban (vs rural) 1.90 (0.86) 2.48 (0.97)**
(p = 0.021)
2.42 (1.33) 2.10 (0.91)*
Number of services 1.08 (0.12) 0.84 (0.09)
Distance of facility from village 1.00 (0.03) 1.07 (0.04)*
Reference heath centre (vs heath centre) 0.74 (0.36) 0.49 (0.24) 0.39 (0.20)*
Age 1.02 (0.02) 1.03 (0.02)
Male (vs female) 0.92 (0.31) 0.66 (0.24)
Number of dependents 0.97 (0.03) 1.11 (0.04)** 1.12 (0.04)***
(p = 0.001)
Married (vs not married) 1.10 (0.14) 0.67 (0.12)** 0.75 (0.12)*
University (vs school education) 0.77 (0.27) 1.07 (0.41)
ASSP programme 0.70 (0.28) 0.58 (0.23)
Received occupational allowance (salary model only) 1.03 (0.35) – –
Received salary (occupational risk allowance model only) – – 1.06 (0.39)
Constant 0.04 (0.05)** 0.09 (0.04)*** 0.37 (0.41) 0.21 (0.08)***
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.14 0.35 0.33
Model χ2 50.90*** 46.98*** 91.22*** 77.56***
Number observations (n) 337 383 318 318
*p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01
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In the private (facilities) the staff are self-directed but
they do not have any sanctions, they behave as they
want. But with us here, the hierarchy demands expla-
nations, there is monitoring
Female, 38 years
Staff at facilities with a higher number of personnel
were less likely to report receiving per diems (OR
0.72, p = 0.019). Nurses in reference health centres
were less likely to receive per diems (OR 0.45, p =
0.032) than those in health centres, while nurses in
facilities far from the village were less likely to earn
performance payments (OR 0.79, p = 0.001) than those
near to the village. Facilities supported by ASSP re-
ported a higher chance of receiving per diems (OR
1.80, p = 0.031) as well as workers receiving govern-
ment payments (OR 1.92, p = 0.012). Males and
workers in facilities offering a higher number of ser-
vices were also more likely to receive performance
payments and per diems.
During interviews, nurses indicated a preference for
government payments over performance payments
from development partners as they saw these as more
stable and less transient sources of income.
Because the state, I could stay with the state until
death. But the partner, will always be there for a term
of 5 years
Male, 30 years
Some of the nurses interviewed felt that per diems
were not allocated fairly.
Ah, it is not well managed (per diems), if someone
tells us there is maternity training, it is one person
who can go, from the other side it is the IT (head
nurse) and IA (assistant nurse), so we others…
nothing!
Female, 37 years
Workers reporting income from non-clinical activ-
ities were more likely to report income from private
practice (OR 2.64, p = 0.035), be based in rural areas
(OR 0.51, p = 0.025) and have a higher number of de-
pendents (OR 1.08, p = 0.008). However, workers re-
ceiving government payments appeared to be less
likely to receive income from non-clinical work (OR
0.51, p = 0.02).
Some nurses reported in interviews that those receiv-
ing government payments were actually more likely to
undertake non-clinical activities, as they knew they
would receive their government payments whether they
worked in the facility or not but this was inconsistent
with the quantitative findings. One worker admitted not
coming to work to enable cultivation of crops to earn
more income. Nurses who did not engage in supplemen-
tary non-clinical activities indicated this was due to a
lack of time or an absence of the necessary resources or
start-up capital.
They become negligent…you see, at the end of each
month, you go to the bank, you see (them) but you go
to the office and there is no-one working. They end up
perhaps going to sell things, but at the end of the
month, they will go to get their money.
Female, 30 years
Total remuneration
In Province Orientale (β = −0.47, p = 0.032) and Maniema
(β = −1.26, p < 0.000), nurses had lower levels of total in-
come than nurses in Equateur. Males earned more income
overall than females (β = 0.21, p = 0.05). Receipt of each
income source was associated with a higher overall total
income, with the exception of informal payments and pay-
ments from private clinical work (Table 6).
Discussion
Nurses constituted the majority of personnel in both pri-
mary and secondary care and were the main focus of the
study. The high variability in the amounts earned from each
income source may be due in part to the fact that nurses
make up a fairly heterogeneous group of different grades
and levels of educational attainment.
Only a minority of nurses received a government salary,
and a higher proportion received occupational allowances,
with uncertainty regarding the timing and extent of pay-
ments. Part of the reason for the difference between gov-
ernment payments is that they are managed by two
different Ministries; the Ministry of Public Sector Reform
is responsible for the payroll while the occupational risk
allowance is issued using the “declarative list” controlled
by the Ministry of Health. Several bottlenecks have also
been identified in the budget process which can result in a
low execution rate of the allocated funds [15].
The extent to which either type of government pay-
ment was received varied across the provinces, likely
due to differences in the available government budget
for remuneration and a lack of transparency in the
allocation of funds by provinces; the majority of the exe-
cuted funds by province are usually untraceable (H Col-
quhoun, pers comm). A recent study of Katanga, South
Kivu and Kasai Oriental provinces found the allocation
and execution of the health budget was inequitable and
not based on any pre-defined criteria (e.g. per capita and
health indicators) [16]. The occupational allowance also
constitutes a lower amount than the salary, potentially
allowing more nurses to be paid within the allocated
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budget. A greater proportion of the allocated health
budget goes towards the occupational risk allowance
than salaries [11]. A repeat census of workers is also
needed in order to identify nurses who have more
recently started working in facilities and ensure they
are paid. Nonetheless, the study found that receiving
government payments sometimes had the unintended
consequence of giving workers the freedom to work
in private practice or non-clinical activities, poten-
tially displacing them from their duties in public
facilities.
User fees were commonly reported, representing a sub-
stantial share of total income consistent with Bertone et
al. [9], but were also highly variable, depending on tariffs
and case load. Informal payments appeared infrequent
and small, particularly in the ASSP area which aims to im-
prove health service accountability in relation to charges
levied and payments received. Where paid, performance
payments tended to be comparable in their amount to the
occupational risk allowance and income from user fees,
and vary by geographic area depending on donor and
NGO presence. Health workers in Maniema were more
Table 6 OLS model for total remuneration
Explanatory variables Coefficient (SE)
Full model Reduced model
Years in position −0.01 (0.01)
Kasai Occidental (vs Equateur) −0.37 (0.19)* −0.27 (0.17)
Kasai Orientale (vs Equateur) −0.11 (0.30) −0.07 (0.28)
Maniema (vs Equateur) −1.27 (0.26)*** −1.26 (0.18)***
(p < 0.001)
Province Orientale (vs Equateur) −0.74 (0.24)*** −0.47 (0.22)**
(p = 0.032)
Population served 0.00 (0.00)
Total personnel −0.01 (0.08)
Urban (vs rural) 0.22 (0.26)
Number of services 0.06 (0.04)
Distance of facility from village 0.01 (0.02)
Reference heath centre (vs heath centre) −0.26 (0.21)
Age 0.01 (0.01)
Male (vs female) 0.26 (0.13)** 0.21 (0.12)*
Number of dependents −0.01 (0.02)
Married (vs not married) −0.03 (0.04)
University (vs school education) 0.11 (0.12)
Supported by ASSP programme −0.13 (0.18)
Receives salary 0.73 (0.14)*** 0.79 (0.12)***
(p < 0.001)
Receives occupational risk allowance 0.81 (0.15)*** 0.70 (0.12)***
p < 0.001
Receives performance payment 0.59 (0.18)*** 0.77 (0.15)***
p < 0.001
Receives user fees 0.65 (0.20)*** 0.75 (0.17)***
p < 0.001
Receives informal payments 0.01 (0.17)
Receives income from private clinical work −0.01 (0.25)
Receives supplemental income 1.03 (0.13)*** 1.00 (0.10)***
p < 0.001
Receives per diems 0.20 (0.13) 0.20 (0.11)*
Constant 2.45 (0.42)*** 2.91 (0.22)***
R2 0.48*** 0.44***
Number observations (n) 268 328
*p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01
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likely to receive performance payments as they were still
receiving payments from the ASSP programme at the time
of the survey, although this was being phased out. Nurses
in Maniema were also less likely to receive salaries. As the
government budget is fungible, it is possible that the gov-
ernment prioritises the allocation of salaries on areas not
supported by donor programmes. Health workers may
also be less likely to push for inclusion on the payroll if
they are receiving an income which substitutes their salary
[17]. Nonetheless, workers tended to value government
payments more than performance payments, similar to
the findings of Fox et al. [6].
Per diems were received by just over half of nurses but
contributed little to total income, consistent with Bertone
et al. [9]. Per diems were sometimes perceived to be un-
fairly managed. We found evidence of gender discrimin-
ation in the allocation of per diems as well as performance
payments, with male nurses being significantly more likely
to receive these. Several studies in low-income countries
have demonstrated how the mismanagement and abuse of
per diems and performance payments can contribute to a
negative organisational culture, on account of the tensions
they create [18–20]. Care is needed to ensure such pay-
ments are distributed equitably across facility personnel
and the same staff are not benefitting each time. Payments
for overtime were not examined here but were found to
be largely irrelevant by Bertone et al. in this context [9].
Less than 10% of workers conducted private clinical work,
which corresponds with Bertone et al. [9] and this was more
common in facilities close to villages and in urban areas
similar to evidence from other countries [8, 10]. Nurses
were more likely to engage in dual practice if they received
income from the government. Nurses not receiving
government payments thought it would be too risky to
work in private facilities as it could jeopardise their
chances of gaining registration.
Almost half of all workers engaged in non-clinical
activities to supplement their income, higher than
observed by Bertone et al. [9]. Agricultural practices
were the most common which may be because the
survey sampled predominantly in rural areas. These
activities were sometimes carried out during working
hours, which would impact on service delivery.
In terms of the total amount of income gained, dif-
ferences were driven by both individual and provincial
characteristics, again similar to Bertone et al. [9].
Males were more likely to receive a higher total in-
come than females, indicating a gender inequity in re-
ceipt of income [21], while workers in Equateur were
more likely to earn more than those in Province
Orientale or Maniema. Unlike Bertone et al. [9], we
did not find any association between facility charac-
teristics and total income; however, their study in-
cluded a wider variety of facilities.
This study attempts to shed some light on the complex
puzzle of how to incentivise vital health workers in hard-
to-reach areas in the context of a fragile state. Future pol-
icies should try to address some of the unacceptable in-
equalities related to gender or provincial location. There is
low satisfaction with the amount received from formal
sources, necessitating an increase in the current wage al-
lowance, as well as perhaps the provision of non-financial
incentives such as training and opportunities for career
progression in order to effectively retain the workforce.
There were several limitations to this study. Firstly, the
health worker survey was limited to those available on the
day of the survey and does not capture the views of those
absent. Secondly, workers may have under-reported or in-
accurately recalled their income [22]. As robust documen-
tation of health worker incomes does not exist in the
DRC, it was not possible to validate estimates. Due to re-
source constraints, qualitative interviews could only be
conducted in one of the five provinces and so we were un-
able to identify reasons for the provincial variation ob-
served. The qualitative interviews preceded the analysis of
the quantitative data, and so the quantitative findings
could not be discussed during the interviews. A further
study which uses the findings of the quantitative analysis
as a basis for interviews may allow for more nuanced
views. Finally, the facilities sampled represent 2.3%4 of the
overall number of state primary care health centres and
therefore the results are not necessarily representative of
the provinces as a whole.
Conclusions
In this study, we found that few workers received a gov-
ernment salary but a larger proportion received govern-
ment payment through the occupational risk allowance.
Often, there was a mixture of individual, facility and
geographical factors associated with the receipt of vari-
ous income sources. Greater co-ordination is therefore
needed between all partners involved in the remuner-
ation of workers in order to design more effective finan-
cial incentive packages, reduce the fragmentation of
incomes and improve transparency in the payment of
workers in the DRC.
Endnotes
1At the time of the study, DRC was composed of 11
provinces which have since been divided into 26
provinces.
2Informal payments defined as payments made by pa-
tients outside of official channels
3Exchange rate as of 26 June 2015 using FOREX cur-
rency converter.
4Calculated using population data obtained from the
Direction d’Etudes et Planification, Ministère de la Santé
Publique in October 2013.
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Appendix 1
Table 7 Hypothesised relationship of independent variables with income sources
Variables Hypothesised relationship with income sources
Age The older the worker, the more likely they are to gain income as elders are respected in DRC (Oppong
& Woodruff, 2007). In addition, older workers will have been working for longer and may be paid more
based on their experience.
Sex Globally, while women comprise the majority of employees in the formal health system, they are
usually less likely than men to hold senior roles, which tend to receive more pay (World Health
Organization, 2010). In a study in Sierra Leone, for certain cadres, women received significantly less
salary than males (Witter et al., 2015). In addition, according to the latest Gender Equality Index, DRC
was ranked near the bottom (United Nations Development Programme, 2014). Therefore, it will be
interesting to examine whether gender inequality also exists in the receipt of certain sources of income
(e.g. user fees) when health worker position and education is controlled for. A study in Tajikistan has
shown that women are equally as likely as men to charge informal payments once other factors have
been controlled for but this has not been explored in other contexts (Dabalen & Wane, 2008). The same
study also showed that women were less likely to work outside of the health facility than men.
Number of dependents There is some evidence that in DRC, those that earn more have a higher number of dependents and so
the number of dependents may increase as overall income increases (Weijs, Hilhorst, & Ferf, 2012).
Urban-rural status Urban areas have a higher population density and so income from user fees may be higher. There are
also large discrepancies in access to healthcare between urban and rural areas, with access being
higher in urban areas, which may also affect income gained from user fees (World Bank, 2008).
Opportunities to receive income from dual practice may be greater in urban areas compared to rural
areas, as was observed in Zimbabwe (Chirwa et al., 2014). In addition, a study in Malawi revealed that
urban health workers had higher monthly household incomes compared to their rural counterparts
(Bowie, Mwase, & Chinkhumba, 2009).
Province There are large differences in poverty between provinces in the DRC which may have implications for
both formal and informal fees charged to patients (Moummi, 2010; United Nations Development
Programme, 2009). Equateur is comparatively poorer than the other provinces that have been sampled.
According to a recent study, there are wide provincial disparities in domestic public spending on health
services, which may affect the amount of government payments received by workers (UNICEF, 2015;
World Bank, 2008).
Total number of staff delivering healthcare
present on the day
There is some evidence that facilities with more staff receive more income than understaffed facilities
(Murro & Pavignani, 2012). On the other hand, income from user fees may be reduced as they are
usually divided among workers at the end of the month. Having a high number of personnel may
result in lower amounts being received by each staff member (Bertone & Lurton, 2015).
Number of services offered Increasing the number of services available to a population is one way of improving access (Gulliford
et al., 2002). This improved access may be reflected in increased utilisation rates resulting in higher
incomes from user fees.
Distance of the facility from the village Evidence has shown that distance travelled by patients is a key determinant of the utilisation of health
services, and so may impact on the amount of user fees collected at facilities (Shannon, Bashshur, &
Metzner, 1969).
Education The level of education will vary by position and within positions. Doctors should hold a seven-year uni-
versity degree, while the education of nurses depends on their grade; it varies between two years of
secondary school to a three year university degree (Yngfors & Andersson, 2010). The difference in grade
(and therefore education) is reflected in the payment of salaries.
Marital status Several wage determination studies have found a positive wage effect of marriage even when other
variables such as productivity and hours worked have been controlled for (Korenman & Neumark, 1991;
Pfeffer & Ross, 1982; Kalachek & Raines, 1976; Hill, 1979).
Years in position The longer a worker has been in their position, the more likely they are to receive a salary as they may
have been identified in the last comprehensive health worker census in 2006. This census aimed to
ensure workers were correctly registered on the government payroll.
Type of facility Reference facilities are bigger, offer more services and serve a greater population compared to health
centres. Therefore, income opportunities may be different within each.
Total population of village User fees and therefore total income are influenced by demand factors such as the total population
eligible to access healthcare.




ASSP: Accès Aux Soins de Santé Primaires (Access to Primary Health care);
CODESA: Community health committees; DFID: Department for International
Development; DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo; FC: Congolese Francs;
NGO: Non-governmental organisation; OR: Odds ratio; PPS: Probability
proportional to size; USD: United States dollars
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6. Health worker motivation in the DRC and effects
associated with removing PBF
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 has set the background to this chapter by giving an overview of the complex 
financial environment within which primary care workers in the DRC operate. The 
financial incentives received by workers have an important bearing on their motivation. 
As noted in chapter 2, policy makers are becoming increasingly aware of the importance 
of health workers' motivation and how it affects their performance. Gaining an 
understanding of motivation, its drivers, and its impact on behaviour is needed to inform 
strategies aimed at improving health worker performance and therefore quality of care. 
However, the challenge with motivation is that it cannot be directly observed, making 
its measurement difficult. Although numerous descriptions of good measurement 
practices exist, their translation into applied research is often difficult.  
The objective of the second research paper was to share our experience of developing 
and validating a tool to measure health worker motivation. In doing so, we hope to 
make other public health researchers aware of some of the common pitfalls to avoid, 
thus helping to improve future practice.  
A common form of financial incentive provided by development partners which aims to 
improve health worker motivation is PBF, and has been described in detail in chapters 1 
and 2. However, the availability of long-term financing to support PBF schemes in low- 
and middle-income settings is not always assured. As a result, evidence of the potential 
consequences of terminating such PBF schemes, such as lowering health worker 
motivation due to the removal of income associated with PBF, is needed. The focus of 
much of the research around PBF to date has been on demonstrating its effectiveness, 
with less attention to its effects on the health system, especially when it is withdrawn.  
The third research paper also included in this chapter investigates the composition and 
levels of motivation of health workers in primary health care facilities of the DRC, as 
well as the effects associated with the withdrawal of a PBF scheme on motivation. This 
paper provides the results of the second research objective of this PhD.  
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6.2 Research paper 2 
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Abstract 
Background: A competent and motivated health workforce is one of the essential 
building blocks of a well-functioning health system. Gaining an understanding of 
motivation, its drivers, and its impact on behaviour is therefore important to inform 
strategies aimed at improving health worker performance and quality of care. However, 
the challenge with motivation is that it cannot be directly observed, making its 
measurement difficult. Although numerous descriptions of good measurement practices 
exist, their translation into applied research is often problematic.  
Methods: In this article, we reflect on our experiences in developing and validating an 
instrument to measure health worker motivation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Specifically, we recount what actually happened and identify what could have been 
improved upon at the design, sampling, data collection and analysis stages. 
Results: Key issues manifesting at the analytical and interpretative stage largely related 
to shortcomings in the preparatory phase, due to lack of time and resources as well as 
psychometric and motivation-related expertise at the outset. The main lessons learnt 
were that the design stage is critical as it lays the foundations for meaningful data 
collection and analysis. Any shortcomings at this stage inevitably reveal themselves at 
the analysis stage, both in technical terms as well as in regards to the interpretation of 
results.  
Conclusion: It is worth investing time and resources when developing a motivation 
instrument, particularly within a sound and culturally appropriate conceptualisation of 
motivation. We hope by openly sharing our experience with other public health 
researchers working in this area that they will be more aware of some of the common 
pitfalls to avoid thus helping them to improve future practice. 
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Background 
Human resources for health are recognised as one of the six building blocks of health 
systems (World Health Organization, 2006). Low- and middle-income countries face 
significant challenges with respect to human resources for health; these include: 
shortages of health care providers, an inequitable distribution of workers, deficiencies in 
skill-mixes and inadequate training of staff (Ranson et al., 2010). As acknowledged by 
the World Health Organization, “developing capable, motivated and supported health 
workers is essential for overcoming bottlenecks to achieve national and global health 
goals”. Motivation is a key determinant of practices and behaviours of health workers 
(Rowe et al., 2005, Chen et al., 2004). An understanding of the drivers of motivation is 
therefore important to informing strategies aimed at improving health workers’ 
performance.  
Measuring motivation, however, is difficult as it is a psychological process which 
cannot be directly observed (Pinder, 2008). Yet, over recent years, there has been an 
increasing body of research aiming to understand the motivation of health workers in 
low- and middle-income countries (Hotchkiss et al., 2015, Lohmann et al., 2016, 
Lohmann et al., 2018, Lohmann et al., 2017a, Lohmann et al., 2017b, Alhassan et al., 
2013, Mutale et al., 2013, Bonenberger et al., 2014). A recent paper has outlined the 
steps required in developing a high-quality motivation scale – which refers to a set of 
statements or questions in a survey tool intending to measure motivation (Borghi et al., 
2017). Yet, there are few studies reflecting on this ideal methodology and challenges in 
its practical application (Prytherch et al., 2012).  
In this article, we aim to share the lessons learnt from developing and validating a 
psychometric scale to quantify the motivation of workers in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) by giving an account of what happened in practice, and then reflecting on 
each stage of the process in relation to the ideal methodology outlined in Borghi et 
al. (2017). We believe that sharing our experience will be of practical value to other 
researchers developing similar measurement tools, helping them avoid potential pitfalls. 
Although our reflection relates to the specific case of developing and applying a health 
worker motivation measure, our reflections are equally valid in relation to the 
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measurement of related psychological constructs such as satisfaction, perceptions, or 
attitudes, in health workers as well as in other populations of interest. 
Context for measuring health worker motivation 
The health worker motivation scale was nested in a larger health worker survey 
conducted as part of the baseline of a population-based evaluation of a new health 
systems strengthening programme, called Accès Aux Soins de Santé (Access to Primary 
Healthcare or ASSP). ASSP covered 56 health zones in provinces of Equateur, Kasai 
Occidental, Province Orientale, Maniema and South Kivu.1 It aimed to support health 
centres and hospitals to deliver a package of basic primary health services, and included 
interventions targeted at health workers with the intent of improving their work 
motivation. ASSP also phased out performance-based financing (PBF) - performance-
conditional financial incentives to health care providers (Meessen et al., 2011) – in 
twenty health zones where it had been provided by a predecessor programme.  
In addition to informing the ASSP evaluation, we aimed to make use of the motivation 
scale to compare the motivation of health workers who had previously received and 
then experienced the withdrawal of PBF with that of workers who had never received 
PBF. We hypothesised that motivation levels would be lower in workers who had 
previously received PBF but then had them removed, compared with those who had 
never received such payments. The results of this analysis have recently been published 
elsewhere (Maini et al., 2019). 
Designing the motivation measurement tool 
What actually happened 
We intended to quantify health workers’ motivation, using a structured, interviewer-
administered health worker survey. In initially designing the questionnaire, 47 Likert-
type questions or items were selected by the principal investigators of the overall ASSP 
evaluation based on previous surveys they had used in other countries as well as a 
review of the literature (Khan et al., 2013, Hansen et al., 2008, Banteyerga et al., 2010). 
1 In July 2015, the provinces of the DRC underwent ‘decoupage,’ whereby the DRC’s 11 provinces were 
further subdivided into 26. This paper refers to the provinces prior to decoupage. 
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These items were grounded in the Franco conceptual framework of motivation (Franco 
et al., 2002) given its extensive use in other low- and middle-income countries (see 
figure 1). 
Figure 1: Franco framework of motivation 
Legend: The Franco framework conceptualises motivation as being influenced by 
various determinants and consequences at the individual, organisational and societal 
level. Motivation is determined by the congruence of worker and organizational goals 
(“will do” motivation) and factors that are focused on the ability of the individual to 
execute a task (“can do” motivation).   
A month prior to finalisation of the questionnaire, the principal author, who had not up 
to that point been involved in the initial questionnaire design, joined the research team 
as a PhD student and had the opportunity to review, modify and add questions as 
needed. Given the principal author’s interest in measuring motivation within the thesis, 
another rapid literature review on previous motivation surveys in low- and middle-
income countries was undertaken (Prytherch et al., 2012, Agyepong et al., 2004, Penn-
Kekana et al., 2005, Chandler et al., 2009, Faye et al., 2013, Mutale et al., 2013, 
Mbindyo et al., 2009, Alhassan et al., 2013), resulting in 11 further questions being 
added, making a total of 58 items. In order to ensure the final questions were relevant to 
the context and would actually measure what was intended, the principal author 
discussed the items with partners implementing ASSP; this resulted in the proposal of 
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an additional 2 items by development partners. Although the data were collected for 
these additional questions, since these items were not hypothesised to be associated with 
a dimension a priori, they were not included in the analysis of the motivation scale.  
The tool was then translated into French and pre-tested with six health workers in two 
non-study facilities. The purpose of the pre-test was to identify difficulties in 
understanding of questionnaire items, assess non-response rates, test the consent form 
and estimate the length of time to administer the survey. Following the pre-test, only 
minor grammatical changes to the phrasing of two questions were made in order to 
clarify understanding. Additional file 1 summarises the final survey items alongside 
each dimension.  
Key reflections on the questionnaire design process 
Conceptualisation of motivation  
Motivation is often viewed as a complex, multi-dimensional construct. Numerous 
theories and taxonomies of work motivation exist which have their origins in various  
disciplines including behavioural economics and psychology (Franco et al., 2002, 
Maslow, 1943, Kanfer et al., 1999, Deci et al., 1999, Locke, 1997, Herzberg et al., 
2011, Vroom, 1964) Therefore, a clear conceptualisation of motivation, including which 
dimensions of motivation are of interest, is fundamental to developing a good 
measurement instrument that optimally serves the purpose of the study (Borghi et al., 
2017). In retrospect, we had not given this conceptual phase enough room in the design 
of the study and questionnaire. This was also in light of the fact that motivation had not 
been a key focus of the study initially, and that there was very limited time to finalise 
the survey tool.  
The lack of time devoted to conceptual thinking at the design stage had two main 
consequences. First, we chose the Franco motivation framework as the most widely 
used health worker motivation framework in low- and middle-income countries to date 
(Borghi et al., 2017). However, it later became apparent that the Franco framework – 
and tools developed to measure its dimensions – were not ideally suited to answer key 
questions related to health worker motivation and PBF; for example, Self Determination 
Theory (SDT) may have been a more appropriate framework to examine the potential 
crowding out of intrinsic motivation through financial incentives (Lohmann et al., 
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2016). Applying SDT would have also yielded different items to those which were used 
in this study. 
Second, rather than using qualitative research to identify items to measure the 
dimensions of the Franco framework which were relevant to the DRC context, we 
instead worked with questions on motivation which had been used and validated in 
other contexts and then linked them back to the Franco framework of motivation. While 
this has the advantage of efficiency and also that questions had been pre-tested and used 
in other settings, they were not necessarily adapted to the local context. In addition, 
although this did not appear problematic in the design stage as we were able to easily 
assign all items to their respective motivation dimensions, at the analytical stage we 
realized that not all dimensions had been adequately covered, both in regards to their 
conceptual breadth i.e. with respect to the definition and scope of the dimension, and in 
terms of number of items measured per dimension. This was because during the design 
stage, we were thinking less about which dimensions to include and more about which 
items had been used in previous settings. A key lesson therefore was to think about the 
dimensions first and their relevance to the intervention/theory, and then ensure enough 
items were included to measure them. Nonetheless, the more fundamental issue was that 
the Franco framework was not the best fit for the research given the focus on PBF; had 
preliminary qualitative work been undertaken at the outset, this could have been 
identified early on. 
Adaptation to the cultural context 
Another risk in relying on measurement scales from other contexts is that researchers 
may miss aspects and interpretations of motivation unique to the culture of the study 
country (Machungwa and Schmitt, 1983, Rowe et al., 2005, Agyepong et al., 2004). 
This was particularly pertinent to the DRC where no previous studies on health worker 
motivation had been undertaken.  
The principal author came into the research study at a late stage, during a time when 
pressure to finalise the health worker survey was high. This meant it was not possible to 
conduct any preliminary qualitative work with health workers to inform the 
questionnaire design, as recommended by others (Prytherch et al., 2012, Borghi et al., 
2017). Such work could have strengthened the relevance of the motivation scale to the 
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local context. For example, questions on the stability of work contracts and government 
salaries had to be dropped in the analysis stage as they were not applicable to the 
majority of workers (see additional file 2). 
Piloting 
At the piloting stage, for practical reasons, we only tested the tool with four nurses and 
two doctors, all of whom had attained at least a secondary level of education. However, 
a larger variety of cadres and grades of health workers were eventually interviewed in 
the final survey, 6.6% of whom had either only received primary level education or had 
not specified their level of educational attainment. It is possible that the more complex 
questions were not as well understood by those with lower levels of education, as has 
been shown in previous motivation surveys (Bennett, 2000). In addition, the pilot 
sample size was insufficient for undertaking meaningful statistical analysis of the pilot 
data, or allow us to check model fit. Particularly with respect to developing scales, 
authors have recommended a pilot sample size of between 10 to 40 participants per 
group to evaluate adequacy of instrumentation (Hertzog, 2008, Johanson and Brooks, 
2010). An alternative to a large pilot sample size could have entailed using “think-
aloud” interviews. This technique requires participants to verbalise their thoughts while 
completing a task (Willis, 2004), and is being increasingly applied to understand the 
completion of survey questionnaires (Ryan et al., 2009, Collins, 2003, Westerman et al., 
2008, Al-Janabi et al., 2013). Employing this method would potentially have uncovered 
any difficulties with terminology and phrasing, as well as any differences in the 
interpretation of questions. The latter is particularly important in assessing content 
validity, to ensure the instrument measures what it intends to measure.   
Sampling  
What actually happened? 
The motivation measurement scale was embedded within a wider health worker survey 
carried out according to the protocol and sampling strategy of the ASSP impact 
evaluation, which also included a health facility and household survey (Keating et al., 
2013).  As motivation was not a primary outcome for the wider evaluation, the sample 
size calculation was rather based on detecting significant differences in health outcomes 
from the household survey. In total, 210 health facilities were to be sampled. All health 
workers of all cadres present in facilities on the day of the survey were to be 
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interviewed by data collectors trained for the purpose in settings assuring respondent 
privacy. We had assumed that there would be on average 4 health workers in facilities 
based on national statistics on staffing levels, yielding an approximate sample of 840 
respondents. This met the required sample size for confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
of at least 200 observations (Decoster, 1998). More detail on CFA and the rationale for 
using this statistical method is provided in the section “data analysis”.  
Key reflections on sampling  
Sampling issues 
Following data collection, the number of respondents to the health worker survey was 
much lower than expected; the total number interviewed was only 485, almost half the 
number originally estimated, however this still met the requirements for CFA. Reasons 
for the lower number of sampled workers included larger-than-expected discrepancies 
between staff on the payroll and staff actually available for interviews on the data 
collection days, as well as large differences in staffing levels by region and facility type. 
This lower sample size had implications for the analysis stage as detailed below.  
One of the objectives of the research was to compare motivation levels of workers who 
had previously received PBF with those workers who had never received PBF. 
However, the sampling of workers was not undertaken with respect to PBF status but 
rather to evaluate the ASSP programme. As workers in PBF and non-PBF groups were 
not randomly distributed but rather determined by the geographical coverage of the 
predecessor health programme, this resulted in an imbalance in the number of workers 
in each group. This would have implications for the subsequent data analysis, and is 
also discussed later on.   
Data analysis 
What actually happened? 
We chose CFA to validate the motivation scale by empirically confirming the initial 
attribution of questionnaire items to motivation dimensions in the Franco framework. 
This was deemed more appropriate than exploratory factor analysis (EFA) as we had a 
prior hypothesis on the dimensions of motivation which would be relevant to the 
Congolese context; EFA on the other hand is useful when there is no prior theory about 
which items pertain to which dimension (Borghi et al., 2017).  
133
CFA largely supported the assumed item attribution with a few modifications (see 
additional file 2 for details). We then calculated scores for each motivation dimension as 
unweighted means of responses to items within each dimension, since within each 
dimension, item-factor loadings were of approximately the same magnitude. Multiple 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models were employed to examine the 
determinants of these ‘composite’ scores for different dimensions of motivation.  
We also applied measurement invariance testing to examine whether the motivation 
scale had the same measurement properties in the sample of health workers which had 
been previously exposed to PBF and those who had never received PBF.  
Key reflections on the analysis stage 
Confirmatory factor analysis 
On average, each dimension originally had four items assigned to it. However, in the 
course of the CFA model fitting, we had to drop a number of items which did not 
correlate with other items as intended (see additional file 2). For most of these items, ill 
model fit made us realize suboptimal or ambiguous phrasing of items within the scale, 
implying that dimensions were not well measured by questions. In retrospect and as 
discussed above, it would have been good to conduct a more extensive quantitative 
piloting of the scale, as this might have given us a chance to detect these issues before 
the main data collection.  
Dropping some items in the CFA model fitting stage is a frequent reality of 
psychometric research (Kline, 1998, Borghi et al., 2017).  Nonetheless, the risk, as in 
our case, is that it results in some motivation dimensions being covered by only one or 
two items. This is not only problematic from a psychometric point of view, where a 
minimum of three items per dimension is recommended, but also from a conceptual 
point of view, as one can question whether a complex motivation construct can be 
assessed in its conceptual breadth by only one questionnaire item. In hindsight, it would 
have been good to anticipate the potential loss of items during analysis, and to include 
more items per dimension within the initial survey. In the current study, however, this 
would have been problematic as the survey was already very long.  It may have been 
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more appropriate to have had a separate survey solely focussed on measuring 
motivation rather than a motivation scale integrated into a larger survey.   
Testing for measurement invariance 
A key part of the analysis was to identify whether there were differences in the 
motivation of workers who had previously received PBF and those who had not. 
Measurement invariance tests for equal measurement properties within subgroups and is 
applied within a CFA framework (Borghi et al., 2017).  
Measurement invariance testing does not necessitate a much larger sample than a simple 
CFA, at least so long as the subgroups to be compared are of similar size (Kline, 1998). 
This was unfortunately not the case for us. As described above, the sampling strategy 
was designed for the primary purpose of the ASSP impact evaluation. It resulted in a 
comparatively much smaller sample of health workers previously exposed to PBF 
(previous PBF group = 118 workers, non-PBF group = 335 workers). To avoid having 
an unbalanced sample for measurement invariance testing, we tested the previous PBF 
group alongside a random sample of a similar number of workers not exposed to PBF. 
However, the small sample sizes (118 in the previous PBF group versus 124 in the non-
PBF group) ended up affecting the precision of measurement invariance testing (Meade 
and Bauer, 2007). Although strong invariance was still identified for a number of 
dimensions, two dimensions were not invariant which meant that any differences in 
scores between groups needed to be interpreted with caution.  
Multiple regressions versus Structural Equation Modelling 
We employed multiple regression techniques to compare composite scores between 
respondents previously versus never exposed to PBF. The use of composite scores 
inevitably results in a loss of information on potentially important variance at the 
individual item level as variation is averaged out in the calculation process. Structural 
Equation Modelling (SEM), on the other hand, is a more sophisticated technique which 
preserves full information in the data (Skrondal and Laake, 2001). 
However, using SEM for substantive regression analyses often requires large sample 
sizes given the large number of parameters to be estimated (Wolf et al., 2013), and was 
therefore unfortunately not an option for us. So long as measurement invariance testing 
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supports equal measurement properties across groups, however, comparing composite 
scores across groups is a good second-best strategy to SEM for each group, and possibly 
even easier than SEM in terms of communicating the results to policy makers.  
Lessons learnt 
Several practical lessons were learned from our experience of trying to measure the 
motivation of health workers in the DRC. The main lesson was that the conceptual and 
survey design stage is critical as it lays the foundations for data collection and analysis. 
Any short-comings and omissions at the design stage inevitably manifest themselves at 
the analysis and interpretation stage.  
Therefore, where possible, it is worth investing time and resources when designing the 
motivation measurement instrument, particularly in clarifying how motivation should be 
conceptualised in the specific context of application. If possible, preliminary qualitative 
research will be immensely helpful in this regard. It may make sense to involve experts 
in psychometrics early on in order to ensure that measurements derived with the tool 
can be subjected to as rigorous an analysis as possible.  
Further, we did not give enough consideration to the number and characteristics of 
workers who would be sampled, and how they would respond to the questionnaire. It is 
recommended to pre-test and pilot the tools with respondents who are as representative 
of the final survey sample as possible to limit biases, and ensure clarity and 
comprehension of questions.  In addition, researchers may wish to consider undertaking 
some “think-aloud” interviews with a small sample of respondents to ensure consistency 
of measurement and reduce ambiguities.  
Finally, although the field of health worker motivation is gaining interest in low- and 
middle-income countries, it is still not regarded as a priority outcome in the context of 
large-scale impact evaluations of health programmes targeting health workers. This was 
evidenced here by the limited time available to develop the scale and reliance on using 
questions from previous studies without tailoring them adequately to the context. Given 
the central role played by health workers in health systems, we strongly advocate for 
affording the issue of health worker motivation and its drivers more prominence in 
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research, as this will ultimately help to inform more effective interventions aimed at 
improving healthcare delivery.  
In conclusion, we hope that our lessons learnt from this experience are useful to other 
researchers embarking on developing tools to measure health worker motivation or 
related constructs such as satisfaction or attitudes, particularly in contexts where they 
have not been studied previously. 
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Additional file 1: Dimensions and associated items in final survey tool 
Dimension Item 
Conscientiousness I am confident about my ability to handle my work 
I effectively cope with any new challenges that occur in my work life 
At work you can always depend on me 
My work is always of high quality 
I am a hard worker 
I always arrive on time to work 
I spend my time at work on work-related activities 
I am careful not to make mistakes at work 
When I am not sure how to treat a patient’s condition I look for information 
or ask for advice 
I do things which need to be done without being asked or told 
Pride This facility has a good reputation in the community 
It is a source of pride to work here 
I feel I am doing something important in this work 
The other workers are proud to deliver good care to patients 
Training How do you rate your opportunities to upgrade your skills and knowledge? 
How do you rate your ability to put into practice what you have learned 
from training?  
How do you rate how you and your colleagues are chosen to attend 
training? 
I have received sufficient training to do my job well 
Tasks How do you rate the description of your job role and tasks? 
How do you rate satisfaction with your workload? 
How do you rate the division of work between you and your colleagues? 
How do you rate the division of work between caring for patients and other 
tasks? 




How do you rate the availability of medicines in the health facility? 
How do you rate the availability of equipment in the health facility? 
How do you rate the availability of medical supplies in the health facility? 
Income reflects 
effort  
The effort that we at this facility put into this job is reflected in our pay 
My job offers adequate pay compared with similar jobs 
The income I receive is a fair reflection of my skills, knowledge and training 
Sufficiency of 
income 
The income that I receive from working at this facility more than covers my 
basic needs such as food, transport, and accommodation 
Organizational 
culture  
How do you rate your working relationships with upper-level staff? 
How do you rate your working relationship with colleagues? 
How do you rate the transparency of the management of financial resources 
by the facility? 
How do you rate your participation in decision-making to resolve problems 
in the facility? 
Community 
relationships 
How do your rate your relationship with local leaders in the community 
Turnover intention I intend to leave this facility as soon as I can find another position 
Extrinsic 
motivation 
I only do this job so that I get paid at the end of the month 
Supplementary files for research paper 2
Note: Additional file 2 is the  same as supplementary file 2 for research paper 2
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Abstract
Background: A motivated workforce is necessary to ensure the delivery of high quality health services. In developing 
countries, performance-based financing (PBF) is often employed to increase motivation by providing financial incentives 
linked to performance. However, given PBF schemes are usually funded by donors, their long-term financing is not 
always assured, and the effects of withdrawing PBF on motivation are largely unknown. This cross-sectional study aimed 
to identify differences in motivation between workers who recently had donor-funded PBF withdrawn, with workers 
who had not received PBF. 
Methods: Quantitative data were collected from 485 health workers in 5 provinces using a structured survey containing 
questions on motivation which were based on an established motivation framework. Confirmatory factor analysis was 
used to verify dimensions of motivation, and multiple regression to assess differences in motivation scores between 
workers who had previously received PBF and those who never had. Qualitative interviews were also carried out in Kasai 
Occidental province with 16 nurses who had previously or never received PBF. 
Results: The results indicated that workers in facilities where PBF had been removed scored significantly lower on 
most dimensions of motivation compared to workers who had never received PBF. The removal of the PBF scheme was 
blamed for an exodus of staff due to the dramatic reduction in income, and negatively impacted on relationships between 
staff and the local community. 
Conclusion: Donors and governments unable to sustain PBF or other donor-payments should have clear exit strategies 
and institute measures to mitigate any adverse effects on motivation following withdrawal.
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Implications for policy makers
• This research indicates that the withdrawal of donor-funded payments may have harmful repercussions for health worker motivation and
service delivery.
• Programmes unable to sustain donor-funded payments to health workers should develop realistic exit strategies and institute measures to
mitigate against any adverse effects on motivation prior to withdrawal. 
• Governments and donors designing new performance-based financing (PBF) schemes or programmes involving supplemental payments to
workers should consider whether the short-term advantages of introducing additional health worker payments outweigh the potential adverse 
long-term consequences in the event that donor financing ceases. 
Implications for the public
This research has demonstrated the potential negative implications for health worker motivation when donor-funded payments provided through 
a performance-based financing (PBF) scheme are withdrawn. PBF is increasingly being employed by the international community as a mechanism 
to enhance worker motivation and performance in fragile settings. However, the long-term funding for PBF is not always guaranteed. This study 
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Background
Human resources for health are one of the core pillars of 
health systems,1 and the performance of health workers 
directly affects the quality of health services. Knowledge and 
competency are not the only influences of health worker 
performance.2,3 Studies have confirmed that there are 
differences in practice between what health workers “know” 
should be performed, and what they actually “do,” and this is 
termed the “know-do” gap.4 Alongside other factors including 
enabling working conditions, motivation is thought to be one 
bridge in overcoming this gap,5 and is often defined as the 
“degree of willingness of an individual to exert and maintain 
an effort towards attaining organisational goals.”6 
In developing countries, health workers face many 
challenges to delivering services, including inadequate 
resources, supervision and training. In such settings, highly 
motivated workers will attempt to overcome such obstacles in 
order to be as productive as possible. Addressing poor health 
worker motivation can therefore lead to significant gains in 
efficiency and performance.7-9
One way of influencing motivation is through incentives, 
which may be financial or non-financial. Financial incentives 
are monetary rewards given to a worker,10 while non-
financial incentives include: career development, resource 
availability, hospital management, supervisory support 
and recognition.11-14 With respect to financial incentives, 
performance-based financing (PBF) can be employed, 
and involves the transfer of funds (either totally or in part) 
to health workers based on their attaining a pre-defined 
level of performance. However, while PBF is expected to 
increase motivation and therefore effort, in some low-income 
countries and fragile states, the effects of introducing PBF 
upon motivation have produced mixed results; workers in 
Rwanda reported increased levels of motivation under a PBF 
scheme,15,16 while a study in Afghanistan indicated that PBF 
did not have a bearing on motivation and performance.17 
In Malawi, PBF appeared to impact upon health worker 
motivation through different mechanisms, for example 
by improving their working environment.18 The authors 
recommended PBF schemes should be designed and 
implemented in anticipation of the different ways they will 
influence motivation, in order to ensure effects on motivation 
can be maximised.18,19
Donors often initially fund PBF in low-income country 
settings. According to the World Bank’s Results Based 
Financing for health website, the Health Results and 
Innovation Trust Fund has committed US$385.6 million to 
funding PBF programmes in 29 countries, which is linked to 
US$2 billion in financing from the International Development 
Association.20 Yet, with the exception of a few countries 
including Rwanda, Republic of Congo, and Burundi,21-23 
the availability of government financing to take over such 
donor-funded schemes is not always assured. The volatility 
and unreliability of foreign financing could leave developing 
countries vulnerable if donors were to withdraw their aid. 
Given financing is not always secure, knowledge of the 
implications of terminating such donor-funded payments 
is urgently needed to counteract any potentially harmful 
consequences for health worker motivation. To date, the 
authors are only aware of one study which was undertaken 
by Huillery and Seban,16 that examined the withdrawal of 
donor-funding in a low-income country which was the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It compared health 
worker motivation between 2 groups – one receiving an 
exclusively performance-based payment, and the other group 
receiving a fixed payment of the same amount. The findings 
indicated that the motivation of workers was higher under the 
performance payment compared to the fixed payment, but 
following the removal of both payments, worker motivation 
was lower in the group which had received the performance 
payment. The study further found that the previous PBF 
group placed greater importance on financial motives than on 
non-material motives compared to the fixed payment group, 
which could not be attributed to a decrease in worker income.
Our study goes beyond the work undertaken by Huillery 
and Seban in that it examines differences observed across 
a vast range of dimensions of motivation between 2 groups 
of health workers; one group who recently experienced the 
removal of a donor-funded PBF scheme (comprising of both 
a fixed and variable payment related to performance) and 
another group of workers who were not exposed to PBF. The 
study also qualitatively explores how the withdrawal of PBF 
affected health workers, and reasons behind any differences 
identified between the 2 groups. 
Study Setting
Like many fragile states, the DRC struggles to provide basic 
healthcare to its citizens.24 Despite the domestic health budget 
mainly serving to finance health workers, few public sector 
health workers receive their government salary at all.25,26 
Consequently, several donors have implemented PBF in an 
attempt to motivate the health workforce and enhance quality 
of care.27
Between 2008 and 2013, the Department for International 
Development (DFID) provided funding to 2 international 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to support health 
centres and hospitals to deliver a package of basic primary 
health services. The programme was called Access To 
Healthcare (ATH), and was implemented in 20 health zones 
in the provinces of Kasai Occidental, Province Orientale, 
Maniema, and South Kivu in the DRC[1]. The programme 
heavily subsidised user fees and additionally implemented 
PBF, involving monthly supplemental fixed payments to public 
sector health workers of $75 plus a monthly performance-
based payment ($25). Facilities were scored against a series of 
quantitative performance targets, for example the attainment 
of 80% coverage for assisted births. Workers only received the 
performance payment if their facility achieved above a certain 
total score. Verification of performance was conducted by 
the implementing partners, who compared reported health 
service indicators with those found in health facility registers, 
and also visited a sample of patients recorded on the register 
to cross-check accuracy of information. 
At the end of ATH in March 2013, DFID commenced 
a follow-on programme called Accès Aux Soins de Santé 
Primaire (Access to Primary Health Care or ASSP) in a total 
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of 56 health zones – the 20 health zones of ATH, and a further 
11 zones in Equateur and 25 zones in Kasai Occidental 
(Figure 1).
The ASSP programme continues to support the provision 
of essential primary health services. However, during the first 
year of ASSP, PBF (both the supplemental fixed payment and 
performance payment) to health workers was phased out in the 
20 health zones of the previous ATH programme by $25 every 
3 months. Firstly, the $25 performance-based component of 
the payment was withdrawn 3 months after the start of the 
new ASSP programme (in July 2013). Then the fixed income 
component was reduced by $25 every 3 months thereafter, so 
all donor-funded payments to workers had ended by March 
2014. Therefore, after 5 years of implementation under ATH, 
PBF was removed in a structured and gradual way under the 
successor programme ASSP. This occurred in tandem with a 
marginal increase in the user fee tariff, in an effort to help 
substitute health workers’ loss of revenue. 
Conceptual Framework
Over 70 years of research particularly in psychology and 
behavioural economics have led to numerous definitions, 
theories, and taxonomies of motivation in general and 
work motivation in specific.28 Motivation is usually viewed 
as a complex, multi-dimensional construct. For instance, 
motivation is often distinguished into different forms by its 
drivers (eg, extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation28,29; Hackman 
and Oldham’s Job Characteristics Model)30 or by its locus 
of causality (Self-Determination Theory).31 Other theories 
such as goal setting theory are concerned with individuals’ 
cognitive processes leading to motivated behaviour, it’s 
direction, intensity, and duration.28 Along with this variety 
of conceptualisations, numerous motivation measurement 
tools have been developed and validated, attempting to 
capture motivation either by asking directly about, or by 
asking about or observing proxies (eg, asking for factors 
assumed to be closely associated with motivation, such as 
working conditions; observing behaviours assumed to be the 
consequence of motivation).32,33 
In low- and middle-income country (LMIC) health 
systems, interest in understanding the work motivation 
of the healthcare workforce is recent, but more and more 
studies are being conducted and published.18,19,34-39 Motivation 
researchers in LMICs struggle not only with the many 
available conceptualisations and measures, but also with the 
fact that very few have been validated and/or customised to 
the specific cultural contexts and work settings.33 Notable 
exceptions include a Self-Determination Theory-based 
psychometric scale,36 as well as the Franco framework.8,40,41 
The Franco framework, which was also used in this study, 
is to date the most widely used framework in the current 
body of literature on work motivation of health workers in 
LMICs and captures motivation indirectly through various 
assumed motivational determinants and consequences at 
the individual, organisational and societal level (Figure 2). 
These determinants are described as either affecting the “will-
do” component of motivation, the alignment of individual’s 
goals to that of the organisation, or the “can-do” component 
of motivation, which refers to the ability of the individual to 
mobilise resources to execute a task. Individual motivation 
outcomes are the result of the interaction between the “can-
do” and “will-do” components of motivation, and can be 
affective, cognitive and behavioural. Affective outcomes 
concern health workers’ satisfaction, cognitive outcomes relate 
to health workers’ perceptions of their job, and behavioural 
outcomes relate to the performance of health workers. This 
study conceptualises motivation according to the Franco 
framework, measuring the impact of PBF withdrawal on 
various motivational determinants and consequences. In the 
following sections, we use the term ‘dimensions’ to refer to 
Figure 1. Health Zones in the DRC Supported by Different Health Programmes Funded by DFID. Abbreviations: ASSP, Access to Primary Healthcare (2013-2018); 
ATH, Access to Healthcare (2008-2013); DRC, Democratic Republic of Congo; DFID, Department for International Development.
20 health zones supported previously 
by ATH and now ASSP
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the individual-level determinants and consequences through 
which motivation is defined and measured in the Franco 
framework.
Methods
The study employed a mixed methods triangulation design. 
In line with Creswell and colleagues,42,43 we use the term 
triangulation to refer to the use of different methods of data 
collection and analysis to explore different aspects of the 
‘phenomenon.’ Specifically, we use quantitative methods to 
quantify motivational factors, and qualitative methods to 
elucidate the reasons why there may have been differences 
in motivation scores between health workers who had 
previously been exposed to PBF and health workers who had 
not been exposed. Quantitative data were collected through a 
health worker survey and allowed a comparison of scores on 
motivation dimensions between workers who had experienced 
PBF withdrawal with workers who had never received PBF; in 
other words, those who had been working in ATH areas prior 
to ASSP (previous PBF group) with workers who had not been 
covered by the ATH programme (non-PBF group). This latter 
group included workers covered by the ASSP programme as 
well as those working in non-ASSP health zones to enable a 
larger sample for comparison, and implementation of ASSP 
was still at an early stage. Qualitative data were collected using 
semi-structured interviews. Triangulation of quantitative and 
qualitative findings occurred at the interpretative stage. 
Quantitative Data
Using Franco’s framework,6 dimensions of motivation 
were identified. To identify questionnaire items to measure 
each dimension, an extensive review of health worker 
motivation surveys was performed and appropriate items 
collected.11,39,41,44-53 Identified items and dimensions were 
discussed with development partners to confirm the selection 
was relevant to the setting. However, it was not possible to 
cover all specified dimensions of motivation according to the 
Franco framework given other competing priorities of the 
health worker survey. As a result, we had to be conservative 
on the number of questions and therefore dimensions of 
motivation that we could measure. The final dimensions 
selected were those deemed to be of greatest importance and 
applicability to the DRC context. 
The final questions were then incorporated into the health 
worker survey, which also gathered demographic information 
on health workers, including: age, gender, cadre, educational 
attainment, number of years worked, and number of financial 
dependents. Small revisions were made following a pre-test of 
the survey in 2 non-study facilities in Kinshasa and a facility in 
Bas-Congo. All items were answered on a 5-point Likert scale, 
with certain question responses worded “strongly disagree” 
to “strongly agree” and others worded “very dissatisfied” to 
“very satisfied.” The response “not applicable” was included 
for items where it was possible the question was not relevant. 
Sampling
The surveys were undertaken as part of a baseline evaluation 
of ASSP.54 Province Orientale and Maniema were combined 
to form one sampling domain, Kasai Occidental and Kasai 
Oriental formed another, and Equateur was its own sampling 
domain. 105 primary care facilities in ASSP areas were 
randomly sampled and matched with 105 facilities on urban/
rural status and catchment population size in areas where 
ASSP was not operational (35 intervention and 35 control 
facilities in each sampling domain). Therefore, although this 
study was nested within the ASSP baseline evaluation, the 
sampling of facilities and workers had not taken into account 
coverage of the previous ATH programme ie, whether 
workers belonged to the “previous PBF group” or “non-PBF 
group.” This latter group included workers working in non-
ASSP health zones as well as ASSP zones which had not been 
covered by ATH. As a result, there was an imbalance in the 
final sample of former PBF workers compared to non-PBF 
workers, with a far greater number of the latter. For this study, 
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the intervention group was workers in ASSP that had received 
PBF, and the comparison group were workers (ASSP or non-
ASSP) who had not received PBF. Figure 3 illustrates the 
results of facility sampling by PBF status.
All workers providing clinical services and on duty on the 
day of the survey were interviewed from sampled facilities. 
The head of the facility also completed a facility survey to 
determine the total number of staff, population served, and 
the number of services provided at the facility. 
Data were collected between April and May 2014, which 
meant that any workers sampled in the previous PBF group had 
stopped receiving any donor-funded payments for at least one 
month. The Kinshasa School of Public Health in collaboration 
with Tulane University hired and trained data collectors from 
each of the sampled provinces to administer the surveys. 
Data collectors explained the purpose, confidentiality and 
anonymity of the study to each health worker in obtaining 
informed consent to participate in the survey. 
Statistical Analyses
Survey data were double-entered into the computer database 
CSPro for verification before being imported into and analysed 
in Stata 13 and R 3.4.2 statistical software. Descriptive statistics 
were used to explore the demographic characteristics of health 
workers and facility characteristics overall, and differences 
between the previous and non-PBF groups assessed using 
chi-square and t tests. For the motivation dimensions, 
psychometric item analysis, examining item distributions, 
summary statistics, and correlation patterns, was undertaken 
in Stata 13 for both the overall sample and the previous PBF 
and non-PBF subgroups (see Supplementary file 1, Table S1). 
Items which clearly did not correspond well with the other 
items pertaining to their intended dimension were dropped 
(see Supplementary file 2, Table S2). The final 11 motivation 
dimensions, along with hypotheses on how PBF withdrawal 
may affect these, are listed in Table 1. 
Prior to the analysis, in the few cases where individuals 
missed a response to an item, missing responses were replaced 
by imputation of the median value of their responses to other 
items pertaining to the same dimension. Confirmatory 
factor analysis, which was carried out in R 3.4.2 using a 
robust maximum likelihood estimator, indicated a good 
model fit for the 11-factor model (χ2 (476) = 816, P = .000; 
RMSEA = 0.040, P(RMSEA<.05) = 1.000; CFI = 0.902; 
SRMR = 0.045), confirming that the 34 motivation-related 
items measured the 11 motivation dimensions as intended. 
Cronbach alpha was greater than 0.60 for all dimensions with 
3 or more items. Factors with more than one item were also 
tested for measurement invariance across both PBF groups. 
Measurement invariance testing aims to confirm that the scale 
has the same measurement properties in different subsamples 
and scores can therefore meaningfully be compared across 
samples. Establishing measurement invariance involves 
a hierarchy of testing, which include tests of weak and 
strong invariance.69 Strong invariance was identified for the 
dimensions: ‘conscientiousness,’ ‘pride’ and ‘training,’ weak 
invariance for ‘organisational culture’ and ‘tasks,’ while only 
‘availability of equipment/supplies’ and ‘income reflects 
effort’ were not invariant and differences between subsamples 
therefore need to be interpreted with caution. 
Scores for each dimension were then calculated as 
unweighted means of responses to items within each 
dimension, as within each dimension, item-factor loadings 
were of approximately the same magnitude. Multiple linear 
regression models with an ordinary least squares estimator 
as the standard were used to test for significant differences 
in motivation scores between workers from the non-PBF 
group and workers in the previous PBF group, controlling 
for health worker and facility characteristics including: age, 
gender, health worker cadre, education, years worked in 
current position, location, type of facility, number of services 
provided, and presence of the ASSP programme. Table S3 in 
Supplementary file 3 indicates how different characteristics 
may have influenced motivation scores, based on the global 
Figure 3. Diagram Showing Sampling of Facilities Under the Baseline Evaluation and the Selection of Intervention and Comparison Groups for This Study.  Abbreviations: 
ASSP,  Access to Primary Healthcare (2013-2018);  ATH, Access to Healthcare (2008-2013); PBF, Performance-based financing.
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Table 1. Final Motivation Dimensions, Link to Franco Framework, and Hypothesis on how PBF Removal May Affect Dimensions
Link to Franco Framework Dimension (Link to Franco Framework) Description of Dimension
How Expected Withdrawal of 
the Donor-Funded Payment 
May Affect Dimension







Perception of level of discipline, effort 
and care put into work Decrease
The introduction of PBF has been shown to increase worker effort55, as well 
as reduce absenteeism.56 The study by Huillery and Seban showed that staff 
attendance reduced significantly following the withdrawal of PBF.16 It also 
reduced in the group where the fixed payment was removed but not to the same 





Pride associated with working at the 
facility Decrease
According to incentive theory, the introduction of financial rewards may ”crowd 
out” intrinsic motivation (which includes feelings of pride); this crowding out 
phenomenon is more likely when employees have high initial levels of intrinsic 
motivation, eg, when pride in one's work is high and the activity is interesting.57 
The evidence around this is contradictory with respect to PBF.58 For example, 
health workers in Bubanza province of Burundi claimed that PBF helped to 
generate pride and professionalism, while in another Burundian province, the 
PBF bonus was gradually perceived as a right and a fixed extra which may have 
led to less intrinsic motivation.59 In addition, the theory does not predict what 
happens to intrinsic motivation when the reward is withdrawn, If there is a 
shift in fundamental motivation composition caused by financial rewards, one 






Importance health workers place on 
external rewards Increase
The importance placed on external rewards by workers receiving PBF has been 
observed in other studies, and manifest through workers prioritising tasks linked 
to higher incentives,15,60,61 or gaming.15,62 Huillery and Seban also found that more 
attention was paid to financial motives relative to intrinsic motives following the 
withdrawal of PBF, and that this was not due to the decrease in worker salary.16 





Degree to which health workers feel 
like their income is sufficient given 
their basic monetary needs
Decrease
Although there is no evidence on this from previous studies, it is expected that 
workers will perceive the sufficiency of income to be less following withdrawal 






Degree to which health workers feel 
income received reflects the amount 
of effort put into work
Decrease
Although there is no evidence on this from previous studies, it is expected that 
workers will likely perceive their (reduced) income as less appropriate in relation 
to effort following withdrawal of PBF, as workers would be expected to perform 
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Organisational level
Training (processes) Satisfaction with training received and opportunities for training No effect
The PBF scheme did not include training and so its withdrawal would not be 
expected to have an effect on workers’ satisfaction with training. Levels of 
training offered would be the same in the previous PBF and non-PBF groups.
3
Tasks (processes) Satisfaction with workload and variety of tasks performed No effect
The withdrawal of the PBF scheme was not accompanied by a change in service 
organisation or workload. Therefore, no difference in this dimension was 





Satisfaction with availability of 
resources such as equipment, medical 
supplies and medications
No effect
The PBF scheme did not include increased equipment or supplies and so its 
withdrawal would not be expected to have an effect on workers’ satisfaction 
with the availability of equipment or supplies. The availability of equipment and 








Satisfaction with relationships with 
colleagues and management of the 
facility
Decrease
PBF has been shown to increase levels of collegial support in Mozambique.63 
The potential volatility of PBF was noted to be a source of stress for the heads 
of facilities in the DRC,16 so the withdrawal was anticipated to negatively affect 
health workers’ satisfaction with interpersonal relationships at work. PBF has 
recently been shown by some studies to improve supervision due to the levels 
of reporting and monitoring required.63,64 Therefore, it was plausible that this 








Satisfaction with relationships with 
local leaders in the community Decrease
In Rwanda, PBF was evaluated to have a positive effect on patient satisfaction,65 
which could improve community relationships with health providers. Yet, the 
presence of PBF did not have any impact on patient satisfaction according to 
Huillery and Seban’s study.16 Therefore, withdrawal either expected to have no 






Intention to leave the facility Increase
 Lack of satisfaction with salary (amongst other job aspects such as career 
opportunities) has been associated with higher turnover intention in a number 
of studies.66-68 Therefore, a reduction in income through PBF withdrawal would 
be likely to increase staff turnover intention.
1
Abbreviations: PBF, performance-based financing; DRC, Democratic Republic of Congo. 
a Although the dimensions “Management” and “Organisational Culture” are treated as separate entities within the conceptual framework, they were merged together as items relating to management were worded in a way that they reflected 
organisational culture.
Link to Franco Framework Dimension (Link to Franco Framework) Description of Dimension
How Expected Withdrawal of 
the Donor-Funded Payment 
May Affect Dimension
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evidence.
The dependent variable was the score on each dimension. 
Standard errors (SEs) were clustered at facility-level and 
ordinary least squares assumptions checked using regression 
diagnostics.
Qualitative Data
Qualitative data were collected in November 2014 in Kasai 
Occidental. Two health zones where workers had previously 
received PBF under the ATH programme were selected 
purposively, as well as another 2 health zones where workers 
had never received PBF. Two facilities in each health zone most 
easily accessible by road were then chosen by the researchers. 
One female and 1 male nurse were purposively selected from 
a single facility in each of the 4 health zones, as nurses are 
the main cadre present in primary care facilities.70 They were 
then interviewed subject to consent and meeting a further 
inclusion criterion, which was to have been based at the same 
facility for at least 1 year. Workers identified for interview 
in the non-PBF group were excluded if they had previously 
received PBF over the past 5 years. In-depth interviews were 
conducted using a semi-structured interview guide. As the 
purpose was to help further understand quantitative findings, 
perceptions and differences in the pre-identified dimensions 
of motivation were explored. The guide was pre-tested in a 
health centre before being finalised. The primary author (RM) 
and an experienced local qualitative researcher familiar with 
the cultural context performed all 16 interviews in French, 
and these were audio-recorded subject to participant consent. 
None of the respondents declined to participate. Interviews 
lasted one to 2 hours and were undertaken in a private room 
within facilities to maintain confidentiality.
Analysis
Audio recordings were transcribed in French by the local 
researcher to maximize accuracy and reviewed by RM, thus 
enabling both researchers to familiarise themselves with the 
data prior to coding. Nvivo 10 software was used to manage 
the qualitative data. Thematic analysis71,72 was employed using 
both deductive coding based on the dimensions measured 
in the quantitative analysis as codes, as well as inductive 
coding allowing the framework to evolve as interviews were 
analysed. RM and the local researcher independently initially 
coded the transcripts and then met for an analysis session 
which involved discussing the themes generated. During the 
analysis session, it was clear that the researchers’ individual 
interpretations of the transcripts were very similar; any 
differences that did occur were resolved by discussion. Results 
were than compared and contrasted for the previous PBF and 
non-PBF groups. In writing up the findings, RM translated 
quotes from French into English. 
Results
Quantitative Analysis
A total of 485 workers were interviewed and no one declined 
to participate in the survey. Three facilities did not meet 
the inclusion criteria as they were private facilities, and 
23 respondents were not classified as health workers. On 
elimination, this left 453 respondents from 202 facilities for 
analysis. 
Descriptive Statistics
The results of this study compare the PBF group with the 
non-PBF group; although the latter group comprised both 
ASSP and non-ASSP facilities, on testing for differences in 
characteristics, the only significant differences identified 
were at facility-level for provincial location and the number 
of services provided, as shown in Table 2. However, there 
were no differences between health worker characteristics. 
Given the ASSP programme had not fully commenced 
implementation when sampling occurred, it is not surprising 
that characteristics were broadly similar. Hence they were 
merged into one comparison group for analysis. Table 2 
presents the characteristics of sampled facilities, 36 of which 
were in areas where PBF had been operational. There were 
significant differences in the numbers of previous PBF and 
non-PBF facilities between provinces, as most of the previous 
PBF facilities were based in Maniema and the non-PBF 
facilities in Equateur. The majority of facilities were located in 
rural areas, with previous PBF facilities having a significantly 
higher number of personnel and offering more services 
compared to non-PBF facilities.
Most health workers surveyed were nurses and male (Table 
3). The majority had attained either a primary or secondary 
level of school education and mean job tenure was almost 9 
years. There were no significant differences in the composition 
of cadres working in previous PBF facilities compared to 
the non-PBF group, although previous PBF workers were 
significantly older and more likely to have had a university/
post-secondary school education.
Comparison of Motivation Scores Between Previous PBF and 
Non-PBF Groups 
Mean and median composite scores for the dimensions of 
motivation overall and by PBF status are shown in Table 
4. The dimension ‘satisfaction with sufficiency of income’
had the lowest mean score, whereas the highest mean
scores were observed for items related to the dimension
‘level of conscientiousness.’ The largest difference in means
between PBF groups was for ‘satisfaction with availability of
equipment/supplies’ where the non-PBF group scored much
higher. Mean and median scores for individual scale items are
provided in the supplementary information (Table 1).
Testing for mean differences using regression and 
controlling for health worker and facility characteristics 
as described in the methods, we found that health workers 
in previous PBF facilities scored significantly lower on all 
dimensions except ‘satisfaction with tasks’ (no significant 
differences) and ‘level of extrinsic motivation’ (marginally 
significantly higher scores) compared to those in non-PBF 
facilities. Table 5 summarises the regression results (separate 
models were run for each dimension).
Qualitative Findings
Sixteen nurses in total were interviewed; 8 in each PBF group, 
of which 4 were male and 4 were female. Ages of respondents 
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Table 2. Characteristics of Previous PBF and Non-PBF Facilities Sampled
Facility characteristics Total (n = 202) Non-PBF (n = 166) Previous PBF (n = 36) Test Statistic, P Value
Number of facilities 202 166 36
Facility location
Urban 14.8% 12.0% 25.0%
χ2 (1) = 5.10, P = .024
Rural 85.2% 88.0% 75.0%
Province
Equateur 33.7% 41.0% (ASSP: 52.3%, non-ASSP: 33.7%) 0.0%
χ2 (4) = 100.30, P < .0001
(Between non-PBF facilities: 
χ2 (4) = 39.22, P < .0001)
Kasai Occidental 28.2% 32.5% (ASSP: 47.7%, non-ASSP: 22.8%) 8.3%
Kasai Oriental 6.0% 7.2% (ASSP: 0%, non-ASSP: 11.9%) 0.0%
Maniema 17.3% 5.4% (ASSP: 0%, non-ASSP: 8.9%) 72.2%
Province Orientale 14.9% 13.9% (ASSP: 0%, non-ASSP: 22.8%) 19.4%
Type of facility
Health centre/health post 85.2% 85.5% 87.0%
χ2 (1) = 0.28, P = .598
Reference health centre 14.4% 14.5% 13.9%
Mean Mean, SE Mean, SE
Number of different services 
provided by facility (eg, antenatal 
care, vaccinations etc) (Total n = 
194, non-PBF = 160, PBF = 34)
6.97a
6.83 ± 0.13a
ASSP: 6.35 ± 1.50; 
non-ASSP: 7.16 ± 1.62
7.65 ± 0.22a
t = -2.76, P = .0064
(Between non-PBF facilities:
t = -3.22, P = .0015)
Total clinical staff present on the 
day
6.31 5.45 ± 0.32 10.28 ± 0.83 t = -6.09, P < .0001
Population catchment for area
(Total n = 163, non-PBF = 135, PBF 
= 28)
2710.31a 2725.64 ± 236.40a 2636.39 ± 431.04a t = 0.16, P = .8725 
Abbreviations: PBF, performance-based financing; SE, standard error; ASSP, Access to Primary Health Care. 
a N less than total number of facilities for some variables due to missing values.
in each group were of similar ranges and those in previous PBF 
facilities had worked between 2 and 16 years at the facilities, 
while in the non-PBF group they had worked between one 
and 10 years. The sections that follow describe the process of 
PBF withdrawal and how it may have affected the individual, 
organisation and community, with due comparison to the 
non-PBF group where relevant.
Process of Performance-Based Financing Withdrawal
The key complaint from the previous PBF group around the 
process of withdrawing the PBF scheme was that it had been 
both abrupt and poorly communicated.
“When the new partner removed the prime (PBF scheme) 
we did not even know that they had removed the prime…we 
were not informed” [Respondent 1: Male 42 years, previous 
PBF].
This led to some resentment from workers in the previous 
PBF group towards the NGO implementing the ASSP 
programme. Workers also felt it was the responsibility of 
international partners to finance them, rather than that of the 
government. 
“For me, I would like it to be as before…I wish, there was 
another partner (NGO/donor) that can take care of us, so we 
can receive money at the end of each month” [Respondent 2: 
Female, 60 years, previous PBF].
Since the removal of the PBF scheme also coincided with 
a deliberate increase in the user fee tariff, this only served to 
magnify problems for health facilities. Nurses complained 
that the community had become used to the previous lower 
user fee tariff and so were less willing as well as less able to pay 
the new tariff. 
“Because people are already used to the free tariff…for 
them it’s a huge problem, even for the maternity here it was 
free, now it’s 1,500FC (1 USD), but for people to pay that, it’s 
becoming quite a problem” [Respondent 3: Female, 37 years, 
previous PBF].
Individual Health Worker Effects
“Extrinsic Motivation,” “Income Reflects Effort,” and “Conscientiousness”
When asked why nurses were motivated to work in their 
profession, few differences in responses were detected 
between the previous PBF and the non-PBF groups. Financial 
incentives appeared to be an important driver of motivation 
for a substantial share of the health workforce, irrespective of 
PBF. Against this general importance of financial incentives, 
respondents from the previous PBF group perceived that 
when they were receiving donor-funded payments, staff 
attendance at the facility was high, nurses worked hard and 
patients were treated in a timely way. 
“When we were paid, it stimulated us to work a lot and 
work well, we worked a lot, as we were paid, we had to be 
able to reach the percentage that was asked… we followed 
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the (performance) indicators” [Respondent 4: Female 27 
years, previous PBF].
Since the withdrawal of donor payments, workers confessed 
to putting less effort into their work. They reported high levels 
of staff absenteeism and admitted that they were less punctual 
in attending the facility, as they felt they were not receiving 
enough money. 
Respondent: “Before (when receiving PBF), I would work 
even if I had not eaten…Now (after PBF), I don’t work a lot. 
There are even health centres which do 10% out of 100%, 
they work only 10%....”
Interviewer: “Why do they not work a lot?”
Respondent: “Because of money” [Respondent 4: Female, 
27 years, previous PBF].
In particular, nurses felt the amount of effort required by 
the job was no longer sufficiently rewarded.
“With the work one does, it’s a tough job, you can be 
standing up for a long time during 2 or 3 hours and at 
the end of the month, what you receive, it’s not enough…” 
[Respondent 5: Female, 48 years, previous PBF].
Stories of corruption were frequent in both groups. Many 
workers shared tales of other workers stealing medications, 
equipment and medical supplies, which they then sold 
privately, and recounted examples of where patients had 
been overcharged for services. Irrespective of PBF group 
status, workers did not always see this as wrong, and some 
considered it justifiable in certain cases. There seemed to be 
no effect of PBF withdrawal in this regard. 
Table 4. Mean and Median Composite Scores for Dimensions of Motivation According to PBF Status
Dimension
Overall Non-PBF Previous PBF
Mean, SD (Median) Mean, SD (Median) Mean, SD (Median)
Level of conscientiousness 4.10, 0.32 (4.00) 4.13, 0.32 (4.00) 4.04, 0.30 (4.00)
Level of pride 4.02, 0.50 (4.00) 4.07, 0.49 (4.00) 3.87, 0.52 (4.00)
Satisfaction with training 3.50, 0.81 (3.67) 3.59, 0.78 (4.00) 3.26, 0.85 (3.33)
Satisfaction with tasks 3.61, 0.62 (3.75) 3.56, 0.64 (3.75) 3.74, 0.53 (4.00)
Satisfaction with availability of equipment/supplies 2.29, 0.93 (2.00) 2.47, 0.91 (2.33) 1.76, 0.78 (1.67)
Satisfaction with sufficiency of income 1.71, 0.65 (2.00) 1.79, 0.67 (2.00) 1.47, 0.55 (1.00)
Satisfied that income reflects effort 2.03, 0.74 (2.00) 2.17, 0.76 (2.00) 1.64, 0.49 (1.67)
Satisfaction with organisational culture 3.83, 0.55 (4.00) 3.87, 0.55 (4.00) 3.72, 0.55 (4.00)
Satisfaction with community relationships 4.00, 0.72 (4.00) 4.04, 0.74 (4.00) 3.91, 0.64 (4.00)
Level of turnover intention 3.00, 1.25 (4.00) 3.07, 1.21 (4.00) 2.82, 1.34 (3.00)
Level of extrinsic motivation 3.62, 1.07 (4.00) 3.50, 1.07 (4.00) 3.95, 0.99 (4.00)
Abbreviations: PBF, performance-based financing; SD, standard deviation. 
Dimensions scored on scale from 1-5. A high mean or median score indicates a higher level for that dimension eg, higher pride. 
Table 3. Demographic Characteristics of Previous PBF and Non-PBF Health Workers




Male 69.3% 70.2% 67.0% χ2 (1) = 0.14, P = .712
Female 31.7% 29.8% 33.0%
Education 
Primary/secondary school 60.7% 65.1% 48.3% χ2 (2) = 11.52, P = .003
University/post-secondary school 33.1% 29.6% 43.2%
Not specified 6.2% 5.4% 8.5%
Cadre
Doctor 0.9% 0.6% 1.7% χ2 (2) = 1.20, P = .549
Nurse 89.8% 90.2% 89.0%
Other clinical workers 9.3% 9.2% 9.3%
Mean Mean, SE N, Mean, SE
Age 40.01 39.41 ± 0.53 41.64 ± 0.87 t = -2.19, P = .029
Number of financial dependents
(Total n = 437, non-PBF = 320, PBF = 117)
8.87a 8.69 ± 0.26a 9.33 ± 0.38a t = -1.29, P = .1964  
Years worked in current position 
(Total n = 444, non-PBF = 327, PBF = 117)
8.93a   8.68 ± 0.46a 9.60 ± 0.87a t = 1.05, P = .2956
Abbreviations: PBF, performance-based financing; SE, standard error. 
a N less than total number of facilities for some variables due to missing values.
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“He is right because, for example, he has been working 
for 40 years at the centre…since he started working he has 
not even been recognised…by anyone or government…he is 
not paid … he has 8 children. …with the little he has…it is 
insufficient. He must pay for his rent, for his childrens’ school 
uniforms, to feed his children, why when in this manner he 
could take money (illegally) from the facility” [Respondent 
6: Male, 35 years, non-PBF].
“Sufficiency of Income”
The amount previously received under the PBF scheme 
had allowed workers to pay for their children’s school fees, 
save money and buy enough food to feed their family well. 
Following the withdrawal of the PBF scheme, the social 
circumstances of nurses dramatically changed. Many nurses 
started to borrow money from their relatives in order to 
continue to meet their own and their family’s basic needs.
“I managed, I sought help from my family to buy a few 
things to start selling in order to feed myself. With the money 
from my family, it is not my own money” [Respondent 7: 
Female, 28 years, previous PBF].
Workers in the non-PBF group felt the amount they received 
was insufficient, particularly those who had been working for 
several years but were still not salaried by the state. 
“I have worked for almost 3 years in this health centre, 
and I have never received a salary…which is why I am not 
happy…I only receive the user fees at the end of the month 
which we share between us” [Respondent 6: Male, 35 years, 
non-PBF].
“We work and then and the end of the month, we receive 
almost nothing” [Respondent 8: Female, 48 years, non-
PBF].
Nonetheless, they did not describe any instances of 
borrowing from other relatives or other behaviours to 
supplement income as described by the previous PBF group.
Organisation-Level Effects
“Organisational Culture”
The majority of workers in the previous PBF group found 
that their main source of revenue had shifted from PBF 
payments to user fees following the withdrawal of PBF. This 
was problematic insofar as the management and allocation of 
user fees had become a source of conflict since the withdrawal 
of the PBF scheme, despite what nurses described as generally 
good working relationships with their superiors. 
“We receive always the user fee because for example, you 
have 2 patients, you are 10 workers, you have to calculate the 
percentage, you will have how much? One can say you have 
5000 francs (4.5 USD)…How are you going to share that?” 
[Respondent 7: Female, 28 years, previous PBF].
Workers in non-PBF facilities where user fees had always 
been the main source of revenue, in contrast, seemed satisfied 
with the allocation of user fees.
“Management at the centre is good...there is transparency…
and the user fees are well managed” [Respondent 6: Male 35 
years, non-PBF].
“Turnover Intention”
Although the PBF scheme had initially attracted workers 
to facilities, shortly after it ceased, there was a mass exodus 
of workers. Some left clinical work completely to work in 
commercial activities. 
Respondent: “There was even a mutiny of other nurses 
who left the health zone”
Interviewer: “You know the number of nurses who left?”
Respondent: “Yes”
Interviewer: “How many?”
Respondent: “There were nearly 10 nurses in all of the 
health zone.”
Interviewer: “Why was there a mutiny?”
Respondent: “Because they were not receiving the prime 
(performance payment), they were going to stay to do what?” 
[Respondent 9: Male, 30 years, previous PBF].
Workers in the previous PBF group who stayed on in 
facilities stated this was either because: they had no other 
options of work available to them; they were waiting for 
another donor or NGO to start paying them; or they felt a 
strong commitment to their vocation and enjoyed working in 
Table 5. Summary of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results Examining Associations Between PBF Removal and Scores on Motivation Dimensions
Factor β P Value 95% CI Constant Pseudo R2
Level of conscientiousness -0.20 <0.001c -0.31 to -0.10 3.76 0.12
Level of pride -0.43 <0.001c -0.61 to -0.25 3.67 0.10
Satisfaction with training -0.47 0.004c -0.78 to -0.15 3.74 0.11
Satisfaction with tasks -0.09 0.40 -0.29 to 0.12 3.33 0.07
Satisfaction with availability of equipment/supplies -0.62 <0.001c -0.95 to -0.29 2.51 0.19
Satisfaction with sufficiency of income -0.24 <0.047 b -0.48 to -0.00 2.15 0.10
Satisfied that income reflects effort -0.51 <0.001c -0.78 to -0.23 3.04 0.17
Satisfaction with organisational culture -0.23 0.020b -0.43 to -0.04 3.74 0.11
Satisfaction with community relationships -0.44 <0.001c -0.64 to -0.25 4.03 0.07
Level of turnover intention -0.49 0.045b -0.96 to 0.01 3.14 0.09
Level of extrinsic motivation 0.40 0.058a -0.01 to 0.80 3.19 0.07
Abbreviation: PBF, performance-based financing. 
a P ≤ .1, b P ≤ .05, c P ≤ .01.
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their profession.
“I am here because I love to treat people. If it wasn’t for 
my desire to work as a nurse, I would return to Katanga 
province, where life is better compared to here in Kasai” 
[Respondent 9: Male, 30 years, previous PBF].
Community-Level Effects
“Community Relationships”
As a result of the re-increase in user tariffs following the 
withdrawal of the PBF scheme, workers perceived that many 
patients were not attending the previous PBF facilities but 
were instead seeking care elsewhere, often from traditional 
healers or private facilities, or not at all. 
“Now to have money, to come to the centre, it’s always 
a problem, they take traditional medicines at home” 
[Respondent 4: Female, 27 years, previous PBF].
It also became clear during interviews that the effects 
associated with terminating the PBF scheme were not only 
influencing staff behaviour and motivation but were being 
felt by the community as well. For example, some nurses 
remarked that colleagues had become less welcoming and 
were even rude to patients since donor payments to workers 
had ceased. 
“They say even in front of the patients there, the patient 
comes, they say ‘no, leave there, I can’t treat you as I’m not 
paid’” [Respondent 9: Male 30 years, previous PBF].
Discussion
Based on existing conceptual and empirical work, we 
developed a scale to measure dimensions of motivation among 
health workers in the DRC. We then used this scale to assess 
differences in levels of motivation across each dimension for 
workers who had recently had PBF withdrawn with workers 
who had never received PBF, triangulating the results with 
the findings from qualitative interviews in order to shed more 
light on how the termination of a PBF scheme had affected 
worker motivation. 
The previous PBF group scored significantly lower on 
almost all motivation dimensions. Exceptions included 
‘satisfaction with tasks’ where there was no significant 
difference between groups, and ‘level of extrinsic motivation’ 
where workers in the previous PBF group scored higher 
(marginally significant). Theoretically, a more significant 
effect with the latter dimension may have been expected; 
according to “crowding out” theory; the introduction of 
monetary incentives may alter the composition of worker 
motivation, with workers becoming more driven by external 
rewards and less by intrinsic motivation.35,73 
Qualitative interviews indicated that financial compensation 
may have been an important dimension of motivation for 
both groups. The quantitative analysis showed that workers in 
the previous PBF group had significantly lower scores for the 
dimension ‘satisfaction with sufficiency of income.’ A likely 
reason behind the lower scores is that during PBF, workers 
were guaranteed a certain level of income each month (at 
least $75) but since the withdrawal of the PBF scheme, the 
amount received was less predictable as it was dependent on 
the amount of user fees collected; Fox et al found the monthly 
variation in user fees received by facilities in Katanga province 
of DRC to be considerable.26 A previous study by the authors 
examining the different income levels and sources of health 
workers using data from the same health worker and health 
facility surveys confirms that the income derived from user 
fees was on average much lower than the PBF payments.70 
However, despite some differences in the various sources of 
income received, the total mean and median income received 
for both the previous PBF and non-PBF groups were still 
similar (see Supplementary file 4, Table S4). 
Nonetheless, workers in the previous PBF group seemed 
unable to have the same lifestyle they had enjoyed before 
the withdrawal of PBF. Staff were unhappy with their lower 
level of compensation post PBF, leading to significantly 
lower scores on ‘satisfaction that income reflects effort’; their 
conscientiousness deteriorated as a result, with reports of high 
levels of staff absenteeism and poor attitudes towards patients. 
Such effects are potentially very destructive and undermine 
the effective functioning of the health system. The reasons for 
the significant differences between groups for the dimensions 
‘satisfaction with training,’ ‘satisfaction with tasks,’ ‘level 
of pride,’ and ‘satisfaction with availability of equipment/
supplies’ yielded by the quantitative analysis, however, could 
not be identified during qualitative interviews.
Although it could not be confirmed quantitatively, 
respondents described a reduction in the number of staff 
working in facilities following the cessation of incentives. Yet, 
contrary to interviews and the initial hypothesis, the previous 
PBF group scored lower on ‘level of turnover intention.’ The 
average tenure of workers in the previous PBF group was also 
not significantly different to that of the non-PBF group. It 
may be that those workers with a high turnover intention in 
the previous PBF group had already left facilities soon after 
PBF removal, so those interviewed were more committed 
to staying. Remaining staff had to rely on user fees received 
at the facility-level as their main source of income, the 
distribution of which was more often a source of dispute in 
previous PBF facilities compared to non-PBF facilities. This 
was perhaps because staff from non-PBF facilities had not 
experienced the same recent loss of income and so were well 
accustomed to the income received from user fees. In parallel, 
relationships between previous PBF workers and the local 
community became strained, as the implementing partners 
of ASSP had introduced higher user fees in order to help 
substitute performance payments. According to nurses in the 
previous PBF group, the community were less likely to access 
care from facilities as user fees had increased. Furthermore, 
in some workers, the resentment towards receiving a reduced 
income manifested itself in their attitudes towards patients. 
This breakdown in the interface between the community and 
health workers was consistent with the quantitative analysis 
where previous PBF workers had significantly lowers scores 
for ‘satisfaction with community relationships.’
The findings in this study do concur with another study in 
the DRC which found that the withdrawal of donor-funded 
payments did reduce the overall motivation of workers.16 
However, in this study we were able to measure differences 
between a group having had PBF withdrawn with a “control” 
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group across several different dimensions of motivation and 
employed in-depth qualitative investigation to yield a more 
in-depth understanding around the differences observed. 
There are few other reports in the wider literature which 
examine the withdrawal of donor-funded payments in 
relation to performance and motivation. A DFID-supported 
health programme in Liberia attempted to withdraw the 
payment of salary supplements to health workers. Following 
this, clinic staff began charging high fees for services and sold 
drugs to private clinics to enhance their income, necessitating 
the eventual reinstatement of financial incentives. Although 
anecdotes concerning unethical behaviour such as stealing 
were common in both groups in our study, it was likely to have 
been under-reported; given the small number of interviews 
conducted, we were unable to draw any strong conclusions 
as to whether this had changed in the previous PBF group. 
In the United States and United Kingdom, the cessation of 
performance payments did not appear to adversely affect 
performance or quality of care.74,75 Nevertheless, unlike 
this study, they were unable to indicate any differences 
observed with a control group. In addition, the contribution 
of performance payments compared to base salaries and 
other income sources is likely to be far lower in high-income 
countries compared with low-income countries, limiting the 
generalisability of the findings. 
The programme’s decision to terminate the PBF 
scheme was made on the premise that the government is 
responsible for public sector personnel remuneration, and 
that PBF funded by donors is not a sustainable solution. 
However, in the absence of any structural improvement in 
government payments to workers, immediate service needs 
still have to be met. Important lessons from this experience 
include: more careful thinking around the implications of 
withdrawing donor-funding for workers and their social 
circumstances, and ensuring that there is an effective 
communication strategy with workers and communities on 
such programmatic changes to mitigate any adverse reactions. 
Alternative, acceptable measures should also be instituted 
which still make it attractive for workers to stay and provide 
high quality services at facilities. As indicated by previous 
studies, workers are not exclusively motivated by financial 
factors.8 Attention to non-financial dimensions such as the 
‘satisfaction with the availability of equipment/supplies’ and 
‘satisfaction with training’ which were rated low in this study 
could serve to enhance motivation. Country governments 
and their international health partners should also consider 
whether the short-term advantages of introducing additional 
health worker payments outweigh the potential adverse long-
term consequences if the chances of it being sustained in the 
long-term for a given context are low. In designing any future 
PBF schemes, a realistic and well thought out exit strategy 
should be planned from the beginning to prevent long-
term dependence, and the existing financial environment of 
workers should also be reviewed to ensure that payments are 
not distortionary in the context of other payments received. 
For example, one way of ensuring PBF is more structurally 
and financially sustainable, is to blend it with other existing 
payment mechanisms (such as salaries)76 as opposed to 
implementing it as a stand-alone, vertical programme, as was 
the case here. Another study in the DRC found that health 
workers appeared to value salaries more than PBF payments,26 
and so efforts to ensure all legitimate workers are remunerated 
by the state should be prioritised.77 Furthermore, with respect 
to PBF, donors may consider what specific sources of funds 
would be used for a PBF scheme in the event their funding 
cannot be sustained. 
A strength of this study is that it supplemented the 
quantitative data with qualitative insights in order to 
corroborate and explain findings. We developed a motivation 
measurement scale customised to workers in the DRC, which 
may be of use to future studies wishing to measure the effects 
of different interventions on motivation. In doing so, we chose 
a proxy-based approach to operationalising motivation, in 
line with many prior studies. We acknowledge, however, that 
such an approach relies on a number of assumptions about 
relationships between proxies and motivation itself about 
which we cannot be fully certain.
There were several limitations to the study, the main 
limitation being it was a cross-sectional study making it 
difficult to causally attribute the lower motivation levels 
observed in the previous PBF group to the cessation of the PBF 
scheme. It is possible that the findings demonstrate that the 
results of PBF are not sustained when funds are withdrawn, 
and that motivation levels in this group had returned to 
baseline levels (pre-PBF). Workers from previous PBF 
facilities also had some significantly different characteristics 
compared to non-PBF workers; in particular, many of the PBF 
and non-PBF workers were located in facilities in different 
provinces. Therefore, the differences in context could also 
explain some of the differences in motivation observed. This 
was unavoidable as coverage of the PBF model was determined 
by the geographical focus of the previous health programme. 
To the extent possible differences in characteristics were 
controlled for in the quantitative analysis, however. 
By the time the quantitative and qualitative data were 
collected, performance payments had stopped for one month 
and 8 months respectively. According to interviews, many of the 
original workers had subsequently left following the removal 
of PBF. Stronger reactions may therefore have been observed 
had interviews occurred immediately after the withdrawal, 
however, of concern is that discontent persisted amongst 
the previous PBF group long afterwards. Furthermore, the 
study was unable to disentangle the influence of removing the 
fixed payment from the performance-based component. This 
was investigated previously by Huillery and Seban, where 
they found the removal of a performance-related payment 
compared with a fixed payment of the same amount had a 
more profound negative impact on motivation.16 
The study was subject to other biases, including social 
desirability bias where respondents’ perceptions of what 
constitutes an acceptable answer or what they think the 
researcher wishes to hear may have influenced their responses. 
The analysis could have been strengthened had we been able 
to link the motivation scores to performance, however data 
on the latter was not captured. Due to resource constraints, 
qualitative interviews were only conducted in one province so 
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may not be generalisable to the other sampled provinces. Kasai 
Occidental province was chosen because it would be easiest to 
access both workers who had either previously been exposed 
to the PBF model or never received PBF. However, a limitation 
is that the number of qualitative interviews undertaken overall 
was small. Although there are no established guidelines on 
sample sizes for qualitative interviews, the literature suggests 
between 20 and 50 interviews are often needed.78,79 We were 
limited in the number of interviews possible by the realities 
of a very difficult context (security, accessibility, availability 
of staff). 
Finally, our confidence in comparing scores for dimensions 
exhibiting strong measurement invariance across PBF groups 
was higher compared to those constructs which showed weak 
or no invariance; the small sample of workers in the previous 
PBF groups would have affected the precision of measurement 
invariance testing.33 
Conclusion
Programmes unable to sustain donor-funded payments to 
health workers should consider the consequences withdrawal 
could have for health worker motivation, and institute 
measures to mitigate against any adverse effects. Governments 
and donors designing new PBF schemes should develop 
realistic exit strategies if they are unlikely to be able to sustain 
these schemes over the longer-term.
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Supplementary Table 1: Dimensions and distribution of item scores overall and by PBF status . 
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Supplementary Table 2: Original survey items and explanation around why certain items were 
dropped from the confirmatory factor analysis 
Dimension Question Item included 
(Y/N) 




The effort that we at this 
facility put into this job is 
reflected in our pay 
Y 
My job offers adequate pay 
compared with similar jobs  
Y 
The income I receive is a 
fair reflection of my skills, 
knowledge and training 
Y 
How do you rate your salary 
with respect to your 
workload? 
N High number of not applicable 
answers received as salaries 
not given to all staff. This was 
identified post distribution of 
the survey.  
Sufficiency of 
income 
The income that I receive 
from working at this facility 
more than covers my basic 




With this job I have worries 
about how to support myself 
and my family 
N Did not group well with 
sufficiency of income 
dimension when performing 
psychometric item analysis. 
How do you rate your salary 
with respect to your 
competencies/ability? 
N High number of not applicable 
answers received as salaries 
not given to all staff. This was 
identified post distribution of 
the survey. 
How do you rate your salary 
with respect to your 
allowances (travel 
allowance, bonus, medical 
care)? 
N High number of not applicable 
answers received as salaries 
not given to all staff. This was 
identified post distribution of 
the survey. 
How satisfied are you with 
the system of 
compensation/motivation of 
personnel? 
N Question was deemed to be 
too vague and did not fit 





How do you rate the 
availability of medicines in 
the facility?  
Y 
How do you rate the 
availability of equipment in 
the facility? 
Y 
How do you rate the 
availability of medical 
supplies in the facility? 
Y 
How do you rate the 
physical condition of the 
facility building? 
N This question was to be 
grouped with questions above 
under a wider dimension of 
“resources”. However, 
responses were very different 
compared to other items under 
resources (now availability of 
equipment/medical supplies) 
so was not included. 
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How do you rate the number 
of personnel working in the 
facility? 
N This question was to be 
grouped with questions above 
under a wider dimension of 
“resources”. However, 
responses were very different 
compared to other items under 
resources (now availability of 
equipment/medical supplies) 
so was not included. 
Training How do you rate your ability 
to put into practice what 
have you learned from 
training? 
Y 
How do you rate how you 
and your colleagues are 
chosen to attend training? 
Y 
How do you rate your 
opportunities to upgrade 
your skills and knowledge? 
Y 
I have received sufficient 
training to be able to 
perform my job well 
Y 
Tasks How do you rate your 
satisfaction with your 
workload? 
Y 
How do you rate the division 
of work between you and 
your colleagues? 
Y 
How do you rate the division 
of work between caring for 
patients and other tasks? 
Y 
How do you rate the variety 
of your tasks? 
Y 
How do you rate the 
description of your 
responsibilities and your 
tasks? 
Y 
How do you rate the 
flexibility with attendance 
and work hours? 
N The tasks dimension was 
initially wider to include 
questions on workload. 
However, this item did not 
correspond well with other 
items under the “tasks” 
dimension when measuring the 
mean distribution of responses 
and cronbach’s alpha. 
How do you rate the help 
you receive from other 
members of your team? 
N The tasks dimension was 
initially wider to include 
questions on workload. 
However, this item did not 
correspond well with other 
items under the “tasks” 
dimension when measuring the 
mean distribution of responses 
and cronbach’s alpha. 
How do you rate your level 
of responsibility? 
N Did not correspond well with 
other items under “tasks” 
dimension when measuring 
mean distribution of responses 
and cronbach alpha. 
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How do you rate the stability 
of your contract? 
N Dropped due to high level of 
not applicable responses, as 
formal contracts did not tend 
to operate in health facilities. 
Also, did not fit well 
conceptually with the 
dimension. 
Pride This facility has a good 
reputation in the community 
Y 
It is a source of pride to get a 
job at this facility 
Y 
In this facility, providers are 
proud to deliver good 
services to patients 
Y 
I feel that I am doing 





How do you rate your 
relationship with local 
leaders of the community? 
Y 
How do you rate your ability 
to satisfy the needs of the 
community? 
N Initially belonged to a 
differently defined dimension 
called ‘community factors’ – 
but items were too disparate 
and did not group well in the 
analysis – so decision to 
change the dimension to 
community relationships. 
How do you rate your safety 
and security to live and 
practice in the community 
N Initially belonged to a 
differently defined dimension 
called ‘community factors’ – 
but items were too disparate 
and did not group well in the 
analysis – so decision to 
change the dimension to 
community relationships  
How do you rate your 
respect from the 
community? 
N Initially belonged to a 
differently defined dimension 
called ‘community factors’ – 
but items were too disparate 
and did not group well in the 
analysis – so decision to 
change the dimension to 
community relationships  
Organisational 
culture 
How do you rate your 
working relationships with 
upper-level staff? 
Y 
How do you rate your 
professional relationships 
with your colleagues? 
Y 
How do you rate the 
transparency of the 
management of financial 
resources by the facility? 
Y 
How do you rate your 
involvement in decisions to 
resolve problems within the 
facility? 
Y 
How do you rate the level of 
respect accorded to you by 
N High number of not applicable 
answers received, as 
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your internal supervisors in 
the facility? 
sometimes the most senior 
member of staff was 
interviewed at the facility. 
How do you rate the 
management of the facility 
by the MSP or health zone 
office? 
N High number of not applicable 
answers received, as not all 




I spend my time at work on 
work-related activities 
Y 
I do things which need to be 
done without being asked or 
told 
Y 
When I am not sure how to 
treat a patient’s condition I 
look for information or ask 
for advice 
Y 
I am careful not to make 
errors at work 
Y 
I am a hard worker Y 
My work is consistently of a 
high quality 
Y 
At work you can always 
depend on me 
Y 
I effectively cope with any 
new challenges that occur in 
my work life 
Y 
I am confident about my 
ability to handle my work 
Y 
I always arrive on time to 
work 
Y 
I am rarely absent from work N Did not correspond well with 
other items under 
“conscientiousness” dimension 
when measuring mean 




I only do this job so that I 





I intend to leave this facility 





How do you rate the level of 
respect accorded to you by 
your external supervisors in 
the facility? 
N Partially captured under 
organisational culture, and did 
not form a stable construct on 
its own.  
How do you rate the 
recognition by your 
superiors for a job well 
done? 
N Partially captured under 
organisational culture, and did 
not form a stable construct on 
its own. 
Self-efficacy I feel that I have control of 
things concerning my work 
N Initially included under a 
different dimension of self-
efficacy. However, this 
dimension was dropped as 
cronbach alpha was poor when 
grouped with other items 
presumed to be measuring 
self-efficacy (indicating very 
different scoring so potentially 
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not measuring the same 
construct).  
I feel that at work things are 
going the way I would like 
them to 
N Initially included under a 
different dimension of self-
efficacy. However, this 
dimension was dropped as 
cronbach alpha was poor when 
grouped with other items 
presumed to be measuring 
self-efficacy (indicating very 
different scoring so potentially 








I would recommend this 
profession to my children 
N This item was suggested by 
development partners but did 
not correspond with any pre-
defined dimension. 
How do you rate your 
opportunities for promotion? 
N This item was suggested by 
development partners but did 
not correspond with any pre-
defined dimension. 
 
In summary, 60 items were initially included in the questionnaire. Two of the items 
which were added by development partners, were not hypothesised to be associated 
with a dimension a priori, so were not included in the analysis. This left 58 items for 
confirmatory factor analysis. 
However, on initial analysis of the data, it was found that six of the items had a high 
level of not-applicable responses (greater than 10%). On further review, it was 
identified that they may not have been applicable to all workers e.g. not all workers 
received a government salary, so these items were dropped. 
For the rest of the items, psychometric item analysis examining item distributions, 
summary statistics and correlation patterns was undertaken. This involved checking 
mean distribution and standard deviation of item scores, as well as cronbach’s alpha. 
Ten items did not correspond well with other items pertaining to their intended 
dimension and so were dropped from the analysis. A further two dimensions, namely 
‘self-efficacy’ and ‘respect/recognition’ were dropped as well as they did not perform 




Supplementary Table 3: Hypothesised relationship of different demographic and health facility 
characteristics with health worker motivation 
Variables Hypothesised relationship with motivation 
Age In a study by Prytherch et al.,1 older respondents were significantly more positive 
in their responses to questions assessing their level of motivation. The authors 
postulated that older workers may receive greater respect and appreciation for their 
work from the community and colleagues given their greater level of experience. In 
other studies, older workers have been found to be more committed to working in 
the facility than younger workers, and more satisfied with their work overall.2,3   
Sex A study in Zambia found female public sector health workers to be less satisfied 
than male workers.4 However, another study found no difference in job satisfaction 




In Tanzania, it was found that the more dependents a health worker had, the more 
positive they were in response to questions concerning their motivation.1 This may 
be because the income of workers becomes more important as their number of 
dependents increases making workers less likely to respond negatively to these 
questions. Workers with children have also been found to be significantly more 
committed to staying in a facility compared to workers without children.3  
Urban-rural 
status 
Opportunities, for example for career development, may be greater in urban areas 
compared to rural areas which could have an effect on motivation.5 Developing 
countries often experience 'urban bias' whereby urban areas experience a greater 
provision of services and investment compared to rural areas.6 The relative 







The number of staff working in a facility at a given time will affect the distribution 
of tasks and potentially the workload of personnel. This may in turn affect health 
worker motivation. Workload is an important motivating factor, particularly in the 




The more services offered by a facility, the greater the potential for workers to use 
a variety of skills and have responsibility for certain tasks. This may have the 
potential to affect motivation, according to the job characteristics model developed 





Distance of the facility from the village has been used here as a proxy for the 
remoteness of facilities. Globally, it is challenging to recruit and retain workers in 
remote areas .9 Nonetheless, Stilwell found that health workers based in remote 
areas of Zimbabwe displayed a high level of motivation despite a lack of financial 
incentives compared to workers in less remote areas .10  
Education Educational background has been shown to be a predictor of intention to leave  a 
health facility.11  
Years in 
position 
In Tanzania, respondents who had been working for longer tended to be less 
critical about the management of the facility. This may be due to their 
understanding and acceptance over time around the constraints faced by facilities.1 
However, another study in Afghanistan showed that workers who had been 
working longer at a facility, had a lower intent to stay than those who had been 
working for a shorter period of time.3  
Type of 
facility 
A cross-country analysis of Tanzania, South Africa and Malawi indicated that 
workers in public hospitals were less satisfied compared to workers in clinics or 
health centres.2 Reference facilities in the DRC are bigger than health centres and 




The greater the population served by a facility may result in more patients 
accessing the facility. The increased workload may in turn affect staff motivation. 
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Supplementary Table 4: Proportion of nurses receiving sources of income and mean and median values of income received by PBF status  
 Workers not receiving PBF (n=302) Workers receiving PBF (n=105) 
Source of income Overall proportion 
of workers who 
received source of 
income 
Median income 
per month among 
those receiving 
income in USD 
(IQR) 
Mean income per 
month among those 












in USD (IQR) 
Mean income per 
month among 
those receiving 




      




50.0% 12.89 (10-30) 46.60 (86.32) 61.0% 11.92 (11-13) 14.43 (11.79) 
Payments from other 
sources  
      
User fees  69.1% 28.71 (16-68) 96.93 (185.10) 90.5% 10.83 (8-16) 14.85 (15.69) 
Gifts/informal payments 
from patients  
15.6% 3.25 (2-11) 9.26 (11.66) 20.0% 5.42 (3-8) 7.58 (7.25) 
Per diems  55.2% 4.06 (2-8) 9.30 (29.47) 41.9% 4.11 (1-6) 5.78 (6.19) 
Income from private 
clinical practice  
5.6% 17.61 (5-22) 28.13 (33.69) 11.4% 21.67 (18-62) 40.90 (34.61) 
Income from supplemental  
(non-clinical) activities  
38.9% 86.67 (54-173) 142.75 (151.36) 69.2% 43.34 (27-87) 91.46 (154.97) 
Total income N/A 84.57 (33-199) 178.96 (244.53) N/A 84.67 (40-135) 118.63 (167.35) 
N.B. For the occupational risk allowance, one outlier income was dropped from the analysis; no outliers were detected for any other income amount. 
 
The table above illustrates differences in the level of income received by nurses who previously PBF compared to those who di d not. The proportion of nurses 
receiving salaries was lower for those who received donor-funding in the past, but median and mean amounts were higher. Nurses who had previously received 
PBF were more likely to receive income from user fees, albeit a smaller median and mean amount  compared with those who had not been receiving donor 
payments. They were also more likely to engage in private clinical practice and other non-clinical activities to supplement their income. Despite the differences, 
however, both median and mean overall total income were very similar for both groups. The minimum daily wage in the DRC is $1.83, or $298 per year.1 
1 US Department of State. Bureaucracy of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017. Available at: 
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper. Updated 19 January 2019. Accessed: 19 January 2019. 
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7. Process evaluation of an intervention to improve
government payments to health workers in the DRC
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 has shown the remuneration of health workers in the DRC is complex and 
fragmented. Primary care workers receive varying amounts of income from a multitude 
of different sources. With respect to government payments, only a minority receive a 
salary, while just over half of workers sampled in the study were paid an occupational 
risk allowance. Yet, despite the significant contributions received from patients and 
donors as a proportion of their total income, the qualitative analysis revealed that 
workers most valued government payments, as they offered more stability compared to 
donor-funded sources.  
In chapter 6, financial compensation was found to be an important dimension of 
motivation to most workers. Furthermore, it revealed the negative consequences for 
their motivation when donor funding is withdrawn, particularly in a context where many 
workers receive either inadequate or no payments from government.  
This chapter describes a process evaluation of an intervention which was primarily 
designed to improve the proportion of workers paid by government in the DRC. Such an 
intervention, if successful, could have significant implications for health worker 
motivation, given the findings from chapters 5 and 6.  
Three research papers are included in this chapter. The first paper goes into detail on 
how the theory of change for the process evaluation was co-developed with other 
stakeholders. Similar to chapter 6, I have reflected on the process in order to capture any 
lessons learnt which could be of value to others using theories of change in their 
research. This paper is presented in the format of a publication in BMJ Global Health.  
The second paper is a short commentary also published in BMJ Global Health which 
provides the justification for the intervention that is being evaluated and contrasts this 
with PBF, exploring the reasons why donors tend to favour PBF over structural 
changes.  
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The third paper gives a full account of the process evaluation, which applied a 
framework of implementation fidelity in order to explore the degree to which the 
planned intervention was adhered to, and any contextual factors which may have 
moderated implementation. This paper is presented in the format of a publication which 
has been submitted to the journal Implementation Science. 
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7.2 Research paper 4 
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AbstrAct
Theories of change (ToCs) describe how interventions 
can bring about long-term outcomes through a logical 
sequence of intermediate outcomes and have been 
used to design and measure the impact of public health 
programmes in several countries. In recognition of 
their capacity to provide a framework for monitoring 
and evaluation, they are being increasingly employed 
in the development sector. The construction of a ToC 
typically occurs through a consultative process, requiring 
stakeholders to reflect on how their programmes can bring 
about change. ToCs help make explicit any underlying 
assumptions, acknowledge the role of context and provide 
evidence to justify the chain of causal pathways. However, 
while much literature exists on how to develop a ToC with 
respect to interventions in theory, there is comparatively 
little reflection on applying it in practice to complex 
interventions in the health sector. This paper describes the 
initial process of developing a ToC to inform the design of 
an evaluation of a complex intervention aiming to improve 
government payments to health workers in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. Lessons learnt include: the need for 
the ToC to understand how the intervention produces 
effects on the wider system and having broad stakeholder 
engagement at the outset to maximise chances of the 
intervention’s success and ensure ownership. Power 
relationships between stakeholders may also affect the ToC 
discourse but can be minimised by having an independent 
facilitator. We hope these insights are of use to other global 
public health practitioners using this approach to evaluate 
complex interventions.
IntroductIon
Complex interventions are commonly 
defined in the literature as interventions 
that comprise multiple components acting 
both independently and in conjunction 
with one another.1 2 Other characteristics 
contributing to their complexity include: 
the number and difficulty of behaviours 
required by those delivering or receiving 
the intervention, number and variability 
of outcomes and the degree of flexibility 
permitted within the intervention.3 A 
theory of change (ToC) approach can be 
an effective way to evaluate such interven-
tions by taking into account implementa-
tion aspects, mechanisms of impact and the 
effects of context.4 When a complex health 
systems intervention is being evaluated, it is 
necessary to understand how the interven-
tion relates to and interacts with compo-
nents of the system to produce an effect. In 
applying this ‘systems thinking’ approach, 
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Key questions
What is already known about this topic?
 ► Theories of change (ToCs) help to articulate the 
change process within complex interventions.
 ► Their use has increased exponentially in the 
development sector.
What are the new findings?
 ► A number of practical issues to ensure the 
successful formulation of a ToC were identified and 
included:
 – The need to consider how a complex intervention 
may interact with the wider system rather than 
being considered only in the context of one 
sector.
 – The importance of identifying and ensuring 
adequate input from all of the relevant 
stakeholders.
 – The need to involve all stakeholders in the 
conception of the ToC to encourage ownership.
 – The role of the facilitator as an objective broker 
of power relationships between stakeholders.
recommendations for policy
 ► These practical issues may help partners to use the 
ToC approach to its full potential, creating space 
for critical reflection rather than being an illusory 
process.
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multiple points of view or perspectives need to be 
sought.5 
Originally developed by Weiss,6 ToCs articulate the 
change process within interventions and describe the 
sequence of events linking intervention activities to their 
long-term outcomes.7 They make explicit the condi-
tions and assumptions required to enable change8 9 
and acknowledge the role of context in influencing the 
process. Diagrams are often used to depict a ToC as most 
complex interventions consist of elements interacting in 
a non-linear fashion, with indirect causal pathways and 
feedback loops. This is in contrast to logic models and 
logical frameworks, which tend to be more rigid and 
linear in outlining the inputs, processes, outputs and 
outcomes of an intervention.4 ToCs are also dynamic 
and should be modified throughout the evaluation to 
reflect any diversions during implementation from the 
original theory. As such, it is recognised that the process 
of conceiving an intervention’s ToC is an ongoing and 
iterative process, requiring regular review throughout 
the evaluation of the intervention. ToCs are typically 
developed in collaboration with stakeholders in order 
to build consensus on the change process. Their use has 
increased exponentially in the development sector4; a 
recent systematic review identified 62 studies employing 
ToCs to evaluate public health interventions.10 However, 
there is comparatively little reflection on the process of 
using this method to design an evaluation.
This article describes the experience of using stake-
holder workshops to construct an initial ToC that will go 
on to inform the evaluation of an intervention aiming 
to improve health worker payment and motivation in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It provides a 
range of lessons learnt from this process. A description of 
how the ToC is subsequently used and updated through 
a process evaluation will be the subject of a separate 
research article.
bAckground
The DRC is a fragile and conflict-affected state with 
several health system challenges, including a dysfunc-
tional public sector wage system.11 12 Most health workers 
do not receive a salary,11 which impacts on motivation, 
the staffing of facilities and therefore the delivery of 
healthcare. The poor remuneration of health workers 
stems from a government failure to update the payroll, 
a lack of sufficient resources and governance to address 
the problem and corruption, which has allowed the 
proliferation of unofficial appointments.
In 2013, the Department for International Develop-
ment (DFID) started funding a 5-year health systems 
strengthening programme in DRC called ASSP (Accès 
aux Soins de Santé Primaires/ Access to Primary Health-
care), implemented through Interchurch Medical Assis-
tance (IMA Worldhealth), which included an intervention 
to facilitate the payment of government salaries to health 
workers. This intervention involved: the establishment of 
an electronic open source Human Resources Informa-
tion System (iHRIS) through a census of health workers 
and the definition of optimal staffing standards using the 
Workload Indicator of Staffing Need procedure, which 
together were aimed at ensuring sufficient workers were 
in place and that they were appropriately paid.
To date, similar interventions using iHRIS to record 
census data have been reported in other countries in the 
form of case studies.13 14 In Sierra Leone, strong polit-
ical will to improve governance was identified as a key 
condition for successfully ensuring the integrity of the 
health sector payroll.14 However, these evaluations lacked 
a theoretical framework from the outset and focused 
on measuring outcomes rather than processes involved 
in implementing the intervention. Consequently, there 
is limited understanding of how to replicate such inter-
ventions effectively in different settings.15–17 Given this, 
a ToC approach was employed to clarify how the inter-
vention in the DRC would translate into its intended 
effects, thus informing the design of an evaluation of the 
intervention.
developIng tHe toc
A workshop was convened to develop the initial ToC 
with principal investigator RM as facilitator using guid-
ance from previous training on constructing ToCs at the 
Wellcome Trust.18 Stakeholders were identified through 
discussions with implementing partners and DFID. This 
workshop lasted 3.5 hours, with representation from 
IMA, DFID and Intrahealth as well as two staff conducting 
operational research on the programme.
During the workshop, RM described the ToC approach 
using examples and then asked stakeholders to undertake 
an exercise. The remainder of the workshop required 
stakeholders to collaboratively construct the ToC for the 
intervention of interest. Ground rules were established, 
requiring participants to: show respect for others’ opin-
ions, put aside personal agendas, be open-minded and 
agree to decisions made on the consensus view.
As human resources and health financing were two of 
the recognised building blocks of the health system being 
targeted by the intervention,19 the ToC approach did not 
exclusively focus on the intervention but rather aimed to 
unpack the effects the intervention would have on the 
health system or the expected mechanisms of programme 
effect (how it works). On identifying the long-term goal 
of the intervention, stakeholders then worked back from 
this through to the earliest changes that needed to occur 
using the process of ‘backwards mapping’. They were 
asked to populate coloured Post-it notes with different 
colours representing: the long-term outcome, precon-
ditions or intermediate outcomes needed to achieve 
the final outcome, activities needed to move from one 
outcome to the next, assumptions (those conditions in 
which the intervention will take place which must hold 
true for the ToC to be realised), rationale for each 
link in the causal pathway and indicators (to evaluate 
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whether the intermediate and final outcomes have been 
achieved). The facilitator then discussed the Post-it notes 
with the group and added those agreed on to a flip chart 
in order to map out the ToC.
Not all of the key stakeholders were present at this work-
shop; although Ministry of Health officials were invited, 
they did not attend. It also emerged during the workshop 
that government stakeholders from different ministries 
would need to be involved. Therefore, another meeting 
was organised that lasted 1 hour and included govern-
ment representatives from the Ministries of Health, 
Public Service, Finance and Budget, as well as DFID, IMA 
and Intrahealth. All those present were asked to review a 
refined diagram of the ToC constructed on the back of 
the discussions from the first workshop.
Interviews were also held with individual stakeholders 
on the ToC both prior to and after implementation of the 
intervention, and each respondent was asked to review 
and comment on the final ToC. Interviewed stakeholders 
included those involved in the workshops, health workers 
who would be affected by the intervention, government 
officials at the provincial level and other donors in the 
health sector.
results
The resulting ToC is given in figure 1. As well as focusing 
on the implementation steps, the ToC describes the 
hypothesised mechanisms of change occurring within 
the health and wider public system. In addition to the two 
main programme activities, the ToC outlines the crucial 
input of government in endorsing staffing standards and 
using iHRIS and committing the necessary resources to 
funding salaries. The intervention is expected to improve 
the availability and distribution of health workers, 
increase their motivation to deliver quality care and 
reduce user fees (a key source of their revenue), making 
services more accessible to the population.




In the first workshop, participants who were not well 
versed with ToCs found it particularly useful to be given 
a simple example of a ToC to help familiarise them with 
the terminology and understand the definitions and 
distinctions between assumptions and preconditions. The 
example provided related to an intervention to deliver 
measles vaccinations to children under 5 years of age, 
which had been devised by RM. This worked well because 
it was a relatively simple intervention that respondents 
were familiar with. While it may have been helpful to 
have guided participants through a more complex health 
systems strengthening example, which would have also 
emphasised the importance of applying systems thinking 
to the conception of the ToC, this had to be balanced 
against using a short and simple example that illustrated 
the concepts fundamental to developing a ToC.
Based on their roles in the intervention, stakeholders 
held very different views on what the long-term goal of 
the intervention should be. For example, DFID believed 
that the overall goal of paying health workers was to 
improve the quality of healthcare, while IMA thought 
it would remove incentives to charge patients high user 
fees. Through facilitation, the group conceded that 
both of these were expected outcomes of remunerating 
workers and aligned with the overall goal of increasing 
access to healthcare. Therefore, a positive outcome was 
that the ToC process brought respondents together to 
reach consensus on goals as well as widen their perspec-
tive on the different effects of the intervention. It also 
meant that stakeholders spent time unpacking the 
change process, reflecting on the connections between 
activities, outcomes and impacts, thereby revealing link-
ages that had previously been overlooked.
What did not work well
Failure to implicate all of the relevant government minis-
tries with significant influence over civil service reform—
namely the Ministries of Budget, Finance and Public 
Service—from the outset meant the intervention was 
initially viewed within the confines of the health sector; 
adopting this narrow perspective meant that the wider 
public institutional system within which this intervention 
was situated was being ignored. Ideally, a ToC would also 
be used to inform the design of an intervention, and 
the system that the intervention needs to change should 
be mapped first, in order to identify potential leverage 
points where the intervention can bring about change. 
In this case, however, the technical components of the 
intervention had already been agreed prior to the devel-
opment of the ToC, so the ToC was used to guide the 
evaluation.
To enable sufficient government engagement, 
another meeting was held and integrated into the 
ASSP project’s quarterly review meeting. However, a 
major limitation was that only 1 hour was allotted to 
the ToC in the agenda, during which the ToC devel-
oped during the first workshop was presented. Govern-
ment stakeholders expressed little desire to comment 
or modify the ToC perhaps because they felt unable 
to challenge the existing theory that had been put 
forward. It is also plausible that the government did 
not fully understand ToCs as time was insufficient to 
go through a worked example. Another possibility is 
that the ToC was perceived to be more donor driven 
and/or did not reflect the reality of the DRC. Conse-
quently, the government may have felt less ownership 
of the process but were also unwilling to go into any 
depth on the specific activities that they needed to 
lead on to enable success, such as how they would use 
the information yielded by the census to improve the 
payroll. Overall, this resulted in poor contribution of 
the relevant ministries to the conception of the ToC. 
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To mitigate this, two sets of follow-up interviews with 
key individuals were later held on the ToC for the 
intervention.
In the first workshop, implementing partners were 
reluctant to define indicators to monitor the interven-
tion, as they felt failure to achieve targets associated with 
the indicators would be an indictment of their perfor-
mance. However, they became more receptive once DFID 
acknowledged that the success of the intervention did 
not solely depend on their performance, as articulated 
by some of the assumptions. The idea that everyone has 
a role with no one group being responsible overall could 
have been better communicated by the facilitator at the 
beginning.
The opportunity to identify which stakeholders were 
responsible for progressing various elements of the 
ToC was missed when developing the ToC; making this 
more explicit would have had the advantage of clari-
fying responsibilities and strengthening accountability. 
However, this had to be traded against stakeholders 
perceiving the ToC as a way of controlling and moni-
toring their actions, rather than a tool to help test the 
hypotheses and assumptions of the intervention.
The expertise required to implement some of the tech-
nical activities for the intervention was to come from 
abroad. Therefore, at the outset, there were questions 
around the adequacy of the intervention design and 
applicability of the intervention to the DRC context. 
In addition, some of the articulated activities were very 
vague, for example, those that required ‘advocacy with 
government’. Yet, the ToC helped to make these areas 
of uncertainty more explicit, thereby providing a focus 
for further work. Given the composition and interests 
of stakeholders involved in constructing the ToC during 
the first workshop, there was a degree of optimism bias 
that the intervention would be successful. This some-
times made it challenging to identify any potential nega-
tive or unintended consequences of the intervention. 
Power dynamics were also evident between stakeholders 
and possibly attributable to their differing incentives. 
For example, as implementing partners are reliant on 
donors for funding, this may have influenced their ability 
to maintain an independent perspective and position. 
Similarly, the Ministry of Health may have felt inhibited 
to speak out in the presence of the more powerful minis-
tries involved in pay reform.
There was a lack of local engagement in both of the 
workshops; the views of health workers who would be the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the intervention were not elic-
ited. This had the drawback of not giving them a voice or 
considering their needs; as a result, follow-up interviews 
on the ToC included health workers in the sample.
During follow-up interviews, a proposed modifica-
tion to the intervention to improve its chance of success 
included working with other donors on the DRC’s retire-
ment policy. However, implementing partners and DFID 
were reluctant to consider this, perceiving it to be ‘scope 
creep’ that would also require far more resources.
lessons leArnt
► A systems thinking approach may require looking beyond in-
dividual sectors. In this case, the process of developing
the ToC was valuable in enabling consensus on the
effects the intervention would have on the health sys-
tem but should have given more consideration to the
wider institutional system at the outset. Systems map-
ping is a tool that can be used in conjunction with
ToCs to reach a deeper understanding of the system
and help identify potential leverage points.
► Identify all key stakeholders from the outset. Stakeholders
are identified as those with an interest in the inter-
vention, are affected by the intervention or those
who may have an active or passive influence over de-
cision-making and implementation processes.20 It is
necessary to be as inclusive as possible at the begin-
ning, recognising the importance of a range of per-
spectives in understanding the theoretical basis for
the intervention.21
► Invest time in ensuring a similar level of understanding of
ToCs among stakeholders. Often, stakeholders will not
have heard of ToCs or have different ideas of what a
ToC is,22 therefore starting the workshop with a pres-
entation on ToCs and some illustrative examples can
ensure everyone has a similar level of understanding
at the start. This will also ensure everyone feels con-
fident enough to contribute to the development of
the ToC.
► Prepare to manage stakeholder dynamics. In this case, une-
qual aid relations existing between donors and imple-
menting partners, as well as between ministries may
have affected the ToC discourse. Hence, having an
independent facilitator can help ensure a degree of
objectivity and mitigate any power imbalances. Other
approaches may include limiting the participants in
the workshop and stratifying groups to ensure open
and honest contributions.23 However, a multistake-
holder workshop has the advantage of ensuring the
sharing of different perspectives, clarifying roles and
responsibilities, and lays the basis for collaboration.24
► Avoid presenting a ready-made ToC. Give space to all
stakeholders to develop the intervention theory
themselves. Although more time-intensive, particu-
larly for those not familiar with the intervention, it is
important in overcoming the phenomenon of ‘group
think’, which can occur with those involved in con-
ceiving the intervention. It will also ensure greater
ownership of the end product by those with any influ-
ence over implementation.
conclusIon
The ToC process had utility in bringing respondents 
together to reach consensus on the mechanisms of 
effects of the intervention and its desired outcomes. 
It also demonstrated the importance of applying a 
systems thinking approach that helped in identifying 
and engaging all stakeholders who could influence the 
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success of the intervention. The role of the facilitator was 
key to: ensuring stakeholders have a clear understanding 
of ToCs, mitigating any power imbalances and encour-
aging a critical, honest and reflective approach.
Nonetheless, particularly with politically sensitive inter-
ventions like this, the process was not straightforward. It is 
hoped that the insights here shed light on what to do and 
what not to do and will encourage others to share their 
experiences to guide those using ToCs in their research.
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InTroduCTIon
Performance-based financing (PBF) is a 
type of provider payment mechanism where 
a financial incentive is given to healthcare 
workers that is linked to performance.1 Also 
known as pay-for-performance (P4P), its use in 
low-income and middle-income countries has 
grown since 2005 when Rwanda adopted it as 
national policy.1 Well-designed PBF schemes 
can be accompanied by broader reforms, 
which aim to clarify roles and responsibili-
ties, strengthen accountability and address 
certain structural problems facing health 
systems.1 However, a recent paper by Paul et al 
has raised concerns over the potential system-
wide and long-term effects of PBF, which may 
be damaging to health services in low-income 
and middle-income countries.2 This has led 
to a public debate on the evidence both for 
and against PBF in different settings,3 4 and 
the authors would like to contribute to this by 
sharing an experience from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC).
THe drC ConTexT
Although the DRC has been post-conflict since 
2003, its health system remains weak; hospitals 
and clinics lack personnel and equipment, 
and often run out of critical medicine and 
supplies. Few public sector health workers 
receive any government payments; this is due 
to the payroll being out of date and plagued 
by ‘ghost workers’, which are people listed on 
the payroll to receive a salary but who do not 
currently practice in health facilities.5 There-
fore, in an effort to maintain health service 
delivery, donors have been implementing 
PBF schemes across the country for several 
years. Many of these have been delivered as 
stand-alone PBF programmes; for example, 
a previous health programme called Access 
to Healthcare (ATH) funded by the Depart-
ment for International Development (DFID) 
between 2008 and 2013 channelled payments 
to workers outside of the national system. 
By 2015, a quarter of all health zones were 
receiving PBF support from various different 
donors.6 Its roll-out has been endorsed by the 
Ministry of Health, but there is no national 
PBF scheme for the country as yet.
However, in the DRC, the evidence 
suggests that health workers do not value PBF 
payments as much as they do fixed salaries.7 8 
Effects of PBF on performance have also been 
mixed in this context. In one study, PBF led 
to efficiency gains and improvements in 
service quality9; another study demonstrated 
Summary box
 ► Performance-based financing (PBF) has been exten-
sively employed by donors in low-income and mid-
dle-income countries as a strategy to improve health 
service delivery.
 ► In the Democratic Republic of Congo, PBF is being
implemented by donors and is endorsed by the
Ministry of Health in a context where only a minority
of health workers receive a government salary.
 ► A donor-funded health systems strengthening pro-
gramme, which did not employ PBF, has recently
succeeded in facilitating the payment of health
workers by government.
 ► The programme achieved this by working closely
with the government to conduct a census of health
workers in order to update the payroll, which would
in turn increase the number of salaried health
workers.
 ► Key lessons learnt from this experience included the
importance of understanding the existing financial
architecture of health workers and its underlying
constraints, and focusing on sustainable, nation-
al solutions rather than stand-alone donor-driven
quick fix solutions, which may be more challenging
to maintain over the longer term.
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that PBF did elicit an increase in efforts to target service 
provision, but did not stimulate demand for services, and 
even resulted in a reduction of intrinsic motivation of 
workers.10
An AlTernATIve To PBF
In 2013, a new health systems strengthening programme 
funded by DFID called Accès Aux Soins de Santé Primaire 
(Access to Primary Healthcare/ASSP) commenced. In 
contrast to other donor programmes that were contin-
uing with PBF or introducing follow-on PBF schemes, 
ASSP started to phase PBF out from its predecessor 
programme ATH. It was hypothesised that the presence 
of PBF—among other reasons including a low national 
budget for health, poor governance and security issues—
had reduced incentives for the government to salary its 
health workers, thus potentially undermining system-
wide reform in the sector. Instead, the ASSP programme 
worked closely with the government to conduct a census 
of health workers in order to update the payroll, which 
would in turn increase the number of salaried health 
workers.5
In practice, the phasing out of PBF proved difficult: it 
was perceived to have caused an exodus of workers from 
facilities as well as to have negatively affected their motiva-
tion and relationships with the local community.11 Part of 
the reason was that the change was poorly communicated, 
and performance payments were much higher than other 
sources of revenue received by workers including salaries, 
and so their removal constituted a significant economic 
shock to workers.8 11 Nonetheless, those workers who 
remained in facilities post-withdrawal of PBF indicated 
they would prefer to receive a fixed salary payment from 
the government compared with a performance payment 
from donors, as they saw the former as a more sustainable 
source of income.8
ASSP eventually succeeded in updating the health 
worker payroll for the provinces of Kasai and Kasai 
Central, as described by Likofata et al.5 Ghost worker 
payments were redistributed to thousands of previously 
undercompensated or uncompensated health workers 
in the civil service. However, the solution was not solely 
technical. The payment of health workers was outside 
the control of the Ministry of health, and under the 
purview of the Ministries of Finance, Budget and Public 
Sector Reform. Development partners involved in imple-
menting ASSP therefore had to build relationships and 
work across these different Ministries, in order to secure 
government ownership and influence change. This was 
particularly crucial as there would have been vested inter-
ests within Ministries to maintain the status quo as sala-
ries tend to be intricately tied to patronage and issues 
of political expediency.12 The DRC’s Health Develop-
ment Plan 2016–2020 also now acknowledges there is a 
continued need to strengthen information systems on 
human resources for health and improve on the number 
of salaried workers.13
leSSonS leArnT
Several key lessons were learnt from this experience. 
First, PBF can serve as a distraction from the pursuit 
of more challenging interventions that are needed to 
address the underlying constraints of health systems. In 
the DRC, the financial compensation received by workers 
under donor-funded PBF schemes was effectively serving 
as a partial substitute for salaries, as only a minority of 
workers were being paid by the government; a similar 
analogy would be that of applying a plaster to an infected 
wound, rather than treating the underlying infection. 
The attraction of PBF for donors is understandable as it 
allows them to measure and demonstrate to their own 
governments and tax payers the results and value for 
money of their investments. On the other hand, inter-
ventions that require donors normally focused on health 
to work across several Ministries may seem less appealing.
Yet, a failure to address the problems at root can lead 
to a perpetuation of weak government leadership and 
accountability.14 In fragile and conflict-affected states 
such as the DRC, despite close coordination with govern-
ment, PBF schemes are often still too complex for states 
to manage within their existing systems, and so involve 
the introduction of parallel systems to channel funding 
to providers and verify performance. Due to poor gover-
nance and accountability in the DRC, partners do not 
provide budget support; instead, PBF funds go directly 
into the accounts of health facilities. This results in PBF 
undermining rather than reinforcing state capacity.15 
Furthermore, given that donor funding for perfor-
mance-based incentives will in all likelihood eventually 
be withdrawn, there is the risk of creating a dependency 
on an income source that is not sustainable over the long 
term, with all the negative consequences that can entail.
Another lesson learnt was the need to understand 
the financial environment within which health workers 
operate when considering PBF initiatives.16 It has been 
acknowledged that PBF initiatives are often implemented 
as stand-alone projects without due consideration being 
given to the overall health system environment and 
their integration therein.17 Although the PBF model 
employed by the ATH programme did show evidence of 
improvements in performance over the short term,10 it 
could not have been sustainably financed in the absence 
of external aid. Soucat et al have highlighted the impor-
tance of understanding how PBF could be blended with 
the existing base payment mechanism to effectively align 
provider incentives with health policy objectives.17 This 
is key to ensuring that the system is structurally and 
financially sustainable; rather than adding extra income 
through a parallel system, existing income payments 
may be adjusted to make a proportion of it perfor-
mance based. More recent innovations, like the Global 
Financing Facility which has started in the DRC, may 
also provide a good mechanism to support government 
efforts to enhance domestic resource mobilisation.18 
The authors would argue, however, that the payment of 
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salaries to workers should first be ensured before intro-
ducing more complex remuneration structures.
ConCluSIon
Donor-funded work to support the financing of health 
systems and its health workers should as far as possible 
address local priorities, be integrated into existing 
systems and seek to address root cause challenges, rather 
than focus on quick fix solutions such as stand-alone PBF 
schemes, which may be harder to sustain over time and 
could also lead to unintended consequences. This may 
require a commitment to working across Ministries and 
a willingness to prioritise sustainable national solutions 
over donor needs to quickly demonstrate results of aid.
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Contributions to the literature
 Little evidence exists on how poorly functioning public sector wage systems can
be strengthened in post conflict states.
 This study employed a theory-based approach to evaluating an intervention to
improve government payments to workers in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. Securing engagement from influential actors early on, using financial
data to advocate for policy change, and banking reforms ensuring greater
transparency around pay were important steps in achieving the intervention’s
overall objectives.
 These findings have important implications for future work on pay reform in




Complex health systems strengthening interventions consist of multiple independent 
and interacting components which directly target one or more of the six health system 
building blocks. An ambitious intervention implemented in 2014 in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo to improve government payment and distribution of workers can be 
described as such an intervention. Key objectives of the intervention were to: update the
payroll to improve the remuneration of workers by government as well as revise 
staffing standards based on service needs to ensure workers were more efficiently 
distributed in facilities. This paper investigates the implementation process, exploring 
the degree to which the planned intervention was adhered to, and any contextual factors 
which may have moderated implementation.
Methods: The evaluation occurred between October 2014 and March 2018, and 
examined implementation fidelity or the extent to which the intervention was 
implemented as planned in terms of coverage, execution and duration. A theory of
change was also developed which identified implementation steps required for the
intervention, informed data collection, and helped to monitor progress. Data were 
collected through document reviews and in-depth interviews with key informants 
throughout the intervention.
Results: Despite the challenges associated with working in a fragile state, full coverage
of the intervention was achieved. Most of the component interventions described in the 
initial theory of change were carried out as intended although some adaptations had to 
be made. Specific to this intervention, securing the engagement from influential actors 
early on, using financial data to advocate for policy change, and banking reforms 
ensuring greater transparency around pay facilitated the achievement of key objectives 
of the intervention.
Conclusions: Complex health systems strengthening interventions may necessitate an
adaptive approach to both implementation and evaluation given the dynamic nature
of the system within which they occur.
194
BACKGROUND
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a fragile and conflict-affected state, 
whose government struggles to pay its public sector health providers for reasons 
including: coordination problems amongst Ministries responsible for payroll reform; 
resistance from those benefiting from misdirected public resources; and a lack of a 
robust information system on public sector workers. The government payroll is also 
known to be plagued by “ghost” or fictitious workers, which are people listed on the 
payroll to receive a salary but who are not currently practicing (Bertone et al., 2016, Fox
et al., 2013).
The inadequate remuneration of health workers significantly influences their motivation
and performance, affecting the quality of health care provided and can lead workers to 
seek other income sources, such as: user fees, illicit fees, and private practice (Maini et 
al., 2017). It also leads to an inefficient distribution of workers with shortages of health 
professionals in areas where income-earning opportunities are low, but oversupply in 
other areas (Hongoro and Normand, 2006). Finding ways to adequately pay and 
incentivise health workers is therefore an issue of global concern and has led to a recent
proliferation of initiatives and studies in this area (Witter et al., 2012, Ogundeji et al., 
2016).
Complex health systems strengthening interventions typically consist of multiple 
independent and interacting components (Craig and Petticrew, 2013) targeting one or 
more of the six health system building blocks defined by the World Health Organization
(Janovsky et al., 2006). Despite this complexity, previous interventions to reform the 
pay and distribution of health workers have not been rigorously evaluated but rather 
reported as case studies, with a predominant focus on outcomes (Goldsmith, 2011, 
Simson, 2013, Dieleman et al., 2009). This “black box” approach fails to explain how 
and why an intervention had certain effects (Stame, 2004, Pawson et al., 2005, Bonell et
al., 2012). Process evaluations, on the other hand, can identify causal mechanisms 
through which interventions may influence an outcome. Understanding to what extent 
interventions were implemented as intended, as well as identifying contextual 
moderators, is fundamental to knowing what elements underpin success, informing 
replication elsewhere (Carroll et al., 2007, Adam et al., 2012, Oakley et al., 2006).
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A recent paper described how the establishment of a human resources information 
system in the DRC enabled the reallocation of 3412 government payments (worth 
approximately US$150,000 per month) from ghost workers to legitimate workers 
(Likofata Esanga et al., 2017). However, that paper focussed on the technical elements
of the system and failed to elaborate on the process that led towards the outcomes 
achieved.
The aim of this study is therefore to unpack the black box of this intervention in order to
more fully understand the implementation process, contextual moderators, and how it 
may have led to the successful outcomes observed. It is hoped that the insights gained 
will help to inform similarly ambitious and complex interventions in the future.
Study setting
The effects of conflict have taken their toll on the DRC’s health system and its 
workforce. In particular, there is a lack of transparency and sound financial 
management when it comes to the payment of health workers by government 
(Herderschee et al., 2012). Salaries for health workers were nominal following the 
economic crisis and conflicts during the 1990s, so in order to increase wages, 
occupational risk allowances or “primes de risque” were introduced (World Bank, 
2008). These are paid to workers delivering clinical services who may be exposed to 
certain health risks (e.g. infectious diseases such as Ebola), and are managed by the 
Ministry of Health while salaries are controlled by the Ministry of Public Sector Reform
(Figure 1). Different lists of workers are used by these Ministries meaning that the 
proportions of workers receiving each payment can be vastly different (Bertone et al., 
2016, Maini et al., 2017). One study indicates that 31% of nurses in primary care 
receive a salary, while 54% receive an occupational risk allowance (Maini et al., 2017). 
This dysfunction creates confusion amongst health workers around what they are 
entitled to receive. Further, the vast majority of rural facilities lack the basic number of 
staff required by staffing norms, significantly impacting on the delivery of health care 
and health outcomes (World bank, 2015),whereas facilities in urban areas often employ 
a high number of personnel.
196
Figure 1: Role of the different Ministries in the execution of government payments to health workers
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Description of the intervention
The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) has been 
funding a five-year health system strengthening programme called Accès Aux Soins de 
Santé Primaire (Access to Primary Health-care, or ASSP) since April 2013. This 
programme supports health centres and hospitals to deliver a basic package of services 
in 52 health zones1 of the DRC in five provinces2: Kasai, Kasai Central, Nord Ubangi, 
Maniema, and Tshopo. The non-governmental organisation Interchurch Medical 
Assistance Worldhealth (IMA) is the lead implementing partner of a consortium of sub-
contracted partners. One part of this programme involves IMA working with the sub- 
contracted partner IntraHealth to implement a complex intervention to improve the 
payment and distribution of health workers.
The intervention was to consist of two main components which are outlined below.
1. Generation and utilisation of information to improve government payments to
workers
The establishment of a database on legitimate government recruited health 
workers that are currently working. This was to be piloted in ASSP health zones
within Kasai Central and Kasai provinces (formerly known together as Kasai 
Occidental). Information on health workers recorded in the database would 
include: qualifications, place of work, and whether they were receiving a salary 
and/or occupational risk allowance. Biometric data to uniquely identify workers 
would be recorded in the form of finger-prints and photographs.
2. Updated staffing norms
Using updated information on health service needs to revise the national 
guidelines on staffing standards from 2006 (Ministère de la Santé, 2006) to
enable more efficient and equitable staffing of facilities.
Central to both components was the need to encourage government to use the 
information generated to improve payments to health workers and enforce the revised
national staffing standards.
1 A health zone is a defined geographical area with a population between 100,000 and 150,000 people and
is usually served by one reference hospital. DRC is thought to have 516 health zones in total.




Implementation fidelity was examined using a conceptual framework adapted from 
Carroll et al.( 2007), to identify the extent to which the intervention had been 
implemented as planned (implementation adherence) by measuring its coverage, 
execution and duration (Figure 2). Coverage examined whether all those originally 
targeted by the intervention received it; the information on government payments to 
workers was to be collected on workers in 28 health zones covered by the ASSP 
programme in the Kasai provinces, while data to update the staffing norms would be 
derived from a representative sample of facilities across the country. Execution 
measured whether the activities were implemented as intended. The expected 
duration of the intervention was June 2014 until December 2014.
Potential moderators of implementation of the intervention also identified by Carroll et 
al. (2007), were examined, including: participant responsiveness, which measures to 
what extent participants respond to, or are engaged by, an intervention; facilitating 
strategies, which are measures put in place to optimise the level of fidelity achieved, 
and; contextual factors external to the intervention which may have acted as either 
barriers or facilitators to implementation. In addition, the evaluation explored potential 
unintended consequences, such as whether the intervention affected the progress of 
similar interventions occurring in other sectors.




In measuring implementation adherence, specifically execution of the intervention, a 
Theory of Change (ToC) was constructed outlining implementation steps and 
hypothesised mechanisms of change. The ToC was developed during two workshops 
held by RM in October and November 2014, and attended by representatives from: 
IMA WorldHealth, DFID, Intrahealth, and officials from the DRC Ministries of Health, 
Public Service, Finance and Budget. Reflections on the process of developing this ToC 
are described in another paper (Maini et al., 2018). The resulting ToC is shown in 
Figure 3. Component 1 would involve conducting a biometric census (including 
fingerprint identification) of all active health workers in Kasai Central and Kasai 
provinces covered by the ASSP programme. Once the information was independently 
verified by members of the community as well as provincial and national government, it
would be recorded on electronic software called iHRIS (open-source Human Resources 
Information System) (World Health Organization, 2012). Improvements in information 
on health workers would then be used to clean the payroll and better allocate 
government payments, which would in turn increase the motivation and performance of
workers.
For component 2, a process called WISN (Workload Indicators of Staffing Need) 
(World Health Organization, 2014) would determine the optimum number of workers 
needed to staff facilities. The steps involved in this method, which is essentially a 
human resources management tool, have been described in detail elsewhere (McQuide 
et al., 2013, Govule et al., 2015). Essentially, data are collected from a sample of health
workers on the activities they undertake and the time taken to do these, in order to 
define workload components and establish activity standards for cadres. Analysis of 
these data using the WISN method yields information on the workload pressures of 
different cadres of staff in different facilities, which can then be used to inform the 
development of national standards for staffing at facilities. If enforced, these standards 
would lead to a more efficient distribution of workers between facilities.
Both intervention components were hypothesised to contribute to improved quality and
uptake of health services. Political will of the government to address these issues was
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recognised as a critical assumption which would fundamentally influence the success of
the overall intervention. Some of the activities in the ToC were very broadly described,
e.g. advocacy with government, to afford implementing partners a degree of flexibility
as to how to best adapt the intervention as it progressed.
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Figure 3: Theory of Change for the human resources intervention
Legend: CODESA: Local health committee; FP: Ministry of Public Service; MoH: Ministry of Health; DFID: Department for International Development; IMA: Interchurch 
Medical Assistance; iHRIS: open source Human Resource Information System; HRH: Human Resources for Health; ASSP: Access to healthcare programme; WISN: 
Workload Indicators of Staffing Norms; SNIS: National Routine Health Information System
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Key informant interviews
We conducted three rounds of semi-structured interviews; one round with 17 
stakeholders (January to February 2015, which was before implementation of the census
and the WISN process); a second round with 24 stakeholders (April to May 2016) with 
the higher numbers in this round compared to the first occurring due to snowball 
sampling; and a third round of more focussed interviews with four stakeholders (March 
2018). The first two rounds occurred during implementation of the intervention while 
the last was conducted once most activities had been completed. This sequencing 
allowed the researchers to record implementation fidelity, as well as the influence of 
moderating factors such as participant responsiveness and context. Each round of 
interviews also inquired about any wider unintended consequences of the intervention; 
for example, a previous civil service census exercise had provided more opportunities 
for corruption (Bomboko et al., 2007).
Interview participants included those involved in the initial ToC workshop and others 
either involved in, able to influence, or benefit from the intervention (Table 1). An 
experienced local qualitative researcher familiar with the cultural context and RM 
conducted all interviews in either French or English depending on the preference of the 
interviewee. None of the interviewees declined to participate and interviews were 
undertaken in a private room to maintain confidentiality and audio-recorded subject to 
consent. Interviews varied between 45 minutes to one and half hours, and audio 
recordings were transcribed in French or English by the local researcher and primary 
author respectively (the researcher’s respective first languages) to maximise accuracy. 
The primary author then reviewed all transcripts and managed the data using NVivo 10 
software. Qualitative data were analysed using the adapted framework by Carroll et al. 
(Figure 2) as the main deductive framework with which to code responses. The ToC 
provided the basis to assess whether planned activities were executed as intended, and 
whether any consequences of the intervention had been anticipated or not. Interviews 
were coded iteratively at each round so that themes emerging in early interviews could 
also be explored in later ones.
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Table 1: Stakeholders interviewed and rationale for their selection during rounds








Intrahealth 2 Non-governmental organisation responsible for 
implementing the technical aspects of the intervention.
IMA Worldhealth 3 Lead implementing partner of ASSP
DFID 2 Funding the ASSP programme
World Bank 1 Previous involvement in civil servant censuses, and in 




2 Involved in programmes to strengthen Human Resources 
for Health in the DRC.
DRC Ministry of Health
(central and provincial 
levels)
3 In charge of administrative management of health 
personnel and the list of workers receiving occupational
risk allowance payments.
DRC Ministry of Public
Sector Reform
(central and provincial 
levels)
3 Charged with recruitment and management of civil 
servants, including the list of workers to receive payment 
of salaries.
DRC Ministry of Budget 
(central and provincial 
levels)
3 In charge of validating any payroll expenditure (both
salaries and occupational risk allowances).
DRC Ministry of Finance
(central and provincial 
levels)
3 Ministry responsible for releasing the payment order (for
salaries and occupational risk allowances).
Health zone workers 2 Beneficiaries of the intervention.
Document review
Information on the execution, coverage, and duration of intervention activities obtained
from project documents was reviewed to profile implementation fidelity. Reports 
included: ASSP quarterly progress reports to DFID, Intrahealth reports and 
presentations, and meeting minutes.
RESULTS
The results below summarise the extent of adherence to the intervention in terms of 
execution, coverage, and duration. They also describe: participant responsiveness to the
intervention; facilitating strategies employed; the role of context in affecting 




For both components of the intervention, a number of planned programme activities 
were executed as intended and in accordance with the ToC (see additional file 1). The
only activities which did not take place as planned were the fingerprinting of health 
workers during the census, and the production of a situational report on human 
resources for government.
It was also recognised that certain activities, such as the recording of data into the 
iHRIS system, should not just be conducted as a one-off. The intervention would need
to adapt to ensure the data were updated frequently to include new staff recruited to 
facilities or changes in details of staff over time.
Duration:
The entire intervention started in June 2014 as planned and was expected to be 
completed by December 2014, however, significant delays were experienced in relation
to implementation. For example, the census was not carried out until over one year after
it had initially been scheduled. The development of staffing norms also took much 
longer than anticipated. By March 2018, most activities were completed but some were 
still ongoing (see additional file 1). Reasons behind the delays are further explained 
under moderating factors.
Coverage
The WISN analysis to inform the development of national staffing standards was 
conducted as planned on data from a representative sample of health facilities from 
Kinshasa and four provinces. Therefore, the intended coverage for this component of 
the intervention was achieved. However, in relation to the census, there was a deviation
from the original plans. Formerly, it was planned that the census of workers would only
be undertaken in zones covered by the ASSP programme, which was 28 zones in total. 
However, the provincial Ministry of Health requested that the census be undertaken in 
all 44 health zones of the Kasai and Kasai central provinces to ensure complete rather 
than piece-meal coverage of both provinces. Therefore, actual coverage of this 




When the intervention was first conceived, engagement of government stakeholders 
had mainly been confined to the Ministry of Health. However, it quickly became clear 
to development partners that other Ministries are involved in health sector pay: the 
Ministry of Public Service is responsible for maintaining the register of civil servants 
and controls the information on workers to receive a salary, the Ministry of Budget is 
charged with preparing and monitoring the national budget, and the Ministry of Finance
releases spend. It was admitted by international health partners that the delay in 
engaging with these other Ministries occurred in part because they did not have any 
experience in working with them. There was also a widespread perception that the 
intervention, particularly the census and subsequent cleaning of the payroll, would 
likely be met with resistance from these other Ministries, as a more transparent payroll 
would minimise any opportunities for corruption.
Non-government, 1st round interviews
Once eventually consulted, the Ministry of Public Service questioned the legitimacy of 
international health partners to undertake a census of health workers, indicating that the
intervention was not adequately aligned with national public administrative reform 
strategies. In particular, this Ministry was concerned that the approach could lead to a 
proliferation of multiple sector-specific information systems which were incompatible 
with their own overarching system to manage the civil service payroll.
As you know, not all people want it to change, there are people who are in the mafia
today, …who would not want a situation of transparency, because they play with 
other people’s salaries. So, if there is a transparent situation that means every person
who works is known and if there is the money that is paid into the bank account of 
this person, the mafia can no longer survive.
206
Government, 2nd round interviews
The implementing partners further realised the importance of having the Ministry of 
Public Service engaged in the census, as this Ministry had the exclusive right to 
undertake finger-printing of all civil servants in order to prevent double registration. 
However, significant delays ensued in starting data collection for the census as the 
Ministry of Public Service would not authorise the use of finger-printing until an 
independent cabinet was established to oversee the process. The argument that 
Intrahealth could be viewed as being impartial was not accepted by the Ministry of 
Public Service. After several months of unsuccessful negotiations, the implementing 
partners decided to forge ahead without finger-printing, as information on the number
and location health workers would still be useful to inform decision-making for 
workforce planning.
By mid-2016, the results of the census were presented by implementing partners to the
Ministries of Budget, Finance, Health and Public Service Reform. The findings 
indicated that there were over 2000 ghost workers (Likofata Esanga et al., 2017). The 
Ministry of Budget committed to setting up a payroll review committee tasked with re-
diverting payments from ghost workers to legitimate workers.
Non-government, 3rd round interviews
Unlike the census, the decision to update staffing norms was under the complete control
of the Ministry of Health. The Ministry was invested in the idea of having a more 
efficient workforce, and so responsiveness to this aspect of the intervention was high. It
was also acknowledged by the Ministry of Health that the current workforce lacked in
The idea is to have one system that manages both the human resources and the 
payroll of the public servants…to further reduce the multiplicity of databases and 
systems…a sector cannot claim to carry out a series of activities without receiving a
mandate from the Ministry of Public Service which is the guarantor of the activity.
With that very public information, that there are 2000 ghost workers…I think they
(the government) would risk their reputation and perhaps their jobs if they do 
nothing.
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certain key personnel such as pharmacists, but that there was also a glut in other cadres
such as doctors.
Government, 1st round interviews
Facilitating strategies
In the delays running up to the census and in recognition of the political sensitivities 
related to reforming the payroll, DFID commissioned a political economy analysis. The 
purpose of this was to examine communication lines and relationships between 
Ministries, how incentive structures aligned and differed, and any other potential 
interventions which could positively influence reform of health worker pay. This 
analysis was helpful in explaining some of the existing power struggles between 
Ministries which had contributed to the significant delays incurred during 
implementation. For example, although the Ministry of Public Service was in charge of 
recruitment and of granting employee registration, most Ministries including the 
Ministry of Health had started to deal directly with the payroll department in the 
Ministry of Budget which seemed to have become the key decider over who was 
included in the payroll. Implementing partners identified that their political capital 
would be better invested in influencing the Ministry of Budget to pay legitimate 
workers their occupational risk allowance which was managed by the Ministry of 
Health, rather than to help improve the payment of salaries given the resistance faced 
from the Ministry of Public Service. To progress negotiations and advocacy with 
Ministries, DFID’s health team also enlisted the help of its governance team with its 
contacts and networks to assist in many of the political discussions.
Non-government, 2nd round interviews
The problem is that we are recruiting categories (of workers) that are overcrowded,
for example the general doctors, there are too many now but we continue to recruit
them…
The Ministry of Health has direct control over “primes” (occupational risk 
allowances), payment occurs more frequently, and doesn't require the same process 
for salaries…there is potential for greater traction.
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For the WISN component, the delays experienced were mainly because the process 
required some of the data collected from the census, such as the number and cadres of 
health workers. However, implementing partners admitted that they had also 
underestimated other data requirements as well as the complexity of data analysis using
the WISN method. WISN uses annual service statistics to assess workloads but most of
the health facilities in the DRC do not keep good records. This led the implementing 
partners to request additional capacity and resources, as well as the enlistment of 
international expertise, in order to facilitate progress on WISN data collection and 
analysis.
Role of context at the macro-level
A major national policy change which supported the intervention was the extension of 
‘bancarisation’ from the payment of salaries to also include occupational risk 
allowances in October 2015. Bancarisation refers to the establishment of bank accounts
to pay employees. Occupational risk allowances were previously paid directly to 
workers in cash. Extending bancarisation to the occupational risk allowance helped to 
elevate the profile of the issue of ghost workers, as far more workers received these 
allowances compared to a salary. With the introduction of bancarisation, payments to 
non-existent workers would start to accumulate at the bank, and after a period of time, 
these unclaimed funds would be returned to the central bank but not the Ministry of 
Health. This meant the government stood to lose significant amounts of money to the 
bank, thus offering them a clear incentive to clean the payroll.
Non-government, 3rd round interviews
Some interviewees had expected the DRC environment would pose a barrier to
accessing health zones in order to deploy training and undertake the census.
One of the reasons the decision (to clean the payroll) was made was because of 
bancarisation…Money you can’t access, you cannot use. Therefore, it needs to be
changed so that the funds can be used.
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Non-government, 1st round interviews
Despite the poor road infrastructure in remote areas and lack of internet connectivity, 
full coverage of the census and training in iHRIS was achieved as local staff were 
accustomed to overcoming difficulties of the terrain. Technical solutions such as VSAT
(Very Small Aperture Terminals)3 were employed to enable internet access at health 
zone offices.
Unintended consequences
An unintended but positive consequence of the intervention was the reaction of the 
donor community to the work undertaken to improve the government payroll. With the 
exception of the World Bank, donors had historically shied away from programmes 
tackling the underlying causes of poor health worker remuneration. Instead, most tended
to invest in performance-based financing schemes where funds were channelled to 
workers outside the government system. Reasons given included: a lack of clear entry 
points to reform the payroll, pressure to demonstrate quantifiable impacts on service 
delivery within short time-scales, inability to directly fund the wage bill due to weak 
public financial management systems, and difficulty in securing funding for high-risk 
system strengthening interventions. However, on presenting the results of progress 
made on the intervention at the joint donor health group and related thematic groups, 
there were signs of a gradual coalition of support to similar interventions to improve 
government payments to workers (including in other sectors) in the future.
3 VSATs are devices that are designed to facilitate effective telecommunications and 
Internet connectivity in remote places
Our country being vast, there are difficulties in terms of geographical accessibility. 
There are places where there are no roads, sometimes you have to cross a river, you 
have to take the canoe, and if the person is not used to doing it, it means it can be 
really dangerous.
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Non-government, 2nd round interviews
Another positive consequence was that the intervention shifted health workers’
perceptions around their remuneration. Increasingly, workers began to expect 
government to start paying them, rather than rely on donors to fill the gap.
Non-government, 3rd round interviews
Discussion
Despite the challenges of implementing an intervention of this nature in a fragile state, 
full coverage was achieved, with one component (the census) even exceeding the 
intended coverage. On the other hand, the duration of the intervention took much longer
than originally anticipated; this required adaptation of the evaluation as well as the 
intervention.
Most of the activities described in the initial ToC were carried out according to the 
design, although some were not executed, for example the finger-printing of workers. 
This was due to a failure to engage the appropriate Ministries involved in health worker
pay from the start; public sector pay goes beyond a specific sector and tends to be 
defined for all government services rather than specifically for health. A reflection on 
the reason why this happened was that health donors tend to liaise uniquely with the 
Ministry of Health, and may find it challenging to work with other Ministries where 
they have no established contacts. This was also observed in Chad, where despite
One of the major barriers to progress in this area is not that people don’t think it’s 
important, it’s just people don’t have a sense of practically how we can take on the 
issues of human resource management in a constructive way…I think we’re just 
beginning to make some headway and there’s the early momentum towards this area 
that hopefully also attracts more attention.
…in the previous programme, one of the outcomes of that was that there was quite a 
strong sense that the management of the health care workers and their remuneration 
was something that health workers turned to the programmes to provide. By the later 
stages… they were turning to the Ministry of Health and the government in the DRC,
to say, look, we deserve to be paid, we need to be paid, what are you going to do 
about ensuring health workers receive the salaries that are due?
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positive results from a pilot PBF scheme, PBF failed to be institutionalised in national
policy as influential stakeholders beyond the Ministry of Health had not been 
sufficiently involved (Kiendrébéogo et al., 2017).
Our experience in the DRC showed that, once engaged, the Ministry of Budget was 
very responsive to the findings, partly because the financial savings of implementing 
change were communicated to them. Another important lesson, therefore, was the 
power of using financial data to make the case for policy change that impacts on health
care, particularly to finance Ministries. Similarly, in Sierra Leone political traction was
gained for a similar intervention through publicising savings from cleaning the payroll 
(Simson, 2013).
Hence, participant responsiveness had a strong influence on the implementation of the 
intervention. Berkel et al (2011) have shown that for public health prevention 
programmes, even if they are delivered as intended, limited participant responsiveness
in terms of involvement and engagement in the programme will mean these 
programmes are unlikely to achieve their intended outcomes. Indeed, a large scale 
multi-donor project initiated in 2005 aiming to reform the payroll for several sectors 
in the DRC had previously been unsuccessful as civil servants had not felt involved 
enough in the process, viewing it as a donor-driven exercise (Moshonas, 2018).
Yet the response of participants was not always straightforward or easily predicted, as 
observed with the Ministry of Public Service in this intervention. In this regard, the 
political economy analysis undertaken by implementing partners proved to be a 
powerful tool in revealing insights into how power, resources and incentives were 
distributed between stakeholders.
Contextual factors also had some bearing on implementation of the intervention. In 
particular, the recent reforms on bancarisation were timely and provided a strong 
motivator to government to clean the payroll as they would have continued to lose 
money to the central bank in the absence of any action. Unexpectedly, difficult terrain
was not a barrier to implementation.
Finally, positive unintended consequences were identified. Even though implementing 
partners had not actively advocated for it, the successes observed through this 
intervention meant that other donors became more supportive and open to strengthening
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the payroll. The intervention also raised awareness amongst health workers of the 
state’s responsibility to pay them, as health workers understood why the census was 
being undertaken; this may in time lead to improved governance of the health system as
information dissemination can have a positive impact on strengthening accountability. 
For example, in Uganda, a survey in 1995 indicated that district governments were not 
transferring 80% of budgeted resources to schools, and this was made public through 
newspapers and other media (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004). By 2001, the diversion of 
funds reduced to less than 20%.
Suitability of the evaluation approach and transferability of the findings
This evaluation indicated that inflexible intervention designs may not be a good match 
when addressing the dynamic properties of health systems (Paina and Peters, 2011). For
example, had the design not allowed for changes in coverage of the census and duration
of the overall intervention, none of the outcomes would have been successfully 
achieved. Alternatively, an adaptive programming approach may be more relevant to 
health systems strengthening interventions, particularly where evidence on cause and 
effect is weak (World Health Organization, 2006, Adam et al., 2012).
However, classical evaluation frameworks do not tend to address the issue of how to 
adapt an intervention while still maintaining its effectiveness. Carroll et al. (2007) 
recognised that in the real world, an intervention cannot always be fully implemented
as planned. Nonetheless, adaptation inevitably compromises implementation fidelity.
In relation to adherence (or fidelity to design), consistent with complexity science 
theory and as noted by Hawe et al. (2004),  the focus should instead be on adherence to 
the steps in the change process or goals of the intervention, rather than the constituents 
of the intervention themselves. Some authors also acknowledge that fidelity should still 
be maintained for certain core intervention activities, while less important or adaptable 
elements at the periphery may be changed to achieve an ecological fit (Durlak and 
DuPre, 2008, Greenhalgh et al., 2004, Fixsen et al., 2005). In the case of this 
intervention, although alterations were made to the execution, coverage or duration of 
the constituent components, the overall ToC still appeared to hold as the causal 
pathways were the same. Low fidelity to certain constituents could, however, affect
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whether key goals were achieved. For example, delays in implementing the WISN 
method meant that by the end of the evaluation, a set of staffing standards had still not
been agreed with government. A limitation of the Carroll framework is that it does not
help identify which components are essential to the intervention; Pérez et al. (2015) 
have proposed a modified version of Carroll’s framework which attempts to more 
comprehensively assess the implementation fidelity-adaptation balance.
By examining adherence to the goals of the intervention, the transferability of the 
findings can be better understood. Important goals achieved by the intervention 
included: building the capacity of the health workforce to use a human resource 
information management system, and engaging key political actors early on in the 
process as well as communicating the benefits of implementing the intervention, 
particularly in financial terms. Although the constituents of the intervention could be 
different to those used in the DRC, other countries looking to implement similar 
complex interventions - not necessarily confined within the health system but even in
other sectors - could aim to achieve the same objectives using slightly adapted 
strategies.
Limitations
This evaluation was primarily qualitative, and only a limited set of indicators could be
measured. This was partly due to a lack of resources but also due to the evolutionary 
and dynamic nature of the intervention; other than quarterly reports, data and reports 
developed by implementing partners on the intervention were often received on an ad 
hoc basis, making it difficult to forecast what data would be available.
Another limitation of the study was that given the sensitivity of the topic and 
stakeholders involved, it may have been difficult to evoke a truthful response from
interviewees. In particular, government officials would have wished to present 
themselves in a positive light, and so there is a risk their responses were subject to 
social desirability bias. To establish reliability of the findings, several different 
perspectives were represented and similarities and differences across accounts 
compared. The lead author who conducted all of the interviews was also non- 
Congolese, and so difference in background and beliefs would have further
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influenced both the information yielded by participants and how it may have been 
interpreted.
Although it was not an objective of this study, it would have been desirable to also 
measure outcomes linked to the intervention. There had been plans to use the baseline 
and end-line evaluation surveys of the ASSP programme to conduct a controlled before-
and-after study. This would have enabled a quantitative comparison of health worker 
motivation, government payments, distribution, and performance for those workers 
receiving the intervention in the Kasai provinces against workers from other provinces 
who had not been exposed to the intervention. However, the security risk posed to 
researchers as a result of instability arising in the two Kasais in 2016 meant that the 
end-line survey could not be undertaken in the Kasai provinces. Nonetheless, this 
analysis still offers credible evidence on the contribution of the intervention to the 
outcome of improving government payments to workers, which has been reported by 
Likofata et al. (2017). Key activities of the intervention were implemented as intended, 
with most elements of the ToC supported and confirmed by evidence on observed 
results. Furthermore, no other similar interventions to clean the payroll or update 
staffing standards were being implemented in parallel.
Finally, no negative unintended consequences for the intervention were recorded. 
Further scrutiny in this area could have been enabled through the development of ‘dark 
logic models’, which can be used to guide the evaluation of potential harms and their 
underlying mechanisms (Bonell et al., 2014).
Conclusion
In conclusion, this study has highlighted that complex health systems strengthening 
interventions may necessitate an adaptive approach to implementation and evaluation 
given the dynamic nature of the system within which they occur. A framework of 
implementation fidelity identified participant responsiveness and context as key 
moderators of the intervention. Specific to this intervention, securing the engagement 
from influential actors early on, using financial data to advocate for policy change, and 
banking reforms ensuring greater transparency around pay were important steps in 
achieving the intervention’s overall objectives.
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Additional file 1: Execution and duration of activities described in the Theory of Change
Constituent interventions Execution 
status






Component  One:  Generation
and  utilisation  of  information
to improve governme nt
payments to workers
1. iHRIS software deployed into
central, peripheral and zonal
levels.
Completed. Computer equipment was purchased and delivered to key health departments in the 






2. Health officials trained in use
of iHRIS
Completed. Training in iHRIS  was carried out at the central and provincial levels. At the health zone
level, a total of 98 data managers in 44 health zones of Kasai Central and Kasai were 
trained. Each health zone, provincial health department and the central health 
departments






3. Data on Human Resources for
ASSP zones in Kasai provinces
entered onto iHRIS
Completed. The details of health workers in the Kasai provinces already registered with the health






4. Recruitment and training of
data operators for identification
exercise (census).
Completed. Six teams of four people were recruited and trained in iHRIS, before being deployed 






5 and 7. Biometric identification
of  health  workers  carried  out






Health  workers  from  each  zone  in  both  Kasai  provinces  were  requested  to  bring
documentary evidence on  their  qualifications  and recruitment  in  health  facilities  for
review by the trained teams. Those workers identified as legitimate had their contact
information, identification, photo, current job, and employment and education history








6. Communities, government and
development    partners  actively




These stakeholders were present during the census, and helped to oversee the verification








12. Advocacy with government
to use iHRIS data.
Completed. Following an analysis of census data,  IntraHealth and IMA World Health met formally
with officials  and  partners including  the  Secretary General  of  the  Ministry  of  Health,
Director in charge of payroll at the Ministry of Budget, and the Ministry of Public










Component two: Update d
staffing norms
9. Advocacy to use WISN with
the government
Completed. The project conducted a four day workshop on WISN with the Ministry of Health in 
order to develop the capacity of the Ministry of Health to better understand the WISN 
process






10. Application  of  WISN
methodology  to  assess  staffing
needs  using  data  on  Human
Resources
Completed. Once approval to proceed had been granted by the Ministry of Health, a WISN Steering
Committee and Technical Working Group were established. A strategy and operational
plan was developed. The Working Group designed the data collection tools a pilot study
was undertaken in Kinshasa.
Data collection for  WISN was completed in another 4 provinces,  namely: Maniema,
Kasai, Kasai Centrale, and Nord Ubangi. This included 35 general reference hospitals,
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8. Data  analysed  together  to
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By the end of the evaluation, the data from WISN and iHRIS had been analysed but not 








11. Advocacy  work  between
government  and  DFID/IMA  to
commit  finances  to  Human
Resources for Health.
Ongoing. IntraHealth and IMA World Health met with officials and partners including the
Secretary  General of the Ministry of Health, Director in charge of payroll at the
Ministry of Budget,  and  the  Ministry  of  Public Service  to  discuss  how  to  use  the
information recorded on iHRIS to pay health workers. This led the Ministry of Budget
to set up a review committee tasked with updating the payroll lists for occupational risk
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and utilisation of information 
to improve government 
payments to workers 
1. iHRIS software deployed into
central, peripheral and zonal
levels.
Completed. Computer equipment was purchased and delivered to key health departments in the 






2. Health officials trained in use
of iHRIS
Completed. Training in iHRIS was carried out at the central and provincial levels. At the health zone 
level, a total of 98 data managers in 44 health zones of Kasai Central and Kasai were 
trained. Each health zone, provincial health department and the central health departments 
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ASSP zones in Kasai provinces
entered onto iHRIS
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Health workers from each zone in both Kasai provinces were requested to bring 
documentary evidence on their qualifications and recruitment in health facilities for 
review by the trained teams. Those workers identified as legitimate had their contact 
information, identification, photo, current job, and employment and education history 
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Director in charge of payroll at the Ministry of Budget, and the Ministry of Public Service 
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plan was developed. The Working Group designed the data collection tools a pilot  study 
was undertaken in Kinshasa. 
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General of the Ministry of Health, Director in charge of payroll at the Ministry of Budget, 
and the Ministry of Public Service to discuss how to use the information recorded on 
iHRIS to pay health workers. This led the Ministry of Budget to set up a review committee 
















At the start of this research, there was little evidence of the sources and levels of income 
available to health workers in low- and middle-income countries, and no such data 
available for fragile states.  Nor were the drivers of income levels and variations across 
providers and interactions between sources well understood. 
While PBF is a growing source of income in low-income countries, there is limited 
research on how it affects motivation and more importantly what happens when it is 
withdrawn. Lastly most research on financial incentives tends to focus on the effects of 
PBF and user fees on health workers, with much less attention to the role of salaries and 
how governments may strengthen systems to pay workers. 
Therefore, this thesis had the following objectives: 
Objective 1: To describe and quantify the sources and levels of income for health 
workers in a sample of public sector facilities in the DRC. 
Objective 2: To develop and validate a scale to measure dimensions of motivation 
among health workers in the DRC, and compare differences in motivation among health 
workers where PBF had recently been removed with those who never received PBF.   
Objective 3: To undertake a process evaluation of a complex intervention aimed at 
facilitating government payments to health workers. 
This chapter will begin with a summary of the thesis findings in relation to each 
objective, situating them within the existing literature. The limitations of this work and 
generalisability of the findings are then discussed. I then reflect on the contribution of 
this thesis and its policy implications. Finally, areas for future research are explored.  
8.2 Summary of key findings 
Objective 1 
This study indicated that within the DRC, nurses constitute the majority of the primary 
health care workforce. The analysis of incomes was therefore focussed on this cadre. 
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The median total income received per month was 85 USD, and mean amount was 165 
USD, and all nurses reported low satisfaction with their remuneration. Only 31% of 
those sampled received a government salary, with a slightly higher proportion of 54% 
receiving the occupational risk allowance, which averaged a lower amount. These two 
government payments were considered to be unreliable by workers; amounts were often 
less than expected and in almost a third of cases were not received on time.  
The majority of staff (74%) received user fees, the amount of which received per month 
was determined by: the user fee tariff set by the facility, patient case load, and number 
of personnel working at the facility as fees were shared out amongst staff. Over one 
year, 52% of workers had received at least one per diem from external partners to attend 
training, but amounts tended to be fairly small. However, almost half of all nurses 
admitted to undertaking non-clinical activities such as agricultural work to supplement 
their income. Private practice was far less common, and appeared to depend upon 
opportunities to practice; those living in urban areas and where villages were situated 
closer to facilities were more likely to conduct private work. Informal payments were 
also rarely reported. 
In identifying the individual and facility-level determinants of income sources received, 
gender and provincial location appeared to be significantly associated with differences 
in types of income received. For example, when controlling for other characteristics, 
men were more likely to receive a high total income and per diems compared to 
females, and nurses in Equateur were more likely to receive a salary compared with 
nurses in Maniema.  
Some unexpected findings also arose from the analysis; receipt of government payments 
was associated with income from private practice. The rationale for this - identified 
through interviews - was that those workers receiving a government payment at the end 
of the month were guaranteed their wage irrespective of whether they worked in a 
facility or not. Yet those workers who were not receiving any government payments did 
not want to risk losing the opportunity of becoming registered to receive a salary or 
occupational risk allowance and so were less likely to undertake private work. The latter 
group of workers tended to be younger, as they had not been captured by the latest 
census and incorporated onto the payroll. 
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Most previous studies have examined income sources in isolation, rather than assessing 
the full set of financial incentives available to workers, with just a few exceptions 
(Roenen et al., 1997, Akwataghibe et al., 2013). With respect to the DRC, studies have 
tended to have a focus on the effects of PBF (Soeters et al., 2011, Fox et al., 2013, 
Huillery and Seban, 2015, Bertone et al., 2018). Investigating the overall level and 
composition of health workers’ income is a relatively new area. The importance of this 
research agenda has been discussed extensively by Bertone and Witter (Bertone and 
Witter, 2015). Particularly in low-income countries where workers often receive 
incomes from a variety of sources, they argue that shedding light on the ‘complex 
remuneration’ experienced by workers will enable a better understanding of the causes 
of variation and fragmentation in income structures and levels, as well as the potential 
incentives it creates which have consequences for health worker motivation. An 
exploration of these issues can then inform the design of coordinated and more effective 
incentive packages, aimed at improving health worker motivation and performance 
(Akwataghibe et al., 2013, Bertone and Witter, 2015).   
Since the start of the research carried out for this thesis, a quantitative examination of 
the ‘complex remuneration’ of workers was conducted for the DRC and in Sierra Leone 
by other authors (Bertone et al., 2016, Bertone and Lagarde, 2016), revealing both 
similarities and differences to the thesis findings.  
After data collection was carried out for objective 1 of the thesis, I was informed of 
another similar study of health worker remuneration being undertaken on behalf of the 
World Bank within the DRC. In order to maximise the usefulness of both studies for 
stakeholders, I liaised with the lead researcher of the World Bank study to ensure 
complementarity rather than duplication of sampling, and to ensure that comparable 
data could be collected in the World Bank study. Following discussions, the World 
Bank agreed to sample health zones in southern Equateur thus avoiding any of the zones 
sampled in northern Equateur under this study. Other provinces sampled by the World 
Bank included Bandundu, Katanga and South Kivu, whereas the data for my thesis was 
collected from Maniema, Kasai Occidental, Kasai Oriental, and Province Orientale.   
Despite some differences in scope and methodology (which are further discussed in 
appendix 10), I was able to synthesise some of the data derived from both studies to 
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yield a descriptive analysis of health worker remuneration across a broader geographical 
area of the DRC. Many of the results from the World Bank study confirmed the results 
in our study, and the final joint report which I lead authored is given in appendix 10. For 
example, the study by Bertone et al. also found that salaries are received by a minority 
of health workers and often do not constitute a substantial source of overall income, 
consistent with the findings in this thesis. As indicated in the joint report in appendix 
10, the proportion of workers receiving a salary in the World Bank sampled provinces 
ranged from 5% to 29% while it ranged from 18% to 39% in our sampled provinces. 
Incomes such as user fees from patients emerged as a common source of revenue across 
cadres and provinces in both studies; between 64% to 90% of sampled workers in our 
study received user fees compared to 72% to 96% of sampled workers in World Bank 
provinces. However, there was significant variation in the proportion of nurses 
receiving income from private practice and/or activities outside the health sector 
between studies (45% of nurses in our study compared to 26% of nurses in the World 
Bank study). This may partly be explained by the geographical differences in sampling 
of the two studies, for example the World Bank study sampled overall proportionately 
more in urban areas compared to our study (21% versus 11% respectively), and 
opportunities to practice outside the public health system may have varied between 
urban and rural areas. Furthermore, as identified in this study and by Bertone et al. 
(2016), the proportion of staff earning from non-clinical activities in the DRC is high, 
which is consistent with other studies in low- and middle-income countries (Van 
Lerberghe et al., 2002, Akwataghibe et al., 2013, Roenen et al., 1997).  
 
Although in Sierra Leone salaries often represented the main share of income, health 
workers in Sierra Leone who had trained after 2010 did not receive a salary as the 
payroll had not been updated (Bertone and Lagarde, 2016). Unlike what was found in 
this study and Bertone’s study in the DRC (Bertone et al., 2016), user fees were less 
common in Sierra Leone given the introduction of user fee exempted services under the 
Free Health Care Initiative (Bertone and Lagarde, 2016).  
 
Objective 2 
The first part of objective 2 involved developing and validating a scale which could be 
used to measure the motivation of DRC health workers. The eleven dimensions of 
motivation which were confirmed to be relevant to health workers in the DRC context 
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are presented in table 6 below along with their definitions and link to the Franco 
framework, which was the principal conceptual framework used (Franco et al., 2002, 
Franco et al., 2004).  
 
Table 6: Dimensions of motivation and link to Franco framework 





Conscientiousness Perception of level of 
discipline, effort and care put 
into work 
Pride Pride associated with working 
in the facility 
Extrinsic motivation Importance health workers 
place on external rewards 
Organisational level 
 
Training Satisfaction with training 
received and opportunities for 
training 
Tasks Satisfaction with workload 





Satisfaction with availability 
of resources such as 
equipment, medical supplies 
and medications 
Income reflects effort Degree to which health 
workers feel income received 
reflects the amount of effort 
put into work 
Organizational culture Satisfaction with relationships 
with colleagues and 
management of the facility 
Sufficiency of income Degree to which health 
workers feel like their income 
is sufficient given their basic 
monetary needs 
Community level Community relationships Satisfaction with relationships 
with local leaders in the 
community 
Outcomes Behaviour Turnover intention Intention to leave the facility  
 
The only two dimensions which were not retained in the final confirmatory factor 
analysis were: self-efficacy (belief in one’s abilities to complete a task), and 
respect/recognition. This is at odds with findings from Jordan and Georgia where 
similarities in self-efficacy dimensions were identified (Franco et al., 2004), and in Mali 
and Tanzania where recognition was identified as a key driver of motivation (Dieleman 
et al., 2006, Songstad et al., 2012).  
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The second part of the objective went on to examine differences in scores against each 
dimension between workers who had recently experienced a withdrawal of PBF (which 
comprised both a fixed and performance payment) and workers who had never received 
PBF. Workers who had previously received PBF scored significantly lower on almost 
all motivation dimensions. The withdrawal of PBF also affected staff retention as many 
workers left following termination of PBF payments. This also links to objective 1, and 
illustrates that an understanding of the contribution of income components to overall 
income is important; given the significant contribution these PBF payments had made to 
the total income, this may have been a factor in explaining its strong association with 
health worker motivation. Given the share of PBF as a proportion of total income will 
vary between different countries, this may limit the generalisability of the findings to 
other contexts. The findings of objective 2 further highlighted key inter-dependencies in 
income sources; as PBF was phased out, user fees became an important substitute. 
We also found that the level of ‘extrinsic motivation’ was higher in the previous PBF 
group compared with the non PBF group (marginally significant). The higher levels of 
extrinsic motivation could be explained by “crowding out” theory, which posits that the 
introduction of monetary incentives can cause workers to be more driven by external 
rewards than intrinsic motivation (Frey and Jegen, 2001, Lohmann et al., 2016). The 
reduction of intrinsic motivation leads to an undermining of an individual’s sense of 
autonomy and competence, which can have negative consequences for performance and 
therefore health service delivery (Deci et al., 1999, Kao, 2015). 
Only one other study was identified that examined how PBF withdrawal may affect 
health worker motivation, and this was by Huillery and Seban in the DRC (Huillery and 
Seban, 2015). It reported that workers were less motivated following withdrawal of a 
performance payment compared with a fixed payment of the same amount. However, 
unlike our study, it did not quantitatively examine how the withdrawal affected a greater 
range of dimensions of motivation, nor did it include a qualitative component. For 
example, Huillery and Seban operationalised motivation in a different way; staff 
attendance provided the measure for total motivation (extrinsic plus intrinsic 
motivation) while other important dimensions of motivation were identified by asking 
workers about one advantage and one disadvantage of their job. In contrast, our study 
was able to quantify the relative importance of different dimensions of motivation to 
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workers and how each of these were affected by the withdrawal of PBF. In addition, the 
qualitative component of our study helped to unpack the reasons behind the observed 
differences in motivation.  
Other studies have examined the effects of withdrawing donor funding in general. In 
Zimbabwe, a corruption scandal in 2009 within the Ministry of Health caused the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency to freeze all of its funding to 
the health sector. This was followed by a decline in performance in antenatal care, 
maternal and new-born health, tuberculosis, malaria, and diarrhoeal and respiratory 
infections (Usher, 2015). Similarly, the cessation of incentive payments to Ministry of 
Health staff in Liberia by DFID led to a loss of  existing qualified staff and increase in 
fees at point of service (Department for International Development, 2011). 
Objective 3 
Under this last objective, the steps and processes underpinning an intervention to 
improve government payments to health workers were comprehensively described. To a 
large extent, most activities were successfully implemented as intended, with the 
exception of some which were politically-sensitive such as the biometric identification 
of workers. Certain intervention activities not originally foreseen included a political 
economy analysis which eventually informed stakeholder engagement. External factors 
outside of the sphere of control or influence of the intervention also facilitated success; 
for example, the introduction of ‘bancarisation’ - which refers to the establishment of 
bank accounts to pay employees - proved a significant incentive to government to 
update the payroll. This was because any payments made to non-existent workers would 
gradually accumulate at the bank and any unclaimed funds would be returned to the 
central bank rather than the Ministry of Health, resulting in significant financial losses 
for the government.  
Interventions to improve the payroll in post-conflict states have been described in Sierra 
Leone, South Sudan, Somaliland, and Puntland state of Somalia (Goldsmith, 2011, 
Simson, 2013), which have been presented as case studies. Unlike other studies of this 
specific type of intervention, this is the first study to apply a theory of change approach 
to evaluate the process of implementation. In so doing, it has helped to articulate the 
causal mechanisms through which the intervention has achieved its outcomes. Using a 
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framework of implementation fidelity, it has also identified which elements have 
contributed to its success, which is critical to informing effective replication elsewhere. 
8.3 Limitations 
The implications for this thesis of undertaking research within an adaptive health 
systems strengthening programme and in an unstable political environment are firstly 
discussed. A number of methodological limitations, many of which have already been 
described in relation to each studied objective within each of the results chapters, are 
then briefly summarised.  
8.3.1 Adaptive programming and context influencing study design 
A major challenge with this thesis has been ensuring the research has kept abreast of 
changes occurring in the programme, which also resulted in some of the limitations 
observed. Originally, I had intended to undertake a controlled before-and-after study to 
measure the effects of PBF withdrawal on health worker motivation. However, I had to 
modify the research design to a cross-sectional study due to a decision occurring within 
the programme to phase out PBF payments before the baseline survey could be 
undertaken in order to free up the programme budget for other health system activities. 
A cross-sectional study design did not allow us to attribute causality to the relationship 
between the withdrawal of PBF and motivation within objective 2 because the exposure 
and outcome were simultaneously assessed, therefore the existence of a temporal 
relationship between exposure and outcome could not be established; a controlled 
before-and-after study, on the other hand, would have had the strength of temporality to 
more robustly assess whether the outcome was impacted by the intervention. In 
addition, by the time the quantitative and qualitative data were collected, performance 
payments had stopped for one month and eight months respectively. Since many of the 
original workers were reported to have left facilities once performance payments 
ceased, it is possible that stronger reactions would have been observed in the in-depth 
interviews had they occurred closer to quantitative data collection. Unfortunately, it was 
not possible to undertake the interviews sooner due to the need to gain authorisation 
from DFID to proceed with the study as well as the necessary ethics approvals. 
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Another example of where programmatic changes impacted on the research was in 
relation to objective 3. I had originally planned to use the baseline and midline (planned 
for March 2016) evaluation surveys of the ASSP programme to conduct a controlled 
before-and-after study to examine the effect of the intervention to improve systems for 
paying health workers on various intermediate outcomes. These outcomes, as described 
in the theory of change, would have included changes in: motivation levels, proportion 
of workers receiving government payments, distribution and performance of workers 
receiving the intervention in Kasai Occidental (the only province where the intervention 
was being piloted). The same measures were to be collected at baseline and midline in 
Equateur where workers were not exposed to the intervention. Difference-in-difference 
analysis using ordinary least squares with standard errors clustered at the facility level 
was then going to be applied to assess the independent effect of the intervention to 
improve systems for paying health workers on each of the outcome variables. The 
results of the research were then to inform whether the intervention to improve the 
integrity of the payroll would be scaled-up in other ASSP provinces.  
Yet, given the extensive delays in implementing the intervention in Kasai Occidental, 
and a decision not to undertake a midline survey, it was decided by the donor and 
implementing partner that the intervention would be scaled up to other provinces in the 
absence of an evaluation. The contingency plan was then to evaluate changes in 
outcomes affecting workers in Kasai Occidental before and after the intervention 
without a counterfactual. 
However, in 2016, the death of a local leader in Kasai Occidental prompted a bloody 
insurgency and months of fighting between the army and newly formed militias. The 
violence resulted in hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people, with many 
civilians caught in the conflict leaving everything to flee across the border to Angola. 
The security risk posed to researchers as a result of this situation meant that the endline 
survey (which was executed between July and September 2017) was not undertaken in 
Kasai Occidental. Hence, a complete evaluation of both process and outcomes of the 
intervention to improve government payments under objective 3 was not possible.  
The tensions between health programming and undertaking robust research to inform 
implementation have also been described in Malawi (Gooding, 2017). Often, 
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implementing partners prioritise service delivery activities over research needs as they 
have been contracted to deliver results. This made it difficult to challenge programmatic 
decisions which eventually impacted on the robustness of the research. As a result, this 
research needed to be flexible and responsive to changes both in programme design and 
implementation plans. For example, I had to change the study design for objective 2 
from a controlled before and after study to a cross-sectional study as partners had 
already phased out PBF payments before the baseline study was implemented. I also 
adapted the study design for objective 3 once the midline was cancelled to take a more 
in-depth qualitative approach. In addition, I had to change the timing of key informant 
interviews for objective 3 when implementation of the intervention became 
substantially delayed. As a result of the dynamic and uncertain environment within 
which I conducted this research, I ended up with more of a methodological and 
reflective focus than I perhaps otherwise would have had. If I had the opportunity to do 
this again, I would have borne this in mind when initially designing my research and 
thinking through various contingency plans in advance, though in practice this would 
not have resulted in any changes to the study itself. Having the capacity to be flexible is 
particularly relevant in the context of fragile states, where the political situation is 
rapidly changing. As was the case here, it can be difficult to achieve the balance 
between undertaking rigorous evaluative research which requires time and control areas, 
with policy desires to scale-up and maximise intervention reach.  
 
8.3.2 Methodological limitations 
 
Sampling 
The sampling methodology for the quantitative surveys undertaken for objective 1 and 2 
has been described in detail in chapter 4. One of the limitations of the health worker 
survey was that it only captured the views of those workers present on the day of the 
survey and the level of staff absenteeism could not be quantified. The extent to which 
this selection bias may have influenced the findings could not be determined; for 
example, it could be that workers sampled on the day of the survey were more 
motivated (as they were at work) compared to those who were not present in facilities 
that day. To reduce this bias, data collectors could have returned to facilities at another 
date or tried to reach workers in their homes, but this would have significantly increased 
the costs associated with the surveys. This issue, although acknowledged by others 
234
(Bonenberger et al., 2014) has generally not been addressed in the wider literature but 
could be an area for future research.  
For objective 2, as coverage of PBF had been determined by the geographical focus of 
the previous health programme and sampling of health facilities was not undertaken 
with respect to PBF status but rather to evaluate the ASSP programme, the number of 
workers in the previous PBF and non PBF facilities were very different and had varying 
characteristics. Although the study was not powered to examine differences in 
motivation across these sub-groups, significant differences were still detected. 
Furthermore, the quantitative analysis was able to control for a range of health worker 
and health facility characteristics. Another limitation is that given the vastness of the 
DRC, there is a risk that the results were not representative of the country; only 2.3%9 
of the overall number of primary health centres in the DRC were sampled. However, the 
similar results from this analysis to the World Bank study on health worker 
remuneration suggests findings may be representative. 
Purposive sampling in only one province was used to identify nurses for qualitative 
interviews under objectives 1 and 2. This is a type of non-probability sampling 
technique which is highly prone to bias given that the researcher has deliberately 
selected participants due to certain qualities they possess. However, this was deemed 
the most pragmatic approach given the context of the DRC, where access and security 
constraints prohibit the collection of data from many areas. A key limitation was that 
only 16 nurses were interviewed and additional interviews were not factored into the 
data collection plan; although no new themes had been uncovered by the end of the 
interviews, the ability to interview a larger sample may have provided more confidence 
that saturation had been reached. Furthermore, workers were only sampled in one 
province; sampling in multiple provinces would have helped to elucidate potential 
drivers behind the variation in incomes observed between sampled provinces.  
Design of data collection and analysis 
The rationale behind each choice of method used to collect data under each objective 
has been described in chapter 4. For objectives 1 and 2, the major challenge was 
9 Calculated using population data obtained from the Direction d’Etudes et Planification, Ministère de la 
Santé Publique in October 2013. 
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ensuring truthful responses were gained from respondents. Direct questioning was 
employed but would have been susceptible to social desirability bias, whereby 
respondents’ perceptions of what constitutes an acceptable answer or what they think 
the researcher wishes to hear may have influenced their responses (Fisher, 1993). It 
could also have led to an under-reporting of more sensitive incomes, such as informal 
payments or earnings from other illegal activities, which have been found to be an 
important source for workers in low-income countries (Stringhini et al., 2009, Van 
Lerberghe et al., 2002, Mcpake et al., 1999).  
There are techniques, such as unfolding brackets discussed in chapter 4 which may help 
to reduce this bias (Paulin, 2003), however this was not applied as this would have 
substantially increased the number of questions and health worker incomes was only 
one of several areas explored in the survey. It was also not possible to cross-validate 
responses from other databases as there is no robust documentation of health worker 
incomes in the DRC.  However, attempts were made to triangulate findings with data 
obtained from qualitative interviews. In addition, the results observed correlated well 
with results from another study by the World Bank which had used the unfolding 
brackets technique to estimate amounts received from different sources of income, 
suggesting this method didn’t yield very different estimates from direct questioning 
(appendix 10). Many of the questions also required respondents to quantify payments 
received over the past month; for infrequent and/or unpredictable payments such as per 
diems, it may have been difficult to report this accurately as the recall period was over 
one year, resulting in a degree of recall bias. It was not possible to identify whether this 
bias may have affected reporting; while a shorter recall period could have mitigated 
against this, it may have yielded a less accurate picture of the extent to which per diems 
were paid.  
With respect to the quantitative analysis for objective 2, since there was no prior 
experience of measuring motivation in the DRC context, a broad range of dimensions 
were initially included in the survey. However, this had to be traded off against having a 
questionnaire of manageable length so only a few items could be included per construct. 
It would have been useful to have undertaken qualitative work to inform the 
development of the survey tool to allow it be more contextually-driven (Chandler et al., 
2009),  but this was not possible within the timeframe of implementing the survey. 
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In addition, the regression analysis of differences in motivation between PBF and non-
PBF groups did not include other incomes or total income received as explanatory 
variables. As seen in supplementary table 4 from paper 3, there were some differences 
in levels of different sources of income received by the PBF and non-PBF groups, 
which could have affected motivation independently of PBF.  For example, workers in 
areas which had never had PBF were more likely to have received a government salary, 
and the overall income level (including income from all sources) was higher, which may 
have made them more motivated. Furthermore, the receipt of PBF may have influenced 
the receipt of levels of other income sources, such as user fees.  
For objective 3, the evaluation was primarily qualitative, and was unable to report on 
outcomes achieved. The reasons for this have been elaborated in section 8.3.1 on 
“adaptive programme and context influencing study design”. Another limitation was 
that I was the only researcher coding interviews for objective 3 due to resource 
constraints; having another researcher code the same data would have improved the 
reliability of the qualitative research  with regards to stability - ensuring codes did not 
change over time - as well as reproducibility - where the concern is whether different 
coders would code the same data the same way (Campbell et al., 2013). In chapters 6 
and 7, a deeper reflection of the methodological limitations with respect to the design 
and analysis of data collection is given; specifically for the approach to measuring 
motivation for objective 2, and the process of developing a theory of change in 
objective 3. 
For all objectives, more steps could have been taken to improve the transferability of the 
qualitative research findings. These included using a range of qualitative methods such 
as narrative interviews and focus groups rather than just in-depth interviews to allow for 
triangulation of the findings, and purposive sampling to saturation. Thicker descriptions 
of experiences during data collection providing a richer and fuller understanding of the 
research setting and study participants would have also helped other researchers judge 
whether the findings could be extrapolated to similar contexts or settings (Geertz, 1973, 
Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
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Reflexivity
Given most of the research undertaken was qualitative in nature, it was important to 
consider throughout how my positionality may have influenced the findings gained 
from interviews, a practice known as reflexivity (Finlay, 2002). Reflexivity was 
exercised during interviews as described in chapter 4. Here, I reflect on how my 
background, beliefs and values may have interacted with the research process.  
During the time of fieldwork, I was affiliated with Tulane International (a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Tulane University based in DRC) as well as being a PhD candidate 
with the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. I am also female, of Indian 
descent but born in the United Kingdom, and am in my thirties. Furthermore, the DRC 
is a francophone country and although I have a good standard of French, I would not 
say I am a fluent speaker.  
My characteristics were therefore very distant to those of the respondents, so I was 
regarded as an outsider. More often than not, foreigners in the DRC either work for a 
multilateral organisation such as the United Nations, an NGO or a donor. Therefore, 
assumptions were usually made at the outset that I was able to influence decisions made 
by the programme, for example, that I had the authority to re-instate PBF payments. 
Despite explaining my role as an independent researcher, some participants still felt the 
need to strongly lobby for certain changes to be made to the programme. In these cases, 
it helped to have a fellow Congolese researcher by my side, who was able to explain the 
situation more articulately in French than I could.  
Yet, irrespective of my organisational identity, being from a developed country meant 
respondents viewed me as someone from a wealthy background who would potentially 
give them money. Having lived in Kinshasa for at least a year before commencing the 
research, I was used to the culture of regularly being asked to pay bribes, for example 
by police officials, and felt comfortable saying no. However, in the research setting, 
refusing an interviewee’s request for money occasionally created an awkward dynamic 
which was difficult to overcome. In those cases, I had to acknowledge that my presence 
was more likely to inhibit the process, so requested my fellow researcher undertake the 
interview without me and we would then have a verbal debrief afterwards on what I had 
missed in order to clarify whether further questions needed to be posed to the 
participant.  
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Interviewing government officials also had its challenges. In 2016, two international 
researchers were very publicly expelled from the country.10 This led to an overall 
increased suspicion of researchers by civil servants, and may have resulted in more 
guarded responses. When conducting interviews for objective 3, one particular official 
requested not to be recorded.  
Following each interview, I had a short debrief session with the local Congolese 
researcher. This was particularly helpful as it allowed me to sense-check my 
interpretation alongside someone much more familiar with the cultural context. Iterative 
discussions with supervisors, Congolese colleagues and outsiders also aided me to 
reflect on my positionality as a researcher. 
8.4 Generalisability of the findings 
The DRC health system exhibits many of the features which are observed in a fragile or 
post-conflict state, such as: insufficient medical equipment, supplies and infrastructure; 
non-operational health information systems; weak regulatory and managerial capacity; 
ghost workers and an inequitably distributed workforce (Newbrander et al., 2011, 
Tulloch et al., 2011). The phenomenon of disjointed donor programming which begins 
in the immediate post-conflict period is common, with performance based contracting 
often employed as a mechanism to deliver services (Bornemisza, 2002, Tulloch et al., 
2011). Therefore, the findings of this thesis will be of relevance to other post conflict 
settings which are likely to share some of the same attributes.  
The quantitative analysis for this thesis was conducted in a limited number of provinces 
of the DRC. This raises questions over the extent to which the findings can be 
generalised to the entire country as well as other similar countries. In this case, the 
findings on health worker remuneration were broadly consistent with the World Bank 
study which mainly covered other provinces in the DRC (Bertone et al., 2016) but 
indicated some differences when compared to Sierra Leone, which is also a post conflict 
10 Jason Stearns, director of the Congo Research Group at New York University, was expelled from the 
country in April 2016 publishing a report linking soldiers to the massacres of civilians. In August 2016, 
the government also revoked the work permit of Ida Sawyer, senior Human Rights Watch researcher, 
without providing a reason for the denial of the permit. 
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state (Bertone and Lagarde, 2016). Differences included the greater proportion of 
workers receiving user fees in the DRC while a higher proportion of workers received a 
salary in Sierra Leone. This implies there will be contextual differences in remuneration 
structures, however the range of income sources received was broadly similar.  
The findings on health worker motivation were consistent with other studies in 
highlighting the importance of non-financial as well as financial incentives as 
determinants of motivation (Willis-Shattuck et al., 2008). However, the literature also 
suggests the importance of undertaking context-specific research and ensuring 
motivation measurement scales are locally relevant, given that factors affecting health 
worker motivation can show significant inter-country differences (Prytherch et al., 
2012). 
Finally, one of the main reasons for employing a theory-based approach to the 
evaluation of the intervention to improve government payments to workers, was so that 
some of the lessons learned could be transferred to other settings. Our findings 
illustrated that adaptation of the constituents of the intervention was often necessary to 
ensure this change was brought about successfully (Durlak and Dupre, 2008, Fixsen et 
al., 2005, Greenhalgh et al., 2004, Hawe et al., 2004). Furthermore, the influence of 
certain actors was critical to ensuring success, and in this respect a political economy 
analysis proved valuable in securing their engagement. In particular, contextual factors 
were key to determining success. This included the introduction of ‘bancarisation’; it is 
possible that the same level of success would be observed in fragile states employing 
similar technology to improve the transparency of accounting. Researchers evaluating a 
similar complex health systems strengthening intervention in other countries still need 
to ensure that they have a comprehensive understanding of the prevailing context, which 
will inevitably vary from setting to setting.  
8.5 Contribution of the thesis 
8.5.1 Methodological contributions 
The work presented under objective 1 builds on relatively new research in the area of 
‘complex remuneration’. At the time of designing the study there was no evidence on 
the determinants of different income sources using regression analysis, though 
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descriptive assessments of income levels were available. However, since the research 
was underway, other studies have used similar methods in Sierra Leone as well as the 
DRC (Bertone et al., 2016, Bertone and Lagarde, 2016). Nonetheless, this study is 
unique in that it has a mixed methods design, introducing qualitative insights which 
provide a deeper understanding of the role of context and health worker attitudes 
towards a variety of income sources, as well as the process underpinning the receipt of 
these sources of income in the DRC. The qualitative component also helped to 
substantiate the quantitative findings and shed light on the reasons behind some of the 
results observed, for example why many workers chose not to engage in private 
practice. Furthermore, this study for the first time examines the interdependency of 
different sources of income and the impact of receiving government payments on the 
receipt of alternative income sources. It was examined by including income source 
variables within regression models to identify any significant associations and found it 
to be highly relevant. For instance, those workers receiving a government payment were 
more likely to engage in private practice compared to those workers who did not receive 
any form of government payment.    
The development of scales to measure health worker motivation in low- and middle-
income countries is not new. However, what makes this work different from most is that 
it is one of the few to employ confirmatory factor analysis to validate the scale (Dale, 
2014, Lohmann et al., 2017, Lohmann et al., 2018), as well as measurement invariance 
testing to ensure different subsamples can be meaningfully compared (Lohmann et al., 
2018, Lohmann et al., 2017). Measurement invariance testing is usually only performed 
in a confirmatory factor analysis framework; where other studies have employed 
exploratory factor analysis to develop motivation scales and are therefore unable to test 
for measurement invariance, this methodological innovation is key in identifying 
whether any subgroup differences are not due to differences in motivation but rather 
differences in the performance of the measure in these subgroups (Vandenberg and 
Lance, 2000).  
In addition, using a theory-based approach to evaluating an intervention to improve 
government payments to workers has not previously been attempted; this study has 
therefore shown the feasibility of applying this approach to programmes outside the 
health sector that impact on health. This approach enabled me to identify critical factors 
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enabling the effective implementation of the intervention, which may then be used to 
inform the delivery of similar interventions to improve government payments to 
workers in other settings.  
Finally, throughout this thesis, I have tried to reflect deeply and honestly on the 
methods used, and recounted how I would have done things differently knowing what I 
know now. Descriptions of the short-comings of the methods used and how they were 
applied, specifically with respect to developing a motivation scale and a theory of 
change respectively, have been either submitted or published (chapters 6 and 7), with 
the intention of helping to improve future practice by other researchers working in these 
areas. 
8.5.2 Contribution to the knowledge, policy implications and recommendations 
This thesis makes some important contributions to knowledge, some of which can be 
linked to clear policy implications and recommendations.  
The research was undertaken in a country which is notoriously evidence-poor. 
Information systems are weak and efforts to collect data from more remote areas are 
often hampered by logistical challenges posed by the difficult terrain, such as a lack of 
roads. This has meant that stakeholders have relied on their own experiences or 
anecdotal reports within the health sector to inform their judgements. However, this 
research has now provided policy-makers robust evidence which will be useful for 
informing national discussions around the coordination of different actors on health 
worker remuneration. Specific policy issues to be addressed by government include: 
increasing the budgetary allocation to health to permit a wage increase for workers –
trends indicate a steady increasing budget allocation to health from 4.5% in 2013 to 
8.6% in 2015 (United States Agency for International Development, 2016, Secrétariat 
Général, 2013); updating the amounts of salary and occupational risk payments which 
should be received by workers by grade and qualification and instituting a standard user 
fee policy which is communicated to the public in order to deter informal payments and 
promote trust between communities and health workers;  
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extending ‘bancarisation’ to all workers to improve transparency of payments; and 
sanctioning workers who are regularly absent from work yet receiving a 
salary/occupational risk allowance.  
However, addressing each of these issues in turn may be challenging. Firstly, increasing 
the health budget may be difficult to achieve given fragile and conflict states are 
characterised by weaker fiscal capacity as a result of lower economic growth rates, 
higher levels of government debt, and a lower tax revenue to Gross Domestic Product 
ratio (Jowett et al., 2019). Furthermore, social sectors are less prioritised by fragile 
states, with conflict tending to depress health expenditure (Witter, 2012). As a result, 
there is a high dependence on external funding. In the interim, donors may support 
governments by channelling and pooling funds through domestic public systems; where 
this is not possible, substitute mechanisms should be established which replicate public 
functions, with an ultimate vision to transition these mechanisms to domestic ownership 
(Jowett et al., 2019). 
Financing mechanisms themselves can be used to leverage domestic funding as well as 
improve governing capacity while providing greater authority to governments. The 
DRC has recently become a recipient of the Global Financing Facility, which aims to 
support governments in identifying key health priorities and crowd in a broader array of 
partners to jointly invest in cost-effective interventions. The Global Financing Facility 
platform has directly supported the prioritisation of health in the budget, increasing the 
share of health in the government’s budget through the country investment case for 
reproductive and maternal child health financing strategies, identifying high-impact 
interventions and efficient service modalities (World Bank, 2019). It has also provided 
technical assistance to evaluate the fiscal space for health in the DRC, supporting more 
effective dialogue between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance. This is a 
key step in helping to identify and mobilise sources of additional public domestic funds 
for the sector. 
Secondly, enforcing standard policies particularly with respect to user fees may be 
difficult to achieve. For example, the DRC already has a policy to subsidise or exempt 
payments for care from a range of patients, such as those affected by tuberculosis, 
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malaria, pregnant women and children under five, and other vulnerable populations, but 
this is rarely applied in practice (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2017).  
 
With respect to bancarisation, encouragingly it is one of the few reforms being carried 
out under the Congolese government’s own initiative with almost no donor involvement 
(Moshonas, 2019). However, it may not eliminate all instances of payroll fraud; for 
example, fictitious names may still be added to the payroll by influential civil servants 
with the complicity of payroll department officials.  
 
Fourthly, Sierra Leone succeeded in instituting a functional attendance monitoring 
system within health facilities. Sanctions for non-attendance were also well-understood 
at all levels and salaries withheld for nonattendance in line with a Conduct and 
Sanctions Framework (Simson, 2013). However, salary deductions were not always 
implemented promptly resulting in some areas still experiencing high non-attendance 
rates, highlighting the importance of having responsive systems in place.  
 
With respect to other development partners, it is recommended that they make more of 
an effort to standardise amounts of other sources of income to workers such as per 
diems and PBF. Furthermore, partners need to ensure equitable distribution of these 
payments rather than leaving it to the discretion of facilities which can cause conflict 
between staff. The fragmentation of donor initiatives and inconsistent policies around 
performance payments has long been recognised, but this research illustrates the extent 
to which such payments may influence health worker’s total incomes. Nonetheless, 
positive developments to improve donor financing and coordination are already 
underway; in 2017, a contrat unique (single contract) was started in eight of the newly 
formed 26 provinces (Ministère De La Santé, 2016). This contract is between the 
provincial Ministry of Health (purchaser), and provincial health authority (provider of 
health services), and development partners. Its objective is to pool domestic and 
external financial resources to support one integrated provincial health plan.  
 
The relative importance of different dimensions of motivation are known to vary 
between countries.  This research is the first to provide an understanding of motivation 
dimensions for workers in the DRC. Policy makers will also find this research useful in 
designing incentive structures which consider financial as well as non-financial 
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incentives. For example, health workers were found to be very dissatisfied with non-
financial factors such as the availability of equipment and supplies, and training; 
addressing these issues could serve to significantly enhance motivation. 
Globally, donor funding directed towards human resources for health, which includes 
salary complements and per diems, was 1.5 billion USD in 2016 (Micah et al., 2018). 
However, there are increasing efforts by the international community to help countries 
move towards fully funding and implementing their own programmes independent of 
external aid and taking on a systems strengthening approach. Recently, global health 
institutions such as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisations and the Global 
Fund, have clearer policies aimed at holistically strengthening health systems, including 
human resources, and have also adopted eligibility and transition frameworks for the 
countries they support (Patel et al., 2015). These frameworks outline criteria defining 
countries no longer eligible for further support alongside a timeline to phase out 
external aid (Silverman, 2018). It is therefore hoped that the study is useful in 
highlighting the difficulties and opportunities in transitioning from donor-led to 
domestic financing of human resources.   
The study on PBF withdrawal also comes at a time when the sustainability of PBF is 
being called into question by academics (Paul et al., 2018). As such, there have been 
more calls for research into understanding the implications for health systems of 
terminating PBF (Paul et al., 2018, Suthar et al., 2017). This thesis responds to these 
calls, and should therefore be taken into consideration when introducing new PBF 
strategies or when programmes are considering discontinuing PBF. For example, 
governments and donors should ensure any new PBF initiatives are designed to be 
financially sustainable and have a realistic and properly costed exit strategy, particularly 
given their potential to ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivation. This strategy should ensure 
there is government buy-in to integrate PBF into domestic purchasing systems once 
donors exit to minimise any adverse consequences of withdrawal.  
Lastly, uncovering the implementation processes and challenges of an intervention to 
support the payment of health workers by government in fragile states will have 
important implications for future continued work on health worker pay reform. It is also 
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of value to other sectors in the DRC seeking to reform civil service pay, such as 
education, given most of the Ministries involved will be the same.  
8.6 Directions for future research 
Several avenues for future research have been identified. As previously outlined, this is 
one of only a few studies to comprehensively examine the phenomenon of ‘complex 
remuneration’ (Bertone and Witter, 2015). This is a research agenda which needs to be 
prioritised in other countries, particularly post-conflict settings, in order to better 
understand the financial environments within which health workers currently operate. 
By better understanding the issue, the causes of revenue fragmentation can be more 
effectively addressed. However, beyond quantifying the contribution of each income 
source and potential interactions between income sources, this thesis only focusses on 
PBF and salary payments thereafter. It would be useful if future studies could examine 
how each source of income influences health worker motivation and performance in 
order to inform the best mix of financial incentives, as well as the extent to which the 
source of funding (government/donor) and differences in accountability mechanisms 
bear impact. For example, does motivation and performance actually improve in health 
workers once they start receiving a government salary? 
The main limitation of the work on PBF withdrawal was that its cross-sectional study 
design was unable to link cause and effect, however the consistency of findings yielded 
by our qualitative and quantitative analysis supports the hypothesis that PBF withdrawal 
negatively impacted health worker motivation. Future studies examining PBF 
withdrawal should attempt to employ quasi-experimental designs, to more conclusively 
demonstrate the impact of the withdrawal of financial incentive payments on motivation 
and health service delivery outcomes.  This would lend weight to the credibility of the 
findings, particularly if trying to convince PBF communities of practice.  
Given many of the sources of income described have evolved as a result of a poorly 
functional state system, it would be interesting to repeat the analysis of health worker 
remuneration levels and sources, as well as motivation and behaviour once the DRC 
payroll system becomes more functional. It has been hypothesised that a stronger single 
principal may reduce the dependency on other sources of income (Ensor and Witter, 
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2001). For example, there is some evidence that increasing salaries of health workers 
reduces dual practice and also embezzlement within healthcare institutions, indicating 
that motivation may align more with organisational goals once financial needs are 
adequately met (Barr et al., 2004). 
 
Similarly, it would be useful to understand the extent to which strengthening civil 
service pay contributes to state legitimacy and the rebuilding of the social contract 
between government and Congolese society (Witter, 2012). 
 
8.7 Concluding remarks 
 
I believe the quote below sums up some of the observations within this thesis. 
 
‘The temptation in post-conflict situations is for a greater degree of international 
intervention in domestic health policymaking. But such an approach neither builds local 
capacity nor represents a demonstration of good government. Indeed, it may even serve 
to foster long-term dependency and undermine the government’s credibility. If health 
and medical care is indeed going to be an area in which governments can demonstrate 
that they act in the interests of the populace and re-establish the social contract it is 
vital that health policy is made at the national government level, and not in Washington 
or London.’ (Rushton, 2005) 
 
For several years following the Second Congo war, international actors in the DRC 
have mainly been focussed on delivering results within the health sector. This has 
encouraged the proliferation of different income sources for workers, as well as 
initiatives (such as PBF) being set up in parallel to the government system. Thoughts 
about state-building were relatively neglected. However, the research undertaken within 
this thesis has shown that international actors in post conflict states need to increasingly 
work with government to strengthen their capacity, rather than engage in complex 
programming which substitutes the role of the state and cannot be sustained over the 
long-term. The DRC is an extreme case but the range of issues presented in this thesis 
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Appendix 1: Criteria for facility-based scoring for PBF 
CRITERES DE PERFORMANCE DU CENTRE  DE SANTE 





1 Tenue de réunions 
mensuelles  de  CODESA 
avec  PV et liste des 
présences avec 
signatures. 
Au moins une réunion 
ordinaire par mois où l’IT 
présente le rapport des toutes 
les activités du CS.  
- PV de réunions du
CODESA et liste des
présences
- Copies du PV envoyées
au BCZ et archivées au CS
Tenue de la réunion ordinaire 
avec PV et liste des présences 
signées = 3  
Absence de réunion = 0 
/3 
La réunion du CODESA  
a lieu une fois par 
mois  avec C.R et liste de 
présences et des 
recommandations  
2 Recommandations de 
réunions de CODESA  de 
la période  évaluée mises 
en œuvre à au moins 50%. 
Nombre d’actions ou 
recommandations mises en 
œuvre / nombre total d’actions 
ou recommandations 
identifiées dans la réunion du 
CODESA. 
- PV de réunions du
CODESA
- Copie envoyées au BCZ,
et archivées  au CS
50% ou plus d’activités mises 
en œuvre = 2 




deux premiers mois du 
trimestre évalué. 
3 Recommandations de   
supervisions de la période 
évaluée  mises en œuvre à 
80% ou plus. 
Nombre d’actions ou 
recommandations mises en 
œuvre / nombre total d’actions 
ou recommandations 
formulées lors des  
supervisions  au cours de la 
période. 
- Cahier de supervision
- Registres d’activités
80% ou plus d’activités mises 
en œuvre = 5  
Moins de 80% = 0 
/5 
Le dernier mois du 
trimestre sera évalué au 
trimestre prochain. 
4 Les supervisions de(s) 
Poste(s) de santé (et Sites 
de soins)  réalisées  par 
l’équipe du CS. 
Nombre de supervisions 
réalisées au(x) Poste(s) de 
santé (et Sites de 
soins)/Nombre de supervisions 
prévues. 




archivés au CS avec copie
au BCZ.
100% de supervisions 
réalisées = 5 
Moins de 100% = 0. 
/5 
Les Postes de santé (et 
sites de soins) doivent 
être supervisés au moins 
une fois par mois par l’IT 
ou  l’IT .A 
5 Tenue de réunions 
mensuelles d’unité 
fonctionnelle du CS  avec  
PV et liste de présences. 
 Réunion d’analyse des 
indicateurs de l’aire de santé 
avec compte rendu et liste de 
présences.  
- Compte-rendu  de la
réunion du monitorage de
l’aire de santé avec copie
envoyée au BCZ et
archivée au CS.
Tenue de la réunion de 
monitorage de  l’AS avec 
compte-rendu et liste de 
présences  = 2  
Absence de réunion ou réunion 
tenue sans compte-rendu ni 
liste de présences  = 0 
/2 
C’est au cours de la 
réunion du monitorage 
interne que l’équipe du 
CS analyse les 
indicateurs de l’aire de 
santé et dégage des 
solutions aux problèmes 
identifiés. 
252





6 Les recommandations de 
la réunion de monitorage 
de  l’aire de santé  mises 
en œuvre à 80% ou plus. 
Nombre d’actions ou de 
recommandations du 
monitorage  mises en 
œuvre /le nombre total 
d’actions ou de 
recommandations formulées. 
- PV de la réunion
mensuelle de monitorage




(monitorage de l’aire de
santé).
80% ou plus d’activités mises 
en œuvre =3 
Moins de 80% = 0 
/3 
Disponibilité du PV de la 
réunion de monitorage de 
l’aire de santé   
(responsabilité du CS). 
7 Les recommandations de  
revues mensuelles mises 
en œuvre à 80% ou plus. 
Nombre de recommandations 
de revues mensuelles mises 
en œuvre /le nombre total de 
recommandations formulées. 
-Liste de recommandations
de  revues mensuelles.
80% ou plus de 
recommandations mises en 
œuvre =3 
Moins de 80% = 0 
/3 
8  Suivi correct des 
ordinogrammes pour 
toutes les consultations 
curatives. 
- Suivi correct des
ordinogrammes signifie : la
cohérence entre plaintes-
diagnostic et diagnostic-
conduite à tenir (de la porte
d’entrée au diagnostic et
traitement).
- 30 fiches de consultations
curatives pour la période
dont 10 par mois
- Registre de consultations
curatives
- Ordinogrammes
24 fiches de consultations ou 
plus sont correctes avec les 
ordinogrammes = 5  
Moins de vingt-quatre fiches 










9 Taux d’utilisation des 
activités curatives > ou 
égal à 50% pour Banalia et 
Bengamisa et > ou égal à 
60% pour Ubundu. 
 Nombre de NC de l’aire de 
santé reçus / Nombre de NC 
de l’aire de santé attendus au 
cours de la période. 
- Rapport SNIS
- Registre de consultations
curatives.
Supérieur ou égal à 50% pour 
Banalia et Bengamisa et 
supérieur ou égal à  60% pour 
Ubundu  = 4 
Inférieur à cela signifie  0.      /4 
-Ce critère tiendra compte
de la disponibilité des 9
médicaments traceurs
dans les structures de
santé.
-En cas de discordance
des données, il faut
considérer celles du
Registre.
10 Le calendrier mensuel des 
activités programmées est 
affiché et respecté à 80 % 
ou plus. 
Nombre d’activités réalisées 
durant la période / Nombre 
d’activités prévues pour cette 
même période. 











Supérieur ou égale à  80%  = 5 
Inférieur à 80 % = 0 
/5 
-Les activités réalisées
doivent être appuyées par
un support (document ad
hoc).
-Ce calendrier doit être
signé par l’IT et le
Précodesa.
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mobilier et équipement  
11   Couverture vaccinale de 
DTC3 > ou égale à 80%. 
 Nombre de NC de l’aire de 
santé reçus / Nombre de Cas 
aire de santé attendus au 
cours de la période.  
- Registre de vaccination  
Formulaire 1 
Fiche de pointage Rapport 
SNIS du  CS.  
> ou égal à 80% = 5  
 
Inférieur à 80% = 0 
 
 
      /5 
Pour la couverture 
supérieure à 100%, il faut 
une explication 
approfondie. 
12 Taux de Perte de vaccins 
lyophilisés   <  ou = à  50 
% et pour les autres < ou = 
à 25 %. 
- Nombre de doses 
administrées  / Nombre de 
doses reçues par antigène au 
cours de la période. 
- Cahier des réquisitions  
- Fiche des pointages  
- Registres de vaccination 
et de CPN 
- Formulaire 1 
- Taux de perte des vaccins 
lyophilisés inférieur ou égal à 
50%=3  
 
- Le contraire de ça = 0  
      /3 - Le taux de perte de 50% 
= BCG, VAR et VAA.  
 
 
13 Taux de perte de vaccins 
non lyophilisés < ou = à 
25% 
-Nombre de doses 
administrées/Nombre de 
doses reçues par antigène au 
cours de la période 
- Cahier des réquisitions  
- Fiche des pointages  
- Registres de vaccination 
et de CPN 
- Formulaire 1 
Taux de perte des vaccins non 
lyophilisés inférieur ou égal à 
25%=2 
 
- Le contraire de ça = 0 
 
/2 
- Pour les 25%, il y a 
VPO, VAT et le 
Pentavalent ou DTC. 
 
14 Taux d’abandon DTC <  ou 
égal à  10 % 
La dose (DTC1-DTC3) x 100 / 
dose de DTC3. 
 - Taux d’abandon au DTC 
inférieur ou égal  à 10%= 5  
- Taux d’abandon  au DTC 
supérieur à 10% = 0 
   
 
        / 5 
 
15  Couverture vaccinale de 
BCG > ou égale à 80%. 
 Nombre de NC de l’aire de 
santé reçus / Nombre de NC 
de  l’aire de santé attendus au 
cours de la période. 
- Registre de vaccination  
-Formulaire 1 
-Fiche de pointage  
-Rapport SNIS  
Supérieure ou égale à 80%  = 
5  
 
Inférieure à 80%. 
 
 
        /5 
 
16   Couverture vaccinale du 
Pentavalent ou DTC3 > ou 
égale à 80%. 
 Nombre de NC de l’aire de 
santé  reçus / Nombre de NC 
de  l’aire de santé attendus au 
cours de la période. 
- Registre de vaccination  
Formulaire 1 
Fiche de pointage Rapport 
SNIS CS  
Supérieure ou égale  à 80% = 
5  
 
Inférieure à 80%  = 0 
        
 
       /5 
 
17   Couverture vaccinale de 
VAR > ou égale à 80%. 
 Nombre de NC de l’aire de 
santé reçus / Nombre de NC 
de l’aire de santé attendus au 
cours de la période. 
- Registre de vaccination  
Formulaire 1 
Fiche de pointage Rapport 
SNIS   
Supérieure ou égale à 80% = 5  
 
Inférieure  à 80% = 0 
      
 
       /5 
 
18 Le pourcentage des 
enfants complètement 
vaccinés  > ou égale à 
80%. 
 Nombre d’ECV de l’aire de 
santé / Nombre d’ ECV de 
l’aire de santé attendus au 
cours de la période. 
- Registre de vaccination  
Formulaire 1 
Fiche de pointage Rapport 
SNIS CS  
> ou égal à 80% = 5  
 
Inférieur à 80% = 0  
   
 
 
       /5 
 
19 Cohérence de données de 
la vaccination se trouvant 
dans les différents outils.  
Les données qui  sont 
enregistrées dans les 
différents documents sont 
concordantes entre elles et 
fiables.  
Registre de vaccination 
Fiche de pointage 
Formulaire1 
Rapport SNIS 
La cohérence entre tous les 
documents = 5  
 
La discordance des données 
dans l’un des outils = 0  
 
 
       /5 
Les mêmes données 
doivent se retrouver dans 
les différents outils surtout 
que les activités ont eu 
lieu à la même date.  
20 La couverture de femmes 
enceintes en VAT2+  est 
 Nombre de femmes enceintes 
de l’aire de santé couvertes en 
Registre CPN 
Fiche de pointage 




Les nouveaux cas de 
l’aire de santé. 
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supérieure  ou égale à 80 
% 
VAT2+ / Nombre total de 
femmes enceintes de l’aire de 





Inférieure à 80%  =  0 
 
       /5 
21 Couverture de femmes 
enceintes en TPI2 
supérieure ou égale à 
80%. 
Une femme enceinte n’est 
considérée couverte que 
lorsqu’elle a reçu le TPI2 à la 
27ème semaine durant sa 
grossesse. 
- Registre de CPN 
- Fiche de Consommation 
journalière de médicaments 
 
Supérieure ou égale à  80% 
des femmes venues en CPN et   
qui ont reçu la 2e dose de  SP 
à la 27e semaine  =  5 
 





       /5 
Se rassurer aussi que le 
TPI n’est pas donné avant 
la 14e semaine ni après la 
27e semaine  
sauf aux PVV chez qui on 
donne la 3e dose  à la 
32ème  semaine. 
22 Couverture de femmes 
enceintes en Fer-folate 
supérieure ou égale à 
50%. 
 Nombre de femmes ayant 
reçu le Fer-folate/ Nombre de 
femmes enceintes de l’aire de 
santé venues à la CPN au 
cours de la période. 
- Registre de CPN 
- Fiche de Consommation 
journalière de médicaments 
 








       / 5 
 
23 Déparasitage de femmes 
enceintes au 
Mebendazole. 
 Nombre de femmes enceintes 
de l’aire de santé ayant reçu le 
Mebendazole / Nombre total 
de femmes enceintes de l’aire 
de santé  venues à la CPN au 
cours de la période. 
- Registre de CPN 
- Fiche de Consommation 
journalière de médicaments 
 





Inférieure à 50%  =  0 
 
         /5 
         
 
24 Taux d’achèvement de la 
CPN est > ou égal à 60 % 
Nbre de femmes enceintes de 
l’aire de santé  vues et 
consultées au 8 – 9ème mois  
de la grossesse/ Nombre des 
femmes enceintes de l’aire de 
santé  inscrites à la CPN 
Registre de CPN Si 60 % ou plus des femmes 
enceintes sont vues et 
consultées au  8 – 9ème mois  = 
4 
 
Inférieur à  60% = 0 
        
 
 
        /4 
 
25 Taux d’accouchements 
assistés dans l’aire de 
santé pour la période 
évaluée  supérieur ou égal 
à 80 %  
Le taux d’accouchements 
assistés  = Nombre 
d’accouchements assistés de 
l’aire de santé / Nombre 
d’accouchements prévus dans 
la période pour l’aire de santé 
X 100. 
- Registre d’accouchement 
- Rapport SNIS CS 




Si inférieur à 80 % = 0 
       
 
 
      /4 
Par  accouchement 
assisté  on sous-entend 
l’accouchement dirigé par 
un personnel qualifié. 
26 Taux d’accouchement 
surveillés au CS pour la 






Si supérieur ou égal à 100%=5 
 




surveillé on entend un 
accouchement pour 
lequel on a utilisé le 
partogramme 
27 Taux de couverture en 
CPoN est supérieur ou 
égal à 50 %. 
Nombre des accouchées de 
l’AS suivies / Nombre total des 
accouchées de l’AS. 
-Registre de CPoN 
-Cahier de pointage 
Si 50 % de femmes 
accouchées ou plus sont 




       
 
Les femmes qui 
accouchent doivent être 
suivies par la stratégie  
« 666 », c'est-à-dire à la 
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Si  moins de 50 %  =  0 
      / 3 6e  heure, au 6e jour et à 
la 6e semaine après 
l’accouchement. 
28 Taux d’utilisation des 
services de Planning 
Familial dans les CS 
supérieur ou égal à 1% 
Nombre des nouvelles 
acceptantes/proportion des 
femmes en âge de procréer 
(21%) 
-Registre de PF 
-Fiche de consultation 
Si supérieur ou égal à 1%=3 
 
Si inférieur à 1%=0 
/3  
29 Pas de rupture de stock 
pour les  neuf 
médicaments traceurs au 
CS. 
- La liste des médicaments 
traceurs est celle qui est  
recommandée  par la DPS. 
 Il s’agit de : Paracétamol  
ACT3+3, Amoxy 250mg cés, 
SRO, Zinc dispersable,  
Diazepam inj, SP, 
Cotrimoxazole 480mg, 
Mébendazole  
- Fiches de stock (grand et 
petit stock)  
- Fiches de consommation 
journalière 
-RUMER 
-Fiches de réquisition 
0 jour de rupture de stock de  
médicaments traceurs dans la 









      /5 
-En cas de pré rupture le 
BCZ s’engage à informer 
les partenaires et la 
hiérarchie.  
-S’il y a rupture à la 
pharmacie Zonale, le 
critère n’est pas appliqué 
mais si c’est au niveau du 
CS et qu’il y a des 
médicaments au BCZ, le 
critère est appliqué. 
30 Concordance entre le 
stock physique et le stock 
théorique dans la 
Pharmacie du CS (grand 
stock  et petit stock). 
Choisir 10 médicaments au 
hasard dans la pharmacie du 
CS (grand stock et petit stock). 
-- Fiches de stocks 
- Observation directe du 
stock physique 
-Fiches de réquisition. 
10 fiches concordantes= 5 
 
 






Les évaluateurs sont 
libres de choisir les Items 
à vérifier. 
31 Stock de l’inventaire du 
mois précédent est égal au 
stock initial du mois suivant 
Vérification de la concordance 
de ces deux stocks 
-- Fiches de stocks 
- Observation directe du 
stock physique 
-Fiches de réquisition. 
Si il ya égalité=5 
 




32  Registres de grand et de 
petit stock sont à jour et 
bien tenus 
- Toute sortie de médicaments 
doit être immédiatement 
consignée. 
- La quantité sortie doit 
correspondre à la quantité 
servie. 
Pas de rature ni surcharge 
dans ces registres. 
 
-Les fiches de stock 
-Les cahiers ou fiches de 
réquisition  
-Les documents à jour et bien 
tenus = 4  
 
 
- Les documents ne 
remplissant pas une de 
conditions citées dans les 






Eviter les ratures et 
surcharges dans les outils 
de gestion des 
médicaments. 
33 Bon archivage au niveau 
de centre de santé 
Un exemplaire de tous les 
rapports expédiés au BCZ doit 
être gardé au centre de santé 
dans une farde ou classeur 




Les classeurs ou les farde  
80 % des archives de 3 










Les archives pour les trois 
derniers mois. 
256







Compte rendu du CODESA 
Compte rendu  de la réunion 
du monitorage, 
Calendrier  d’activités et  
rapport de supervisions de 
poste de santé 
Rapport de gestion de 
médicaments. 
Lettre administrative.  
 
- Moins de 80 % = 0  
34 Taux de complétude   des 
rapports périodiques et 
mensuels au BCZ et 
archivée au CS. 
 
Les rapports périodiques 
concernent le rapport du PEV, 
le SNIS, le rapport de la 
réunion du CODESA, le 
rapport de la réunion du 
monitorage du CS, tous  les 
rapports financiers y compris 
la justification de FF,  ainsi que 
le rapport de gestion de 
médicaments. 
- Copies envoyées au BCZ 
- Copies archivées au CS 
 
100% de rapports remis   = 3  
 
 












- Tous les rapports du CS 
doivent être envoyés au 
BCZ. 
35 Taux de promptitude des 
rapports au BCZ et 
archivés au CS. 
Les rapports périodiques 
concernent le rapport du PEV, 
le SNIS, le rapport de la 
réunion du CODESA, le 
rapport de la réunion du 
monitorage du CS, tous  les 
rapports financiers y compris 
la justification de FF,  ainsi que 
le rapport de gestion de 
médicaments. 
- Copies envoyées au BCZ 
- Copies archivées au CS 
 
100% de rapports remis à 





Un seul rapport  remis en 












- La période d’envoi des 
rapports est fixée au plus 
tard le 3 du mois 
prochain. 
- Pour le rapport  
MAPEPI, c’est chaque 
lundi. 
36 Les données sanitaires 
(Soins curatifs, CPN, 
Accouchements, CPON, 
références et observations) 
se trouvant dans le SNIS 
sont concordantes avec 
celles contenues dans les 
registres y afférents.   
Les données qui  sont 
enregistrées dans les 
différents documents sont 
concordantes entre elles et 
fiables.  
-Registres de consultations 
curatives 
-Registre de CPN 
-Registre d’accouchements 
-Registre de CPON 
-Registre de référence 
-Registre d’observations 
-SNIS 
La cohérence de données 




La discordance des données 








37 Disponibilité des outils de 
gestion de finances. 
 
Concordance de tous les outils 
de gestion financière   
-Compte d’exploitation 
-Livres de caisse 
analytique et ordinaire 






Tous ces outils doivent 
être à jour,  sans ratures 
ni surcharges et ne 
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 -Cahier de versements 
-Bons d’entrées et de 
sorties caisse 
-Carnet de bar ou carnet de 
reçu 
-Cahier de paie du 
personnel 










Mauvaise tenue d’un seul outil  
= 0 




38 Respect de la clé de 
répartition de recettes 
locales du CS. 
Pour ce qui est de la clé de 
répartition de recettes locales 
du Centre de santé, l’actuel 
Protocole d’accord prévoit ce 
qui suit : 
-60 % pour la pérennisation 
-30 % pour  tous les agents du 
CS non primés par IRC. 
-10 % pour la Particom (à 
remettre au CODESA). 
-Compte d’exploitation 
-Livres de caisse 
analytique et ordinaire 
-Etat de paie de tout le 
personnel  
-Bons de sortie caisse 
Respect strict de la clé de 





Non respect de la clé de 
répartition de recettes locales 





        /  5 
Tous les différents outils 
concernés dans pour cet 
indicateur doivent être 
conforme entre eux. 
39 Absence de rupture de 
stock pour  tous les 
antigènes. 
Les antigènes concernés sont 
les vaccins : 
 BCG, VAA, VAR, VAT, VPO 
et le Pentavalent. 
- Fiche stock des vaccins 
- Cahier des réquisitions 
des antigènes.  
0 jour de rupture de tous  ces 
antigènes dans la période 












Tenir compte de la 
rupture qui est en amont 
du CS. 
40 Suivi de la qualité des 
vaccins. 
La fiche de relevé de   
température est complétée 
chaque jour (matin et soir).  
-Thermomètre 
-Fiche de température 
-PCV 
-Congélation de DTC et 
VAT 
Le remplissage journalier de la 
fiche avec une T° requise = 5  
 
Le non remplissage de la fiche,  
Vaccins avec PCV virées, 
congélation de DTC et/ou de 






-La température requise 
varie de +2  à + 8 °C 
-DTC et VAT ne doivent 
jamais congeler 
-Ne pas utiliser les 
vaccins avec PCV aux 
stades III et IV 
 
41 Bonne gestion du pétrole. Approvisionnement journalier 
d’un litre de pétrole dans le 
réfrigérateur. 
-Fiche de stock de pétrole.  
-Cahier de réquisition 
-Observation du stock 
physique. 
Concordance entre la quantité 
sortie  et celle effectivement 








Eviter la rupture de stock 
de pétrole. 
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La discordance entre la 
quantité sortie  et celle 
effectivement utilisée dans le 
réfrigérateur = 0 
/5 
42  Dépistage au VIH pour les 
femmes enceintes venues 
en CPN. 
Nombre de femmes enceintes  
venues en CPN dépistées/ 
Nombre total de femmes 
enceintes venues en CPN. 
-Registre CPN 
-Registre de labo 
50% de femmes enceintes qui 
acceptent le dépistage= 5 
 






43 Implication des membres 
du CODESA dans le 
processus de gestion du 
CS 
Participation de CODESA 
dans la réception des MEG et 
inventaire du patrimoine du CS  
PV de réception des MEG 
avec signature du 
CODESA 
Présence de signature 
dans les PV d’inventaire 
 
 
Absence de signature de 
CODESA dans le document=0 
 





Toute falsification est 
interdite 
44 Taux de référence 
supérieur ou égale à 5% 
Nbre de malades référés 
durant la période / Nbre de NC 
reçu de l’aire de santé 
Registre de référence  
Registre de réception  
Registre de consultation 
curative 
Supérieur ou égale à 5 %= 5 
 
Inférieur à 5% = 0 
/5 Les malades référés 
doivent se retrouver  
aussi dans le registre de 
reception, consultation 
curative et de référence 
                                                       SCORE :                         /                          soit                             % 
Toute fausse information  rapportée prouvée entraine une pénalité de 25% du score obtenu. 
 
 




Les personnes présentes à l’évaluation:                                                                                           L’équipe  d’évaluateurs: 
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Appendix 2: Final Health worker survey 
 
Interview Start Time:    Hour   |___|___|     Minute       |___|___|   
 
SECTION 1: PROVIDER INFORMATION, TRAINING, POSITION AND EXPERIENCE 
 
101 What is your age? (record age in years)                   |___|___|  Years  






103 Sex of the healthcare provider  Male ….............................................................1 
 Female ….........................................................2 
 
104 What is your position in the health facility? 
 




Trained birth attendant…………………………5 





105 What is your educational qualification (highest 
degree or certificate earned)? 
General Physician……………………………....1 
Medical Specialist (please specify)…………....2 
Nurse A0/L2……………………………………...3 
Nurse A1….………............................................4 
Nurse A2 ….…..................................................5 
Nurse A3………………………………………....6 
Midwife A0/L2 …………...…………………........7 
Midwife A1….…................................................8 
Midwife A2 ………………………………….…...9 
Midwife A3………………………………….…...10 
Trained birth attendant…………………..….....11 
Community health worker L2……………….....12 







106 How many years have you worked in this current 
position since your final degree/graduation? 
 
Years ................................................ |___|___|   
 
107 How many years have you worked at this facility?  Years ............................................... |___|___|    
108 Is this facility located in your home district or not?  Yes……………………………………………….1 
No………………………………………………...2 
 




Not applicable …………………………………. 8 
 
110 How many dependents are you financially 
responsible for?  
Number………………………………..|___|___|    
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SECTION 2: SERVICES PROVIDED 
Which of the following services have you provided 
within the past 3 months?  
 
READ EACH SERVICE AND CIRCLE”1” ( YES) IF 
THE RESPONDENT HAS PROVIDED AT LEAST 
ONCE WITHIN THE PAST THREE MONTHS. 
OTHERWISE, CIRCLE “2”.  
Yes No Do you spend more than 6 
hours a week on the 
average on this?  
Yes No 
201 Supervise Community Health Workers 1→ 2−−↓ 1 2 
202 Consultation for children 1→ 2−−↓ 1 2 
203 Consultation for adults 1→ 2−−↓ 1 2 
204 Family planning (temporary and permanent methods) 1→ 2−−↓ 1 2 
205 Antennal Care (ANC) 1→ 2−−↓ 1 2 
206 Postnatal Care (PNC) 1→ 2−−↓ 1 2 
207 Major Surgery 1→ 2−−↓ 1 2 
208 Minor Surgery 1→ 2−−↓ 1 2 
209 Inpatient care/services 1→ 2−−↓ 1 2 
210 Deliveries in a facility 1→ 2−−↓ 1 2 
211 Home deliveries 1→ 2−−↓ 1 2 
212 Tuberculosis treatment/diagnosis 1→ 2−−↓ 1 2 
213 Vaccinations 1→ 2−−↓ 1 2 
214 Malaria treatment 1→ 2−−↓ 1 2 
215 Nutrition (growth monitoring, nutrition counseling, 
etc) 
1→ 2−−↓ 1 2 
216 Other outreach services 1→ 2−−↓ 1 2 
217 Community Health Worker training 1→ 2−−↓ 1 2 




    220 
1 2 




     220 
1 2 
No Questions Response  
220 How many hours do you work in this health facility in 
a normal week? 
 
Hours ..................................  ........... |___|___|  
 
221 How many hours are you paid to work in this facility 
in a normal week? 
Hours ..................................  ........... |___|___| 
Don’t know………………………………………8 
 
SUPERVISION OF SERVICE PROVISION 







223 Who is your supervisor WITHIN the facility? Head of the facility….…..................................1 
Medical specialist (please specify)…………..2 
Physician (general) …. . ………………………3 




Midwife A0/L2 …………..………………….......8 
Midwife A1…. . …………………………………9 
Midwife A2 …...………………………………..10 
Midwife A3………………………………….….12 
Trained birth attendant……………………….11 
Community health worker L2 ………………..13 




224 When was the most recent time that a supervisor 
from WITHIN the facility interacted with you in a 
supervisory capacity? 
DO NOT READ CHOICES, BUT CIRCLE THE 
APPROPRIATE NUMBER FOR THE RESPONSE 
GIVEN 
During the current month …………………….1 
Within the past one month .. ………………….2 
Within the past 1-3 months . ………………….3 
Within the past 3-6 months . ………………….4 
More than 6 months ........... ………………….5 
Never .................................. ………………….6 ➔226
225 What did the supervisor do? 
DO NOT READ CHOICES; CIRCLE THE 
ANSWER(S) GIVEN, OR WRITE IN IF “OTHER”.  
IF MORE THAN ONE ANSWER IS GIVEN, CIRCLE 
ALL THAT APPLY. 
Checked records ......................................... 1 
Checked finances ........................................ 2 
Observed consultation ................................. 3 
Asked knowledge questions ........................ 4 
Provided health instruction .......................... 5 
Provided administrative instruction .............. 6 
Provided instruction in filling HMIS .............. 7 




226 Do you have a supervisor OUTSIDE the facility? Yes……………………………………………….1 
No………………………………………………...2 ➔231
227 Who is/are your main supervisor(s) OUTSIDE the 
facility? 
Médecin Chef de Zone…………………………1 
Health Zone Management team………………2 
NGO workers……………………………………3 
Faith based Organisation representatives...…4 
Other (please specify)………………………….5 
_____________________________________ 
(Specify) 
228 When was the most recent time that a supervisor 
from OUTSIDE the facility interacted with you face to 
face? 
Within current month …………………………1 
Within the past one month .. ………………….2 
Within the past 1-3 months . ………………….3 
Within the past 3-6 months . ………………….4 
More than 6 months ........... ………………….5 
Never .................................. ………………….6 ➔230
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229 What did the supervisor do when he/she came?  
 
DO NOT READ CHOICES; CIRCLE THE 
ANSWER(S) GIVEN, OR WRITE IN IF “OTHER”.  
IF MORE THAN ONE ANSWER IS GIVEN, CIRCLE 
ALL THAT APPLY. 
Brought supplies .......................................... 1 
Checked records ......................................... 2 
Checked finances ........................................ 3 
Observed consultation ................................. 4 
Asked knowledge questions ........................ 5 
Provided health instruction .......................... 6 
Provided administrative instruction .............. 7 
Provided instruction in filling HMIS .............. 8 





230 When was the most recent time that a supervisor 
from OUTSIDE the facility interacted with you 
through other means e.g. telephone/official 
communications? 
Within the current month …………………….1 
Within the past one month .. ………………….2 
Within the past 1-3 months . ………………….3 
Within the past 3-6 months . ………………….4 
More than 6 months ........... ………………….5 
Never .................................. ………………….6 
 
231 What are the three biggest difficulties that you face in 
doing your job in the facility?  
 
How would you rank these in terms of the biggest, 
second biggest and third biggest difficulties?  
 
DO NOT READ CHOICES; CIRCLE THE 
ANSWER(S) GIVEN, OR WRITE IN IF “OTHER”.  
CIRCLE ONLY THREE CHOICES. 
 
         1st biggest        2nd biggest 
                          3rd biggest 
Lack of trained personnel/staff…. ............... …1 
Lack of knowledge…. .......... ……. .............. …2 
Lack of feedback of performance……………..3 
Patients come to clinic too late…. .............. …4 
Inadequate transport…. ....... ……. .............. …5 
Lack of time…. .................... ……. .............. …6 
Lack of motivation…. ........... ……. .............. …7 
Staff shortages…. ................ ……. .............. …8 
Poor working environment…. ..................... …9 
Lack of supplies and drugs…. .................. …10 
Lack of equipment…............ ……. ............ …11 
Irregular/no water supply…. ……. ............ …12 
Irregular/no electricity…....... ……. ............ …13 
No laboratory or poor lab quality …. ......... …14 
Lack of space in the facility…. .................. …15 
Lack of supervision…. ......... ……. ............ …16 
Inadequate furniture ............ …. ............. ……17 
























Have you discussed the problems with your 
supervisor(s) (either within or outside the facility) 
within the last year? 
 
IF RESPONDENT HAS NO INTERNAL OR 








233 After these discussions did you notice any 










SECTION 3: HEALTHCARE PROVIDER SATISFACTION 
In this part of the questionnaire we would like to ask you some questions regarding your satisfaction with your current 
job.  All answers are confidential and any identifying information will be removed.  
I’m now going to read you a series of statements about your level of satisfaction. Please indicate whether you are 
very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied. If you are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied then say neutral.  
READ FROM THE LIST BELOW AND ASK WHICH CATEGORY APPLIES (1-5). 
No. How would you rate the 


















301 Working relationships with 
upper-level staff  
1 2 3 4 5 
302 Working relationship with 
colleagues 
1 2 3 4 5 
303 Management of the health 
facility - by the Ministry of 
Public Health or by the 
relevant management office 
1 2 3 4 5 
304 Transparency of the 
management of financial 
resources by the facility  
1 2 3 4 5 
305 Your participation in 
decision-making to resolve 
problems in the facility  
1 2 3 4 5 
306 The number of staff working 
in the facility  
1 2 3 4 5 
307 The description of your job 
role and tasks  
1 2 3 4 5 
308 Relationships with local 
leaders in the community 
1 2 3 4 5 
309 The stability of your 
job/contract  
1 2 3 4 5 
310 Availability of medicines in 
the health facility  
1 2 3 4 5 
311 Availability of equipment in 
the health facility 
1 2 3 4 5 
312 Availability of medical 
supplies in the health facility  
1 2 3 4 5 
313 The physical condition of the 
health facility building  
1 2 3 4 5 
314 Your  ability to provide a high 
quality of care to patients  
1 2 3 4 5 
315 Your level of responsibility  1 2 3 4 5 
316 The level of respect from 
your supervisors within the 
facility  
1 2 3 4 5 
317 The level of respect from 
your supervisors outside the 
facility  
1 2 3 4 5 
318 Your respect in the 
community 
1 2 3 4 5 
319 Your training opportunities to 
upgrade your skills and 
knowledge  
1 2 3 4 5 
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320 Your ability to use skills 
learned from training in your 
work  
1 2 3 4 5 
321 Your ability to meet the 
needs of the community 
1 2 3 4 5 
322 Your salary in relation to your 
workload  
1 2 3 4 5 
323 Your salary in relation to your 
competence/skills  
1 2 3 4 5 
324 Employment benefits (travel 
allowance, bonus, health 
care etc.)  
1 2 3 4 5 
325 Flexibility with attendance 
and work hours  
1 2 3 4 5 
326 Your workload 1 2 3 4 5 
327 The division of work between 
you and your colleagues  
1 2 3 4 5 
328 The division of work between 
caring for patients and other 
tasks 
1 2 3 4 5 
329 The support from other 
colleagues in your team 
1 2 3 4 5 
330 How you and other 
colleagues are selected to 
attend training  
1 2 3 4 5 
331 The variety of your tasks  1 2 3 4 5 
332 Safety and security to live 
and practice in the 
community 
1 2 3 4 5 
333 Living accommodations for 
your family  
1 2 3 4 5 
334 Education for your children  1 2 3 4 5 
335 Recognition of your good 
work by your boss  
1 2 3 4 5 
336 Your opportunities for 
promotion  
1 2 3 4 5 
337 The system by which staff 
are rewarded  
1 2 3 4 5 
338 
 
Overall, your satisfaction with 
your job  
1 2 3 4 5 
339 Which three of the aspects 
mentioned above, in your 
opinion, are most important 
in affecting your job 
















3rd most important 
     
 
   
 










SECTION 4: MOTIVATION OF HEALTHCARE PROVIDER 
Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements. If you 
neither agree nor disagree say “neutral.” READ FROM THE LIST BELOW AND ASK WHICH CATEGORY APPLIES 
(1-5) 














This health facility has a good reputation in 
the community  1 2 3 4 5 
402 It is a source of pride to get a job at this facility 
1 2 3 4 5 
403 
I am satisfied that I accomplish something 
worthwhile in this job  1 2 3 4 5 
404 
Healthcare providers at this health facility 
pride themselves on providing good services 
to patients 
1 2 3 4 5 
FINANCIAL REWARD 
405 
The effort that we at this facility put into this 
job is reflected in our pay 1 2 3 4 5 
406 
My job offers adequate pay compared with 
similar jobs 1 2 3 4 5 
407 
The income I receive is a fair reflection of my 
skills, knowledge and training 1 2 3 4 5 
408 
The income that I receive from working at 
this facility more than covers my basic needs 
such as food, transport, and accommodation 
1 2 3 4 5 
409 
With this job I have worries about how to 
support myself and my family 1 2 3 4 5 
PERCEIVED SELF-EFFICACY 
410 
I am confident about my ability to handle my 
work 1 2 3 4 5 
411 
I effectively cope with any new challenges 
that occur in my work life  1 2 3 4 5 
412 
I feel that at work things are going the way I 
would like them to 1 2 3 4 5 
413 
I feel that I have control of things concerning 
my work 1 2 3 4 5 
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414 
I have received sufficient training to be able 
to perform my job well 1 2 3 4 5 
COMMITMENT 
415 
I only do this job so that I get paid at the end 
of the month 1 2 3 4 5 
416 
I intend to leave this facility as soon as I can 
find another position  1 2 3 4 5 
417 
I would recommend this profession to my 
children  1 2 3 4 5 
SELF-PERCEIVED CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 
418 I am always reliable and dependable at work 
1 2 3 4 5 
419 My work is consistently of a high quality 
1 2 3 4 5 
420 I am a hard worker 
1 2 3 4 5 
421 I am always on time at work 
1 2 3 4 5 
422 
I spend my time at work on work-related 
activities 1 2 3 4 5 
423 I am rarely absent from work 
1 2 3 4 5 
424 I am careful not to make errors at work 
1 2 3 4 5 
425 
When I am not sure how to treat a patient’s 
condition I look for information or ask for 
advice  
1 2 3 4 5 
426 
I do things which need to be done without 
being asked or told 1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION 5: PROVIDER INCOME 
Now we would like to ask you some questions about your income, both from this job and any other sources of income 




Who is/are your main employer(s)? 
DO NOT READ CHOICES; 
CIRCLE THE ANSWER(S) 
GIVEN, OR WRITE IN IF 
“OTHER”.  IF MORE THAN ONE 






FBO (faith based organization)………………5 
Private organization……………………………6 




What is the total monthly net salary 
you are supposed to receive from 
your employment at this facility 
(after deduction and taxes etc.)?  
 |___|___|___|___|___| ___| 
Congolese francs  
Don’t know………………………………………8 
503 
What salary did you actually 
receive from your employment at 
this facility last month (after 
deduction and taxes etc.)? 
|___|___|___|___|___| ___| 
Congolese francs 
504 Is the payment of your salary up to 
date?  
Yes .............................................................. 1 
No……………………………………………….2 
➔506
505 How many months behind is it? Months  ...............................  ................. |___|___| 
Don’t know……………………………………..8 
506 
Do you receive a monthly hazard 
pay? 
Yes ........................................................ 1 
No .......................................................... 2 ➔512
507 
What is the amount of hazard pay 






What amount of monthly hazard 




509 Is the payment of your hazard pay 
up to date?  
Yes ........................................................ 1 
No .......................................................... 2 
➔511
510 How many months behind is it? Months  ...............................  ................. |___|___| 
Don’t know……………………………………..8 
511 






FBO (faith based organization)………………..5 
Health facility income…………………………...6 
Don’t know……………………………………….7 





Do you receive a monthly 
performance bonus? 
Yes ........................................................ 1 
No .......................................................... 2 ➔517
513 
Are you aware of any performance 
criteria attached to this bonus?  
Yes ........................................................ 1 
No .......................................................... 2 
514 
What is the amount of monthly 
performance bonus you are 





What amount of performance 











FBO (faith based organization)………………..5 
Health facility income…………………………...6 
Don’t know……………………………………….7 




Do you receive any monthly 
income from user fees collected at 
the facility? 






What is the amount of monthly 





Do you get housing through your 
work?  
Yes ........................................................ 1 
No .......................................................... 2 ➔521
520 
If you get housing through your 
work, what should be the fair rental 





Do you receive any of the other 
following allowances through your 
work?  
READ EACH POSSIBLE 
RESPONSE TO THE 
RESPONDENT. CIRCLE ONLY 




















FOR EACH RESPONSE 
CIRCLED IN QUESTION 521, 
POSE THE QUESTION:  
How MUCH do you receive for 
(STATE APPROPRIATE 
CATEGORY)? 
Rural allowance             |___|___|___|___|___| 
Transport allowance      |___|___|___|___|___| 
Medical allowance         |___|___|___|___|___| 
Overtime allowance       |___|___|___|___|___| 
Uniform allowance         |___|___|___|___|___| 
Non practice allowance |___|___|___|___|___| 
Other (please specify)   |___|___|___|___|___| 
_____________________________________ 
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IF UNKNOWN WRITE 99999. (Specify) 
523 
Do you receive any per diems (e.g. 
for workshops, training or other 
travel)?  






If yes, how much do you receive in 
per diems for training on average 
in a year?  
|___|___|___|___|___| ___| Congolese francs 
525 
Did you receive additional income 
from patients over the past year, 
either as direct payment for 
services or as a gift? 






If yes, please state the amount you 
received from your patients in the 
previous month  
|___|___|___|___|___| ___| Congolese francs 
527 
Do you supplement your main 
income with extra private health 
care work?  






If yes, which of these options best 
describes where this private 
practice is located?  
Same building as main job…………………….1 
At home…………………………………….........2 
At home of a colleague………………………..3 
In rented premises……………………………..4 
At patient/client’s home……………………......5 
Private facility…………………………………...6 
NGO facility………………………………………7 




How much did you get paid for this 
private practice last month?  
|___|___|___|___|___| ___| Congolese francs 
530 
Do you have any additional 
sources of income? 
Yes ........................................................ 1 
No .......................................................... 2 ➔End
531 
Can you tell me which of the 
additional sources of income you 
have? 
Agriculture ............................................. 1 
Trade/Business ...................................... 2 





If yes to one or more of any of the 
above, what is the amount for each 
in the last month? 
IF UNKNOWN WRITE 99999. 
Agriculture         |___|___|___|___|___| 
Trade/Business            |___|___|___|___|___|  
House rent          |___|___|___|___|___| 
Other (specified above).|___|___|___|___|___| 
Don’t want to say……………………………….8 
Thank you for your time 
Interview End Time:    Hour   |___|___|     Minute   |___|___|  
Appendix 3: Final Health facility survey (overleaf) 
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Appendix 3: Final Health facility survey 
Interview Start Time: Hour   |___|___|     Minute   |___|___|
SECTION 1. BASIC FACILITY INFORMATION 
First I would like to ask you some general questions about how this facility is organized, and what 
infrastructure and resources are available. 
No. QUESTION RESPONSE SKIP/ 
INSTRUCTION
S 
1. How far is the village from the facility? DISTANCE IN KM 
|___|___|___|   
DON'T 
KNOW……………………999 




3. How many days each week is the facility routinely open 
for outpatient curative services? 
NUMBER OF DAYS 
|___|   
DON'T 
KNOW………………………..9 
4. Is there a trained health provider assigned to and 
present at the facility at all times (24 hours a day) for 
emergencies? 
IF YES, ASK:  Is there a duty schedule for 24-hour staff 
coverage?  IF  
YES, ASK TO SEE THIS. 
YES, DUTY SCHEDULE 
OBSERVED……………………
……..01 
YES, NOT OBSERVED 
…………..02 
NO 24-HOUR ON SITE 
STAFF……………………………
…….03 
 GO TO 6
 GO TO 6
5. Is there a trained health provider available away from 
the facility but officially on call, at all times, (24 hours a 
day) for emergencies? 
IF YES, ASK:  Is there a duty schedule for 24-hour staff 
coverage?   








NO 24 HOUR ON CALL 
STAFF……………………………
…….03 






7 How far is the facility to which the patients seen at this 











































SECTION 2. SERVICES OFFERED BY HEALTH FACILITY 
SERVICE 
Is [SERVICE] 








POSE THE QUESTION 
IN THE COLUMN. 
IF NOT APPLICABLE, 
TO GO QUESTION c. 
Do patients have to 
pay for [SERVICE]? 
1=YES  
2=NO  (NEXT 
SERVICE) 
How much are patients 
charged for (SERVICE)? 





2      (NEXT 
SERVICE) 
How many observation 















2  (NEXT 
SERVICE) 
 c 1 








2  (NEXT 
SERVICE) 
 c 1 








2  (NEXT 
SERVICE) 
 c 1 










2  (NEXT 
SERVICE) 
 c 1 








2  (NEXT 
SERVICE) 
 c 1 








2  (NEXT 
SERVICE) 
 c 1 









2  (NEXT 
SERVICE) 
 c 1 








2  (NEXT 
SERVICE) 
 c 1 










2  (NEXT 
SERVICE) 





1                                
 
2      (NEXT 
SERVICE) 
 







1                                
 
2      (NEXT 
SERVICE) 
 
How many routine 
inpatient beds are 
there in this facility? 
 
















1                                
 
2      (NEXT 
SERVICE) 
 
How many surgical 



















SECTION 3. GENERAL STAFFING 
 
Now I have some questions about staffing for this facility. Please tell me how many staff members with each 
qualification are currently assigned to this facility and whether they are male or female staff, and whether they 
are present today. 
 













22. Medical Doctor (specialist) |__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
23. Medical Doctor (General 
practitioner) 
|__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
24. Registered Nurse (L2) |__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
25. Nurse A1 |__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
26. Nurse A2 |__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
27. Nurse A3 |__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
28. Anesthetist |__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
29. Midwife or trained birth attendant 
(A1) 
|__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
30. Community health worker (L2 OR 
G3) 





SECTION 4. BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE 
No. Questions and filters YES NO SKIP 
42. Is there a reception/registration rooms or space? 1 2  
43. Is there a consultation/examination room for outpatients? 1 2  
If NO GO 
TO 48 
44. Does the examination room have an examination bed? 1 2  
45. Does the examination room have an instrument trolley? 1 2  
46. Does the examination room have a hand-washing facility? 1 2  
47. Does the examination room have a spot light? 1 2  
48. Is there a separate treatment room? 1 2  
49. Is there a separate room for observation? 1 2  
50. Is there an emergency room? 1 2  
51. Is there an operation theater? 1 2  
52. Is there a separate medicine dispensing room? 1 2  
53. Does this facility have a maternity ward? 1 2 If NO GO 
TO56 






55. Does the facility have a maternity-waiting house? 1 2  
56. Does the facility have cell phone reception? 1 2  
31. Pharmacist  |__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
32. Pharmacy dispenser |__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
33. Laboratory Technician/technologist 
A1 
|__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
34. Radiology Technician |__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
35. Nutritionist |__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
36. Records Clerk |__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
37. Hospital Administrator |__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
38. Maintenance technician |__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
39. Receptionist |__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
40. All other staff with clinical training 




|__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
41. SUM THE NUMBER OF STAFF 
REPORTED 
IN EACH COLUMN 
|__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| |__| |__|__|__|__| 
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57. Does the facility have a radio? 1 2 
58. Does the facility have internet? 1 2 
59. Does the facility have electricity? 1 2 
If NO GO 
TO 62 
60. Is electricity functioning now? (CHECK TO SEE IF ELECTRICITY 
CAN BE TURNED ON). 
1 2 
61. Is the electricity, not including any backup generator, ever 
interrupted during the times when the facility is providing 
services? 
1 2 
62. Is there a functional solar panel? 1 2 
If NO GO 
TO 63 
63. Is there a functional battery for solar panel? 1 2 
64. Does this facility have a generator for electricity? 
This may be a back-up or stand-by generator. 
1 2 
If NO GO 
TO 66 
65. Is the generator functional and is there fuel today? 
ACCEPT REPORTED RESPONSE FROM 
KNOWLEDGEABLE RESPONDENT. 
1 2 
66. What is the main source of water at this facility? 

























68. Is there a sanitary toilet or latrine that is available for clients to 
use, such as those with sewer connections, septic system 
connections, pour-flush latrines, ventilated improved pit latrines 















GO TO 70 
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70. Please tell me the most common means of transport used by 
patients to travel to this facility. 























71. Does this facility have a functional ambulance or other vehicle for 
emergency transportation for clients?   







SECTION 5. FACILITY VOLUME 
ASK THE FACILITY IN-CHARGE FOR THE RECORDS/DATA 
TRANSMISSION FOR THE LAST COMPLETED MONTH. 
COLLECT INFORMATION ONLY FOR THE LAST 
COMPLETED MONTH; DO NOT COLLECT DATA ON THE 
CURRENT MONTH 
WRITE IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF 
PERSONS OR PATIENTS IN THE 
APPROPRIATE COLUMN, BASED ON 
WHETHER THE NUMBER COMES FROM THE 
FACILITY’S RECORDS OR FROM ESTIMATES 
MADE BY THE IN-CHARGE. IF NOT KNOWN, 





72. Population of catchment area. |__|__|__|__||__||__| |__|__|__|__||__||__| 
73. Number of outpatients seen during the last 
completed month (1 month). 
|__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| 
74. Number of female outpatients seen during the 
last completed month (1 month). 
|__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| 
75. Number of under 5 patients seen at outpatient 
during the last completed month (1 month). 
|__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|__| 
76. ASK THE QUESTION ONLY IF THE 
RESPONDENT ANSWERED “YES” TO 
QUESTION 12: 
Number of normal deliveries in the facility 
during the last completed month (1 month). 
|__|__|__| |__|__|__| 
77. ASK THE QUESTION ONLY IF THE 
RESPONDENT ANSWERED “YES” TO 
QUESTION 13: 
Number of cesarean sections in the facility 
during the last completed month (1 month). 
|__|__|__| |__|__|__| 
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SECTION 6. BASIC DRUGS AND SUPPLIES 
I would like to ask you some questions 
regarding the facilities drug supply. I am going 
to read you a list of drugs. For each one, please 
tell me if the drug is currently in stock and if 
the drug has been out of stock at any point in 
the past month 
Is this drug 




Has this drug been out of stock at any 






78. Halothane or Ketamine 1 2 1 2 3 
79. Atropine 1 2 1 2 3 
Local anesthetics 
80. Lidocaine or Bupvicaine 1 2 1 2 3 
Analgesics, Antipyretics 
81. acetylsalicylic acid 1 2 1 2 3 
82. Ibuprofene or paracetamol 1 2 1 2 3 
Anti-Allergy 
83. Hydrocortisone or Dexamethasone 1 2 1 2 3 
Anticonvulsants 
84. Diazepan 1 2 1 2 3 
Intestinal anthelmintics 
85. Mebendazole or albendazole 1 2 1 2 3 
Antibacterial 
86. Amoxicilline 1 2 1 2 3 
87. Ampicilline 1 2 1 2 3 
88. Ciprofloxacine 1 2 1 2 3 
89. Cotrimoxazole 1 2 1 2 3 
TB 
90. Isoniazide + rifampicine 1 2 1 2 3 
91. Éthambutol + isoniazide 1 2 1 2 3 
92. Streptomycine 1 2 1 2 3 
93. Rifampicine + Isoniazide + éthambutol 1 2 1 2 3 
Antiamoebic 
94. Métronidazole 1 2 1 2 3 
Antimalarial 
95. Sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP) 1 2 1 2 3 
96. Quinine 1 2 1 2 3 
97. Artéméther + luméfantrine 1 2 1 2 3 
98. Artésunate + Amodiaquine 1 2 1 2 3 
Viral 
99. PEP kit / emergency kit 1 2 1 2 3 
Antianemic 
100. Acide folique 1 2 1 2 3 
101. Iron syrup or iron dextran 1 2 1 2 3 
Antiangoreux 
102. Nitroglycérine 1 2 1 2 3 
hypotensive 
103. Aténolol 1 2 1 2 3 
Heart attack/failure 
104. Digoxine 1 2 1 2 3 
105. Épinéphrine 1 2 1 2 3 
Diuretics 
106. Fursémide 1 2 1 2 3 
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SECTION 7. EQUIPMENT 
Now I would like to ask you some questions about the facilities equipment. I will read you a list of equipment 
and for each piece please tell me how many the facility has and the number functional. 




117. X-ray |___|___| |___|___| 
118. Ultrasound |___|___| |___|___| 
119. Microscope |___|___| |___|___| 
120. Sterilizer |___|___| |___|___| 
121. Centrifuge |___|___| |___|___| 
Equipment for Newborns 
122. Table to care for newborn |___|___| |___|___| 
123. Scale for baby weighing |___|___| |___|___| 
Other Materials 
124. Weighing scale for adults |___|___| |___|___| 
125. Height measure for children |___|___| |___|___| 
126. Height measure for adults |___|___| |___|___| 
127. Delivery kit |___|___| |___|___| 
128. Episiotomy Kit |___|___| |___|___| 
129. Simple Stretcher |___|___| |___|___| 
130. Instrument cart |___|___| |___|___| 
131. IV Stand |___|___| |___|___| 
132. Delivery table with stirrups |___|___| |___|___| 
133. Examination table |___|___| |___|___| 
134. Gynecological table |___|___| |___|___| 
135. Blood pressure monitor |___|___| |___|___| 
136. Stethoscope |___|___| |___|___| 
137. Thermometer |___|___| |___|___| 
138. Timer (clock with second hand) |___|___| |___|___| 
Family Planning Kits 
139. Insertion/withdrawal of IUD |___|___| |___|___| 
140. Insertion/withdrawal of Implants |___|___| |___|___| 
Individual Protection Equipment 
141. Gowns |___|___| |___|___| 
142. Mask |___|___| |___|___| 
143. Sterilized gloves |___|___| |___|___| 
Cold Chain 
Antidiabetic 
107. Insuline 1 2 1 2 3 
108. Metformine 1 2 1 2 3 
Trouble Hydro-électrolutiques 
109. ORS 1 2 1 2 3 
Oxytocics 
110. Oxytocine 1 2 1 2 3 
Family Planning 
111. Condoms 1 2 1 2 3 
112. Oral contraceptives 1 2 1 2 3 
113. IUD 1 2 1 2 3 
Antiseptics and disinfectants 
114. Alcool dénaturé 70° 1 2 1 2 3 
115. Alcool iodé 2% 1 2 1 2 3 
Other 
116. Wound stitching material 1 2 1 2 3 
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144. Refrigerator |___|___| |___|___| 
145. Working Thermometer |___|___| |___|___| 
Transportation Equipment (in working 
condition) 
146. Motorcycle |___|___| |___|___| 
147. Bicycles |___|___| |___|___| 
148. Canoe/boat |___|___| |___|___| 
149. Ambulance/car/truck |___|___| |___|___| 
SECTION 8. LABORATORY 












I am going to read you a list of laboratory 
test. Please indicate whether the facility is 
able to do this test today, was able to do this 
test in the past 6 months but not today, or if 
the facility cannot do this test. 
Able to do this 
test today 
a. 
Able to do 





Cannot do this 
test 
c. 
152. Haemoglobin testing 1 2 3 
153. Complete blood count 1 2 3 
154. Malaria tests 1 2 3 
155. Blood glucose 1 2 3 
156. HIV testing 1 2 3 
157. Ziehl stains 1 2 3 
158. Gram stains 1 2 3 
159. Blood type and cross match 1 2 3 
160. Syphilis testing 1 2 3 
161. Urine analysis 1 2 3 
162. Stool direct microscopic examination 1 2 3 
163. Pregnancy testing 1 2 3 
164. Hepatitis testing 1 2 3 
165. Does the facility use external diagnostic 





SECTION 9. PHARMACY FACILITIES 
166. Does this facility have a pharmacy or a 






167. Are there enough shelves for storing 











SECTION 10. VACCINE CAPACITY 
NOTE: ASK THESE QUESTIONS ONLY IF THE RESPONDENT ANSWERED “YES” TO QUESTION 9 IN SECTION 2 
169. Are immunizations regularly given to 
children at this facility or in outreach EPI 
activities or both? 
YES, AT FACILITY 
ONLY…………………………..01 
YES, AT OUTREACH 
ONLY……………………….02 




170. How many EPI outreach activities were 
conducted in the past 3 months? 
NUMBER EPI OUTREACH 
ACTIVITIES  |___|___|___| 
CHECK RESPONSE TO QUESTION 144, IF “YES” ASK QUESTIONS 171 AND 172. IF “NO” GO TO 173. 
171. 






















SECTION 11. MATERNAL AND NEONATAL CARE 
173. Are postpartum care services 
offered routinely? 




YES, IN THE FACILITY AS PART OF ROUTINE 
SERVICES AND IN SPECIAL 
CLINICS……………………………….……….....02 
NO, NOT AS PART OF ROUTINE SERVICES 




NO, NOT OFFERED AT THIS
FACILITY……………..………….04
Are the following services provided? Yes No 
174. Maternal examination & 
treatment 
1 2 
175. Breast feeding counseling 1 2 
176. Newborn examination & 
treatment 
1 2 
177. Growth Monitoring & 
promotion 
1 2 
178. Vaccination counseling 1 2 
179. Family planning counseling 1 2 
180. PMTCT counseling 1 2 
181. Dietary counseling for 




182. Counseling on mother and 
child hygiene 
1 2  
 
 
SECTION 12. MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION 
SUPERVISOR/MONITO
R 
LEVEL FROM WHICH 
THE SUPERVISOR 
CAME 
Did the supervisor 
from [LEVEL] 
supervise/monitor 
this health facility 
in the last 3 
months? 
1=YES    
2=NO  
Which month and year did 
supervisor from [LEVEL] last 
visit? 






1=MONTHLY       
2=QUARTERLY   
3=TWICE A YEAR  
4=ANNUALLY         
What topic was 
discussed at the last 
visit by 
[SUPERVISOR]? 
CHECK ALL THAT 
APPLY 












1                                                




























1                                                




























1                                                




























1                                                
































1                                                

























188. Does this facility have routine meetings for 










189. How often do meetings to discuss the facility 
managerial and administrative matters take 
place? 















190. Are there any routine meetings about facility 
activities or management issues that include 











191. How often are routine meetings held with both 
facility staff and community members? 
















192. Is there a Hospital/facility community advisory 









193. Does this facility have any system for 
determining clients’ opinions about the health 
facility or its services? 
 
IF YES, CIRCLE ALL METHODS THAT ARE 
USED FOR ELICITING CLIENTS’ OPINIONS. 










GO TO 190 
GO TO 192 
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SECTION 13 MEDICAL WASTE TREATMENT 
195. What is this facility’s disposal 
practice for sharps such as 
needles, glass, surgical 
instruments, etc.? 
(CIRCLE THE CODES FOR ALL 
PRACTICES THAT ARE 
MENTIONED/OBSERVED IN 





BURY BUT DO NOT BURN
 ........ ………………………………………………………………….03 
BURN BUT DO NOT BURY
 ........ ………………………………………………………………….04 
USE SAFE 
BOX…………………………………………………………..………………………05 
PUT IN A COVERED PIT (COULD BE LATRINE)
 ................................................ …………………………………….06 
PUT IN AN OPEN PIT
………………………………………………………………………….07 
STORE, COLLECT AND MOVE OFFSITE
 .................................. ……………………………………………….08 






















194. Does this facility routinely carry out quality 
assurance activities?  By this I mean some 
formal review system or comparison of work or 









196. What is this facility’s disposal 
practice for biomedical wastes 
such as placenta, human body 
parts, laboratory waste, etc.? 
(CIRCLE THE CODES FOR ALL 
PRACTICES THAT ARE 
MENTIONED/OBSERVED IN 





BURY BUT DO NOT BURN
 ........ ………………………………………………………………….03 
BURN BUT DO NOT BURY
 ........ ………………………………………………………………….04 
USE SAFE 
BOX…………………………………………………………..………………………05 
PUT IN A COVERED PIT (COULD BE LATRINE)
 ................................................ …………………………………….06 
PUT IN AN OPEN PIT
………………………………………………………………………….07 
STORE, COLLECT AND MOVE OFFSITE
 .................................. ……………………………………………….08 






197. Does the facility have a picture 
























SECTION 14. COMMUNITY FUNDING INITIATIVES 
198
. 
Is there a health cooperative (mutual)? YES ................................................. 1 




Is there a community funding initiative of FOSA (IT 
payment salary, etc.)? 
YES ................................................. 1 
 NO .................................................. 2 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME. 
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Page 1 of 5 
Instructions to Interviewers 
Before beginning each interview, greet the potential respondent and read the following statement 
aloud. Once you have finished reading the statement, indicate whether the respondent agrees to 
participate or not. Then sign the form to show that you asked the respondent to give informed 
consent. Use two copies of this form for each person that you ask permission to interview and 
turn one copy in to your supervisor with the questionnaires. 
The following informed consent is required by Tulane University for any research study 
conducted by investigators at the University.  This study has been approved by the University’s 
Institutional Review Board for Human Subjects and the Kinshasa School of Public Health’s 
ethical review board. No research activity is to be conducted until you have had an opportunity to 
review this consent form, ask any questions you may have, and sign this document if applicable. 
Written permission was obtained from the site manager, the Ministry of Health and local 
officials prior to the interview. A copy of which was given to you. Please keep a copy with you in 
a place where you’ll be able to access it at any time. 
Principal Investigator: Dr. Joe Keating 
Study Title: Evaluation of the Impact of the ASSP (Accès aux Soins de Santé Primaires) Project 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
Performance Sites: Democratic Republic of Congo 
Sponsor: DFID 
INTRODUCTION 
Hello. My name is ____________ and I am doing a study to lean how well a health systems 
project is working in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In this study, we would like to know 
more about the availability and quality of health care services in the DRC. We would like to ask 
you some general questions about the facility in which you work, as well as some general 
information your skills and experiences as a health care provider. 
WHY THE STUDY IS BEING DONE 
Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, located in New Orleans, 
Louisiana, United States, the Kinshasa School of Public Health and IMA World Health want to 
learn if a health systems project is improving the availability and quality of health care services.  
The project incorporates a number of health financing, community engagement, and service 
quality improvement strategies.  
Appendix 4: Consent form for health worker and health facility surveys
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Page 2 of 5 
We will be visiting people in their homes to ask general questions about their health and 
utilization of services, as well as visiting many different health facilities to gather information 
about the quality and availably of facilities and services. A maximum of 630 health care facilities 
will be included health facility survey, and in each of these facilities, we will be interviewing 
health care providers who are working in the facility.  
WHEN IS THE STUDY BEING DONE 
The data collectors will conduct the survey during the current visit and then will attempt to return 
to the health facility and conduct the full survey with each respondent two more times – in 2015 
and 2017.  You will be asked to consent before each interview. 
WHAT THE STUDY PROCEDURES ARE AND WHAT YOU WILL BE ASKED TO DO 
If you agree to participate, the research team will interview you regarding your experiences as a 
health care provider as well as ask some general questions about the health facility in which you 
work.  We plan to ask you a few questions about your institution, personnel, the availability of 
medications and medical supplies, record keeping, educational materials and advocacy. This 
interview will take approximately 1 hour.   
DISCLOSURE OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
The investigators in this study are all health professionals. They are interested in the knowledge 
to be gained from this study and in the well-being of members of the community. Investigators 
may obtain salary or other financial support for conducting the research. You are under no 
obligation to participate in any research study offered to you.  
RISKS AND BENEFITS OF BEING INVOLVED IN THE STUDY 
We realize that our presence might interfere with your work. We are not here to supervise your 
work. Should we observe any areas in which we believe the services might want to improve, we 
will discuss these openly and constructively at the end of our visit to this facility. We realize that 
you have a very busy schedule and that the interview may be an inconvenience.  
There are no disadvantages to you participating in this study, other than having to answer some 
questions that might make you feel uncomfortable.  We would like to remind you that you can 
refuse to answer any question at any time. 
This study may not benefit you directly; however, it will help us to learn more about health care 
facilities and the availability of services in the DRC.  
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CONFIDENTIALITY 
The information you provide will be kept private and it will not be shown to anyone else.    
Although we have recorded your name on this questionnaire, we will remove your name once we 
transfer this information to the computer.  Your name will not appear in any report, nor will we 
use any description that could identify you (such as “the doctor at Mama Yemo Hospital”).  
The research team will prepare the results in different formats: data on individual facilities, on all 
facilities in the health zone.  Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, 
the Kinshasa School of Public Health, and local non-governmental organization will participate 
with the research team in publishing and distributing these results.  
The following procedures will be used to protect the confidentiality of your data. The researchers 
will keep all study records locked in a secure location. Research records will be labeled with a 
unique code. A master key that links names and codes will be maintained in a separate and 
secure location. All electronic files (e.g., database, spreadsheet) containing identifiable 
information will be password protected. Any computer hosting such files will also have 
password protection to prevent access by unauthorized users. Only the members of the research 
staff will have access to the passwords. Data that will be shared with others will be coded as 
described above to help protect your identity. At the end of this study, the researchers may 
publish their findings. Information will be presented in summary format and you will not be 
identified in any publications or presentations. Any master key or other data described in this 
paragraph will be maintained in accordance with the security provisions of this paragraph until 
destroyed by the researchers.  
You should also know that the Tulane University Human Research Protection Office and the 
Biomedical Institutional Review Board (IRB) may inspect study records as part of its auditing 
program, but these reviews will only focus on the researchers and not on your responses or 
involvement. The IRB is a group of people who review research studies to protect the rights and 
welfare of research participants. 
PARTICIPATION IS VOLUNTARY 
Participation in this survey is voluntary, and the refusal to participate will not involve any 
penalty. You may also choose to discontinue participation at any time during this interview or 
future interviews, again without any penalty to yourself or your facility. You have the right to 
stop participating in the study at any point over the five year time period. 
Take as much time as you like before you make a decision to participate in this study. If you 
have any questions about this study, please feel free to ask the data collector in charge in the 
field whose name and contact information is given below____________________________. 
        (Data Collector’s Name Here) 
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If you want to voice concerns or complaints about the research or if you have a research-related 
problem, you may contact the country coordinator for this study whose name and contact 
information is given below.   
 
Dr. Tshefu Kitoto Antoinette 
Phone: 00243 81 01 56 910 
Email: antotshe@yahoo.com 
 
WILL I RECEIVE PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION?  
 
You will not be paid to be in this study. 
 
ARE THERE COSTS TO PARTICIPATE? 
 
There are no costs to you to participate in this study. 
 
WHO DO I CONTACT IF I HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS STUDY? 
We will be happy to answer any question you have about this study. If you have further 
questions about this study, want to voice concerns or complaints about the research or if you 
have a research-related problem, you may contact the principal investigator, Joe Keating (+1-
504-988-3655) or the Co-investigator, Dr. Tshefu Kitoto Antoinette (00243 81 01 56 910). If you 
would like to discuss your rights as a research participant, discuss problems, concerns, and 
questions; obtain information; or offer input with an informed individual who is unaffiliated with 
the specific research, you may contact the Tulane University Human Research Protection Office 
at (+1-504-988-2665) or email at irbmain@tulane.edu. 
 
INFORMED CONSENT 
Do you have any questions? 
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Thank you very much for your time.  Would you like to take part in this survey? 
 
I have read this form and decided that I will participate in the research project described above. 
Its general purposes, the particulars of involvement and possible risks and inconveniences have 
been explained to my satisfaction. I understand that I can withdraw at any time. My signature 
also indicates that I have received a copy of this consent form.  
____________________________________________   _____________  
Subject         Date                  
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Appendix 5a: Consent form for nurses (objectives 1 and 2) 
 
 
Principal Investigator: Rishma Maini, MBChB 
Co-Investigator: David Hotchkiss, PhD 
Study Title: Health worker motivation in the DRC. 
Sponsor: Interchurch Medical Assistance 
 
The following informed consent is required by Tulane University for any research study 
conducted by investigators at the University. This study has been approved by the 




You are invited to participate in a research study to understand more about your experience 
of working in this health facility. You are being asked to participate because you are 
currently working in this facility. No research activity is to be conducted until you have had 
an opportunity to review this consent form, ask any questions you may have, and sign this 
document if applicable. 
 
The main objective of this study is to understand health workers experiences of working 
in facilities, and what help health workers to be effective in their job, and what needs to 
be improved or changed. The information collected will guide decisions regarding 
changes which should be made in health facilities in order to improve the effectiveness 
of health workers and hence service delivery.  
 
We would like to ask you about more about your role in the facility, the facility 
environment, what helps you to do your job effectively and what things hinder you in 
performing your job. We will also be asking some questions related to your income.  
 
You have the right to refuse to participate in the study now or at any time during the 
interview. There are no penalties of any kind if you decide that you do not want to 
participate. You can also refuse to respond to specific questions if you choose. If you 
decide to participate, you will be asked to sign this form and it will be a record of your 
agreement to participate.  You will be given a copy of this form. 
 
The study will be carried out in eight health facilities of ASSP and the study will be 
conducted in Kasai Occidental province. In each facility we plan to carry out two 
interviews with nurses working there.   
Why is this study being done? 
 
The purpose of this research study is to understand the working environment of health 
workers in the DRC, and the experiences of health workers in delivering services. We 
also hope to understand what changes could be made to improve the ability of health 






What are the study procedures?  What will I be asked to do? 
 
If you agree to take part in this study, you will then be asked to participate in one interview 
which should last about an hour. Questions will be asked about the place where you work, 
and how you feel about working there. There will also be some questions relating to the 
income you receive in the facility. If you agree, the interview will be audio recorded for 
the study. We will conduct the interview in a private area of the facility today. After this 
interview, I may need to follow up to understand some of the points made during our talk 
and to ask some additional questions. We are hoping to interview a total of 16 people for 
this study.  
 
If you agree to have our talk audio recorded, neither your name nor any other information 
that can identify who you are and will be linked to the audio recordings or any written 
documents created from the recordings. Only the people involved in the study will be 
permitted to listen to the recordings. Immediately following your interview you will be 
given the opportunity to have the recordings erased. The recordings will be written up by 
members of the research team and erased once the written document is checked for 
accuracy. The written document may be used in whole or in part for oral presentations or 
written documents that result from this study. Neither your name nor any other 
information that can identify who you are will be used in presentations or in written 
documents that result from this study. 
 
What are the risks or inconveniences of the study?   
 
We believe there are no known risks associated with this research study; however, a 
possible inconvenience may be the time it takes to complete the study. You can refuse to 
answer any questions during the discussion. The initial discussion will take about an hour 
of your time. Any discussions carried out later will probably be shorter.   
 
We understand the possibility of problems in keeping the information we collect 
confidential, or private, and are taking measures to prevent that your name is linked to 
the information collected.  All the information obtained from you will be kept in a secure 
location and will be strictly used for the purpose of this study.  If you have any concerns 
regarding our study, please use the contact information below to express your concerns.  
 
What are the benefits of the study? 
 
You will not receive any direct benefit from taking part in the study. By talking to you, 
we will be able to understand changes that are needed to improve working conditions for 
health workers in order for them to be more effective.  
 
Will I receive payment for participation?   
 
You will not be paid to be in this study. Your participation in the study is for voluntary. 
You will not be provided with any reward or payment to participate in the study.  
 
Are there costs to participate? 
 
There are no costs to you to participate in this study. 
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How will my personal information be protected? 
 
The following procedures will be used to protect the confidentiality of your data.  The 
researchers will keep all study records locked in a secure location. Research files and 
documents will be marked with a special code. A list that includes the names of people who 
participated in the study and special codes for each name will be kept in a separate and secure 
location. All computer files that include information that can be used to identify your name 
will be protected by a password. Any computer containing these files will also have a special 
password to prevent use by people not participating in the study. Only the members of the 
research staff will have access to the passwords and any other information you provide. At 
the end of this study, the researchers may share the findings. Information will be presented 
in a summary format and you will not be identified in any printed documents or 
presentations. Any list of codes, audio recording, and other information described in this 
paragraph will be kept as explained in this paragraph until they are destroyed by the 
researchers five years after the study. Audio recordings will be written up by a member of 
the staff.  
 
You should also know that the ethics committees of Tulane University and the University 
of Kinshasa School of Public Health may inspect study records, but these reviews will only 
focus on the researchers and not on your responses or involvement. The IRB or ethics 
committee is a group of people who review research studies to protect the rights and well-
being of research participants. 
 
Can I stop being in the study and what are my rights? 
 
You do not have to be in this study if you do not want to. If you agree to be in the study, but 
later change your mind, you may drop out at any time. There are no penalties or 
consequences of any kind if you decide that you do not want to participate. You also do not 
have to answer any question that you do not want to answer. 
Who do I contact if I have questions about the study? 
 
Take as much time as you like before you make a decision to participate in this study. Feel 
free to ask me any questions you have about the study. If you have questions about this 
study that I cannot answer, or if you feel that you have been treated unfairly or have been 
hurt by joining the study, you may contact Rishma Maini who is in charge of the study, 
at Tel: 0817106670 or David Hotchkiss who is the co-investigator of the study, at +504 
988-3289. 
 
If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about your rights as a research subject 
or want to speak to someone who is not included in in the research, you can contact the 
Kinshasa School of Public Health Ethics Committee, Félicien Munday Mulop, Tel: 
0998419816 or Tulane University Human Research Protection Office (HRPO) Tel: +504 
988-2665; email at irbmain@tulane.edu. 
 
Consent to Audio:  
  
This study involves audio recording of your participation. Neither your name nor any 
other identifying information will be associated with the audio recordings or any 
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transcripts created from them.  Only the researchers will be permitted to listen to the 
recordings.  
Immediately following the interview, you will be given the opportunity to have the 
recordings erased.   
 
Please initial one of each pair of options.  
  
___ I consent to have my participation recorded.  
 
___ I do not consent to have my participation recorded   
  
___ I consent to have my recorded participation transcribed into written form.  
 
___ I do not consent to have my recorded participation transcribed.  
  
The recordings will be transcribed by the researcher and erased once the transcriptions 
are checked for accuracy.  Transcripts of your participation may be reproduced in whole 
or in part for use in presentations or written products that result from this study.  Neither 
your name nor any other identifying information such as your voice will be used in 
presentations or in written products resulting from the study.  
  
___ I consent to the use of the written transcription in presentations and written 
products resulting from the study provided that neither my name nor 
other identifying information will be associated with the transcript.  
  
___ I do not consent to the use of my written transcription in presentations or 
written products resulting from the study.  
  
The above permissions are in effect until August 2015.  On or before that date, the tapes 
will be destroyed.   
 
____________________________________________       _____________ 
Subject  Date 
____________________________________________      _____________ 
Legally Authorized Representative (if applicable)        Date 
 
____________________________________________      _____________ 














Documentation of Consent: 
I have read this form and decided that I will participate in the research project described 
above.  Its general purposes, the particulars of involvement and possible risks and 
inconveniences have been explained to my satisfaction.  I understand that I can withdraw 
at any time.  My signature also indicates that I have received a copy of this consent form. 
____________________________________________      _____________ 
Subject                                          Date 
____________________________________________      _____________ 
Legally Authorized Representative (if applicable)        Date 
____________________________________________      _____________ 






I am unable to read but this consent document has been read and explained to me by 
___________________ . I volunteer to participate in this research.  
 
____________________________________________      _____________ 
Subject                                       Date 
____________________________________________      _____________ 
Witness                    Date 
____________________________________________      _____________ 
Person Obtaining Consent                                  Date 
____________________________________________      _____________ 
























Appendix 5b: Topic Guide for in-depth interviews with nurses 
Note to interviewer on logistics: 
Conduct interview in a private place. Interviews should be tape-recorded subject to 
consent. 
 
Selecting interviews:  
Choose 8 nurses in facilities previously receiving salary supplements and 8 nurses in 
facilities where salary supplements were never operational. 
Respondents:   
Gather basic information about the respondents before the interview and assign a code 
to him/her. Only use the assigned code for the interviewee in the notes/transcript, 
together with notes about gender, age, etc. 
 








Key area of  
investigation 
Rationale Themes Example questions Explanatory notes 
Health facility 
environment 
Introductory questions to 
encourage nurses to 
discuss the health facility 
within which they work in 
and what their everyday 
job is like. This will give 
an idea of context.  Also 
explore reasons for doing 
their job, which may be 
linked to intrinsic 
motivation.  
 
Also start to explore 
nurse’s perceptions of the 
facility and challenges 
associated with their 
work. 
 History of working 
for the facility 
 
 Health facility 
environment 
 
 Perceptions of 
quality of health 
facility services 
 
 Barriers or 
facilitators in 
performing job in 
facility 
 
 Relationship with 
other staff 
1. What made you want to become 
a nurse? 
 
2. Can you tell me for how long you 
have worked in this facility? 
 
3. What services do you directly 
provide at the facility? 
 
4. Do you think that the clinic 
provides good services to the 
community? Can you give 
examples? 
 
5. What features of the services do 
you think are good and what 
bad? Can you give examples? 
 
6. How does this service compare 
with the services offered at other 
facilities? 
 
7. Do you think the facility has a 
good reputation with the 
community? (Please give reasons 
for your answer) 
 
8. What prevents you from doing 
your job effectively at this facility? 
Can you give examples? 
 
9. What would allow you to do your 
job more effectively? Can you 
give examples? 
 
Deliberately don’t start with 
challenges of doing the job. 
Want to understand the 
everyday context within 
which the nurse operates, 
and encourage them to talk 
in a more informal way.  
 
Also may discuss features of 
the environment (extrinsic 
factors) which may affect the 
“can do” component of 
motivation. 
 
When asking about 
challenges or reputation of 
the facility, may be 
worthwhile emphasising the 
confidentiality of the 
interview.  
297
10. How would you describe your 




To explore the 
commitment of the nurse 
to the organisation, and 
this should lead into 
discussion of whether the 
nurse’s goals are aligned 
with that of the 
organisation and 
perceptions of 
management of the 
facility. 
 Commitment to 
organisation 
 
 Factors which 
affect commitment 
to the organisation 
 
 Perception of 
management of 
the facility 
11. Do you feel that there is a strong 
commitment to delivering good 
health care at this facility?  
 
12. Do you think the commitment of 
health workers is different in 
different sectors (private, for-
profit, not-for-profit)?  Why? 
 
13. How likely is it that you will be 
working at this facility three years 
from now? Why or why not? If 
not, where do you think you will 
be working and why? What would 
encourage you to stay? 
 
14. What are your thoughts on the 
way the facility you work in being 
managed? 
 
15. If you could change anything 
about how the facility is 
managed, what would you 
change? 
Want to understand whether 
the nurse’s  goals are 
aligned with what they 
perceive to be the 
organisational goals (the “will 
do” component of motivation) 
 
Also want to understand the 
organisational environment 
within which the nurse is 
working (extrinsic factors). 
Incentives and 
income 
To understand the non-




To also explore the 
perception of the job itself 







16. How valued do you feel by your 
employer? Why or why not?  
 
17. What are some of the ways your 
employer shows that they value 
you as a professional? Can you 
give any examples? 
 
18. Does your facility or employer 
do/give you anything if you 
perform well at work? If yes, can 
you please explain? Does this 
Important to get a picture of 
the different incentives 
nurses are exposed to. Also, 
whether these incentives are 
perceived to change how the 
nurse works, and which ones 
are deemed to be important.  
 
These questions are likely to 
be more sensitive hence 
they are being raised later on 
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influence how you work? If so, in 
what way? 
 
19. What are your sources of 
income? 
 
20. How often are you paid from each 
source? 
 
21. Do you receive any allowances or 
other benefits e.g. 
accommodation etc. Can you 
please elaborate? 
 
22. Do you have to work elsewhere 
to supplement your income? If so, 
can you please give details? 
 
23. Do you feel you are well 
compensated for the work you 
do? Please give reasons for your 
answer. 
 
24. How do you feel currently about 
the way you are compensated by 
the government for the work you 
do? 
 
25. Do you think the government 
currently fulfils its responsibility to 
health workers? Please give 
reasons for your answer. 
 
26. What changes, if any, would you 
like to see in the future in terms of 
how the health system operates 
in the DRC? 
in the interview, once rapport 





outcomes – job 
satisfaction and 
behaviour 
To give some contextual 
understanding around 
how nurses behave in the 
workplace, and factors 
influencing job 
satisfaction. 




 Job satisfaction 
 
 
27. In many countries, communities 
complain about the quality of 
health services. For example, 
there are often complaints that 
health workers are not very 
motivated, that they do not spend 
as much time as they should 
doing their job, that they are 
competent at their job, and even 
sometimes that they are involved 
in illegal activities such as 
stealing drugs and material and 
charging too much for services. 
How do you feel that the situation 
is in the DRC? 
 
28. Do you think most health workers 
are satisfied with their job? Why 
do you think some health workers 
are unsatisfied in their job? 
 
29. What aspects of how the staff 
behave and do their work are 
good and what are bad? Can you 
give examples for each? 
 
30. What drives you to do your job? 
Can you give any concrete 
examples? 
Where the nurse may be 
struggling to talk about 
anything that they feel may 
incriminate them (e.g. 
charging informal payments), 
then you should use 
hypothetical situations – 
what would happen if etc.?  
 
Again, it may be worthwhile 
emphasising the 









Effect of removing 
primes 
 
To explore nurses 
perceptions of (1) the 
payment of primes, (2) 
how primes were 
removed, and (3) a 
description of any 
changes in behaviour 
following the removal of 
primes  




 Perceptions on 




31. What did you think about the 
payment of “primes” in the old 
Access to healthcare 
programme? Did you agree with it 
or disagree with it? Can you give 
reasons for your answer? 
 
32. Did you understand the reasons 
why the primes were removed? 
Need to understand the 
strengths and weaknesses 
around the process of 
removing primes so lessons 
can be learned and applied 
to other programmes. Also to 
gain an understanding of any 
negative or positive 
consequences as a result of 
removing primes.  
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What do you think these reasons 
were?  
 
33. Was it adequately explained to 
you that primes would be 
removed? Who explained that 
this would occur? 
 
34. How did you feel when the salary 
supplements were removed? Did 
you change your behaviour in any 
way? Did you see any change in 
behaviour in your colleagues? 
 
35. How have you coped with the 
removal of primes? Have you 
done anything to supplement 
your income since they have 
been removed? 
Finish by asking for advice from nurses (if not already covered) on what strategies nurses think would be likely to lead to improvements in nurse 




Thank you very much for your time, it’s been really interesting to hear about your 
experiences and views.  
I have asked so many questions, do you have any further questions? 
Again thank you. And let me just remind you that, as I said at the start, this interview 
will be confidential no one will know what you personally have said. 
302
Appendix 6a: Consent form key stakeholders (objective 3) 
 
Principal Investigator: Rishma Maini, MBChB 
Co-Investigator: David Hotchkiss, PhD 
Study Title: Health Worker Motivation in the DRC 
Sponsor: Interchurch Medical Assistance 
 
The following informed consent is required by Tulane University for any research study 
conducted by investigators at the University. This study has been approved by the 




You are invited to participate in a research study to understand more about the pilot 
intervention affecting human resources for health within the ASSP programme. No research 
activity is to be conducted until you have had an opportunity to review this consent form, 
ask any questions you may have, and sign this document if applicable. The main objective 
of this study is to understand whether the activities of the intervention are being 
implemented as planned, any strengths and weaknesses, as well as any ways to improve 
the intervention. The information collected will guide decisions regarding changes in 
intervention activities. 
 
We are asking you to participate in the study because we know that you are either involved 
or will be affected by the intervention. We would like to learn more about your views on 
the intervention preparations and activities, including any benefits and problems that have 
occurred thus far. We would like to ask you about how you are involved in the project, 
and how the project activities could be improved.   
 
You have the right to refuse to participate in the study now or at any time during the 
interview. There are no penalties of any kind if you decide that you do not want to 
participate. You can also refuse to respond to specific questions if you choose. If you 
decide to participate, you will be asked to sign this form and it will be a record of your 
agreement to participate.  You will be given a copy of this form. 
 
The study will be carried out mainly in Kinshasa with a total of 18 people who are known 
to be involved or affected by the intervention.   
Why is this study being done? 
 
We are working with a university in the United States called Tulane University. The 
research will be carried out to understand how the intervention itself, and to learn about 
ongoing intervention activities. We also hope to understand successes and failures 
associated with the intervention, as well as any outcomes that were not planned.   One 
component of the study is to talk to people who have directly influenced or been involved 
in the planning and/or implementation of the intervention.  We will also talk to those who 






What are the study procedures?  What will I be asked to do? 
 
If you agree to take part in the study, I will ask you to participate in one interview which 
should last about an hour. If you agree, the interview will be audio recorded for the study. 
After the first interview, I may need to follow up to understand some of the points made 
during our talk and to ask some additional questions. We are hoping to interview a total 
of 18 people for this study. 
 
If you agree to have our talk audio recorded, neither your name nor any other information 
that can identify who you are and will be linked to the audio recordings or any written 
documents created from the recordings. Only the people involved in the study will be 
permitted to listen to the recordings. Immediately following your interview you will be 
given the opportunity to have the recordings erased. The recordings will be written up by 
members of the research team and erased once the written document is checked for 
accuracy. The written document may be used in whole or in part for oral presentations or 
written documents that result from this study. Neither your name nor any other 
information that can identify who you are will be used in presentations or in written 
documents that result from this study. 
 
What are the risks or inconveniences of the study?   
 
There are no known risks in taking part in the study. You can refuse to answer any 
questions during the discussion. A possible problem may be the time it takes to complete 
the discussion.  The initial discussion will take about an hour of your time. Any 
discussions carried out later will probably be shorter.   
 
We understand the possibility of problems in keeping the information we collect 
confidential, or private, and are taking measures to prevent that your name is linked to 
the information collected.  All the information obtained from you will be kept in a secure 
location and will be strictly used for the purpose of this study.  If you have any concerns 
regarding our study, please use the contact information below to express your concerns.  
 
What are the benefits of the study? 
 
You will not receive any direct benefit from taking part in the study. By talking to you, 
we will be able to understand changes that are needed to improve working conditions for 
health workers in order for them to be more effective.  
 
Will I receive payment for participation?   
 
You will not be paid to be in this study. Your participation in the study is for voluntary. 
You will not be provided with any reward or payment to participate in the study.  
 
Are there costs to participate? 
 






How will my personal information be protected? 
 
The researchers will keep all study records locked in a secure location. Research files and 
documents will be marked with a special code. A list that includes the names of people who 
participated in the study and special codes for each name will be kept in a separate and secure 
location. All computer files that include information that can be used to identify your name 
will be protected by a password. Any computer containing these files will also have a special 
password to prevent use by people not participating in the study. Only the members of the 
research staff will have access to the passwords and any other information you provide. At 
the end of this study, the researchers may share the findings. Information will be presented 
in a summary format and you will not be identified in any printed documents or 
presentations. Any list of codes, audio recording, and other information described in this 
paragraph will be kept as explained in this paragraph until they are destroyed by the 
researchers five years after the study. Audio recordings will be written up by a member of 
the staff.  
 
You should also know that the ethics committees of Tulane University and the University 
of Kinshasa School of Public Health may inspect study records, but these reviews will only 
focus on the researchers and not on your responses or involvement. The IRB or ethics 
committee is a group of people who review research studies to protect the rights and well-
being of research participants. 
 
Can I stop being in the study and what are my rights? 
 
You do not have to be in this study if you do not want to. If you agree to be in the study, but 
later change your mind, you may drop out at any time. There are no penalties or 
consequences of any kind if you decide that you do not want to participate. 
Who do I contact if I have questions about the study? 
 
Take as much time as you like before you make a decision to participate in this study. Feel 
free to ask me any questions you have about the study. If you have questions about this 
study that I cannot answer, or if you feel that you have been treated unfairly or have been 
hurt by joining the study, you may contact Rishma Maini who is in charge of the study, 
at 0817106670 or David Hotchkiss who is the co-investigator of the study, at +504 988-
3289.  
 
If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about your rights as a research subject 
or want to speak to someone who is not included in in the research, you can contact the 
Kinshasa School of Public Health Ethics Committee, Félicien Munday Mulop, Tel: 
998419816 or Tulane University Human Research Protection Office (HRPO) Tel: +504 
988-2665; email at irbmain@tulane.edu. 
 
Consent to Audio:  
  
This study involves audio recording of your participation. Neither your name nor any 
other identifying information will be associated with the audio recordings or any 
transcripts created from them.  Only the researchers will be permitted to listen to the 
recordings. Immediately following the interview, you will be given the opportunity to 
have the recordings erased.   
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Please initial one of each pair of options.  
  
___ I consent to have my participation recorded.  
 
___ I do not consent to have my participation recorded   
  
___ I consent to have my recorded participation transcribed into written form.  
 
___ I do not consent to have my recorded participation transcribed.  
  
The recordings will be transcribed by the researcher and erased once the transcriptions 
are checked for accuracy.  Transcripts of your participation may be reproduced in whole 
or in part for use in presentations or written products that result from this study.  Neither 
your name nor any other identifying information such as your voice will be used in 
presentations or in written products resulting from the study.  
  
___ I consent to the use of the written transcription in presentations and written 
products resulting from the study provided that neither my name nor 
other identifying information will be associated with the transcript.   
 
___ I do not consent to the use of my written transcription in presentations or 
written products resulting from the study.  
 
 
The above permissions are in effect until August 2015.  On or before that date, the tapes 
will be destroyed.   
 
____________________________________________       _____________ 
Subject  Date 
____________________________________________      _____________ 
Legally Authorized Representative (if applicable)        Date 
____________________________________________      _____________ 
Person Obtaining Consent                                   Date 
 
 
Documentation of Consent: 
I have read this form and decided that I will participate in the research project 
described above.  Its general purposes, the particulars of involvement and possible risks 
and inconveniences have been explained to my satisfaction.  I understand that I can 
withdraw at any time.  My signature also indicates that I have received a copy of this 
consent form. 
____________________________________________      _____________ 
Subject                                          Date 
____________________________________________      _____________ 
Legally Authorized Representative (if applicable)        Date 
____________________________________________      _____________ 




I am unable to read but this consent document has been read and explained to me by 
___________________ . I volunteer to participate in this research.  
____________________________________________      _____________ 
Subject                                       Date 
____________________________________________      _____________ 
Witness                    Date 
____________________________________________      _____________ 
Person Obtaining Consent                                  Date 
____________________________________________      _____________ 











































Appendix 6b: Topic Guide for in-depth interviews with key 
stakeholders (objective 3) 
 
Stakeholders: DFID / Government Ministries / IntraHealth / IMA / World Bank 
Note to interviewer on logistics: 
Conduct interview in a private place. Interviews should be tape-recorded subject to 
consent. 
Respondents:   
Gather basic information about the respondents before the interview and assign a code 
to him/her. Only use the assigned code for the interviewee in the notes/transcript. 
 



















Key area of  
investigation 
Rationale Themes Example questions Explanatory notes 
Knowledge of the HR 
intervention 
Introductory questions to 
encourage stakeholders 
to reveal their 
interpretation and 
understanding of the HR 
intervention.  
 
Also start to explore the 
role of the stakeholder in 
the intervention and how 











made to the 
intervention 
 
 Perceptions of 
stakeholder’s 
role in the 
implementatio
n of the 
intervention 
1. Can you start off by telling me what 
you know about the HR intervention 
planned in ASSP? 
 
2. What problems do you think this is 
trying to address? 
 
3. What is/are the overall goal/goals of 
the intervention? 
 
4. What activities are planned in order 
to achieve these goals? 
 
5. How did the choice of these 
activities come about?  
 
6. How will these activities achieve the 
intended goal/vision, and through 
which mechanisms? 
 
7. Do you know of any changes which 
have been made to the intervention 
during the pilot? If so, what are 
they?  
 
8. What has been your role in the 
intervention to date? 
This will allow the interviewer to 
gauge the respondent’s 
knowledge and understanding as 




Theory of Change To explore the 
stakeholder’s 
understanding of theory 
of change, and how it 
applies to the 
intervention. Also to 
identify areas of 
risk/contention/gaps with 
 Understanding 





of how theory 
of change 
9. Are you familiar with Theories of 
Change? (Explain using a brief 
description if necessary). 
 
10. Below is a theory of change which 
has been devised together with 
relevant stakeholders. Starting with 
inputs, followed by outputs through 
The interviewer will use a visual 
theory of change map when 
discussing this element with 
stakeholders. 
 
The interviewer should think 
about how best to extract 
individual opinion as opposed to 
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respect to the 
intervention. 
 
applies to the 
intervention 
 
 Gaps in the 
intervention 
 



















to outcomes and impact, are there 
any gaps that you can identify 
based on your knowledge of the 
planned interventions? Is there 
anything in there which you do not 
agree with? Are there any activities 
missing which we would should be 
doing? 
 
11. Who will be involved in 
implementing these activities and in 
taking action to achieve the goal?  
 
12. How will each actor be involved? 
 
13. What are their roles?  
 
14. Why are they crucial for this 
intervention (probe: what resource 
they bring in, etc)) 
 
15. Which parts of the theory of change 
seem to carry the highest risk? In 
other words, what threats are there 
to the intervention not being 
executed as planned? 
 
16. Overall, do you agree with the 
approach being adopted? Please 
give reasons for your answer. 
the “party-line” response. They 
should also be cognisant and 
reflect on their position in relation 
to the interviewee (e.g. is the 
interviewee perceived as being a 
member of DFID etc.) and 
emphasise that they will not be 





Implementation of the 
intervention 
To better understand the 
current state of 














17. Are the activities being implemented 
as you had envisaged (execution)? 
If not, please elaborate. Has the 
expected population been reached 
(coverage), and have they received 
the intervention as intended (dose)?  
 
18. What has happened so far that you 
didn't expect?  
The interviewer should seek to 
probe for strengths and 
weaknesses of the intervention, 
as well as understand the roles 
played by stakeholders and how 
they may influence 
























19. Were the necessary inputs supplied 
by the project (technical input, 
equipment, managerial and training 
support)? 
 
20. Were there any particular 
opportunities the HR interventions 
could capitalise on? 
 
21. What (contextual) factors/who have 
been the important elements so far 
in enabling the HR interventions to 
happen?  
 
22. What (contextual) factors/who has 
impeded the HR interventions? 
 
23. How do you expect the health 
workers to react to these activities? 
Why do you expect that?  
The information will be used to 
refine the intervention if 
necessary. 
 
Next steps To explore where the 
intervention can be 
changed in order to 
enhance the chance of 
success 
 Changes 
needed to the 
intervention 
24. What do you think will be needed to 
insure that the HR activities 
succeed and have a sustained 
impact on health workers?  
 
25. Do you have any suggestions 
regarding ways to improve the HR 
intervention design and/or 
activities? 
Information will be used to inform 
ongoing implementation so that 







Thank you very much for your time, it’s been really interesting to hear about your 
experiences and views.  
I have asked so many questions, do you have any further questions? 
The next step is that I'm going to go away and put together a combined Theory 
of Change for the HR interventions, based on this interview and the other interviews I'm 
conducting with key stakeholders. I'd like to forward the final version to you to let you 
feedback on it, if that would be OK? 
Again thank you. And let me just remind you that, as I said at the start, this interview 
will be confidential no one will know what you personally have said. 
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Appendix 6c: Topic Guide for in-depth interviews with key 
stakeholders (2) 
 
Stakeholders: Health Workers/NGO implementing partners 
Note to interviewer on logistics: 
Conduct interview in a private place. 
Respondents:   
Gather basic information about the respondents before the interview and assign a code 
to him/her. Only use the assigned code for the interviewee in the notes/transcript. 
 











Key area of  
investigation 
Rationale Themes Example questions Explanatory notes 
Knowledge of the 
HR intervention 
Introductory questions to 
encourage respondents 
to reveal their awareness 











1. Can you start off by telling me
what you know about the HR
interventions planned in ASSP?
2. What do you think the HR
interventions are intending to
achieve?
3. What do you think is/are the
overall goal/goals of the
intervention?
4. Do you know about the activities
planned in order to achieve these
goals? If so, what are they?
5. To what extent have your views
been solicited on the HR
interventions planned within the
programme?
This will allow the 
interviewer to gauge the 
respondent’s knowledge 




To explore the 
respondent’s 
understanding of theory 
of change, and how it 
applies to the 
intervention. Also to 














6. Are you familiar with Theories of
Change? (Explain using
description if necessary).
7. Below is a theory of change that
has already been devised
together with relevant
stakeholders.
Starting with inputs, followed by
outputs through to outcomes and
impact, are there any gaps that
you can identify based on your
knowledge of the planned
interventions? Is there anything
The interviewer will use a 
visual theory of change map 
when discussing this 
element. 
For NGO implementing 
partners, the interviewer 
should think about how best 
to extract individual opinion 
as opposed to the “party-
line” response. They should 
also be cognisant and 
reflect on their position in 
relation to the interviewee 
(e.g. is the interviewee 
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in there which you do not agree 
with? Are there any activities 
missing which we would should 
be doing? 
 
8. Which parts of the intervention 
seem to carry the highest risk? In 
other words, what threats are 
there to the intervention not 
being executed as planned? 
 
9. Overall, do you agree with the 
approach being adopted? Please 
give reasons for your answer. 
perceived as being a 
member of DFID etc.) and 
emphasise that they will not 
be individually identified by 
their responses. 
 
For health workers, the 
interviewer may need to 
explain the theory of change 
in a lot of detail, as it will be 
unlikely they will have ever 
come across this before. 
The interviewer may also 
have to explain the 
intervention activities as it is 
possible that the health 




To better understand the 
current state of 
implementation and 
contextual factors 









 Participation in 
implementation 
 




10. Do you think the HR 
interventions are being 
implemented as planned? 
 
11. What positive things have you 
seen happen as a result of the 
intervention? 
 
12. What negative things have you 
seen as a result of the 
intervention? 
 
13. Do you feel sufficiently involved 
and consulted in the process? 
 
14. Do you know of anything which 
has helped the activities to 
occur? 
 
15. Do you know of anything that has 
prevented certain activities from 
taking place? 
As above, the health worker 
may not be aware of the 
status of implementation. 
However, the interviewer 
should try and probe for 
their opinion on risks 
associated with the 
intervention and whether 
there are any gaps in 
activities. 
315
Next steps To explore where the 
intervention can be 
changed in order to 
enhance the chance of 
success 
 Changes needed 
to the 
intervention 
16. What do you think will be needed 
to insure that the HR activities 
succeed and have a prolonged 
impact on health workers?  
 
17. Do you have any suggestions 
regarding ways to improve the 
HR intervention design and/or 
activities? 
Information will be used to 
inform ongoing 
implementation so that the 






Thank you very much for your time, it’s been really interesting to hear about your 
experiences and views.  
 
I have asked so many questions, do you have any further questions?  
 
The next step is that I'm going to go away and put together a combined Theory 
of Change for the HR interventions, based on this interview and the other interviews I'm 
conducting with key stakeholders. I'd like to forward the final version to you to let you 
feedback on it, if that would be OK? 
Again thank you. And let me just remind you that, as I said at the start, this interview 
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Introduction: The Health Sector in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo 
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a vast country rich in mineral resources, 
with the potential for significant economic growth. However, multiple political, social 
and economic crises over the years have led to the DRC being classified as a fragile state.   
 
Despite a peace deal in 2002 after the war and the formation of a transitional government 
in 2003, the DRC remains affected by conflict in the East.1 This conflict continues to 
displace government resources from other sectors, such as health. In 2014, public 
investment in health was only 3.6% of the national budget falling short of the Abuja 
commitment of 15%.2 As a result of limited government financing to the sector, health 
services rely heavily on a system of cost recovery through user fees, which may be 
prohibitive to the majority of the population who live in extreme poverty. The health 
system has also become dependent on financing from external partners. However, in 
general, the activities of donors and non-governmental organisations are not well 
harmonised and coordinated with each other, resulting in the fragmentation and 
heterogeneity of health services. In addition, various studies have confirmed problems in 
the supply chains for essential medications and vaccines, poor teaching standards in 
medical schools and universities, and a general lack of medical personnel due to 
inadequate workforce-planning.3  
 
As a consequence, health indicators in the DRC continue to be amongst the worst 
globally. According to the 2014 Demographic Health Survey, infant and child mortality 
rates were 58 and 104 per 1000 live births, respectively.4 The DRC also languishes at the 
bottom of the Human Development Index, which uses a measure of life expectancy in its 
calculation.5  
 
Health workers and their revenue in the DRC 
 
The World Health Organization recognises that health workers are one of the core 
building blocks of country health systems.6,7 The performance and benefits produced by 
the health system depend heavily on the knowledge, skills and motivation of its 
workforce.8 Health workers are also critically important to the functioning of a health 
system as they manage and coordinate other important elements, including technology 
and infrastructure. Neglecting the workforce could therefore result in the waste of these 
other resources as well as severely hamper the delivery of health services. 
 
Several challenges exist in relation to human resources for health in the DRC. One of 
these concerns the payment of health workers. Salaries for health workers were nominal 
following the economic crisis and conflicts during the 1990s. In order to increase wages, 
occupational risk allowances, or “primes de risque,” were introduced.9 These allowances 
are managed by the Ministry of Health while salaries are controlled by the Ministry of 
Public Sector Reform. This system of dual payment has led to much confusion among 
health workers around what they should receive from the government, and has important 
implications for health worker motivation and performance. Moreover, the revenues of 
health workers have evolved to be “complex”,10,11 with workers receiving compensation 
from several alternative sources, including: user fees, informal payments, per-diems and 
supplements from donors and other non-governmental partners. Many health workers 
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also supplement their income by engaging in private practice or non-clinical income-
generating activities. 
 
Importance of understanding health worker revenue 
 
The income received by health workers has been shown to influence their motivation and 
performance in the work place.12,13,14 Given the central role that health workers play with 
respect to health service delivery, a clear understanding of the amounts and mechanisms 
by which they are compensated is therefore important. Information on health worker 
revenues can be used to inform national discussions on health worker salary and health 
systems policy, and to coordinate the efforts of the government and other partners 
involved in compensating health workers. A provincial-level analysis will be particularly 
important in light of decentralisation reforms that transfer more autonomy to provinces.  
 
World Bank study in co-ordination with DFID study 
 
Between October and December 2014, the World Bank carried out a survey on the 
revenues of health workers in the provinces of Bandundu, Katanga, South Kivu and 
Equateur. The full results of this study are presented elsewhere.15 Prior to the 
implementation of the study, the World Bank was made aware of a DFID-funded study 
examining health worker revenue which had already been carried out by Tulane 
University School of Tropical Medicine and Public Health in collaboration with the 
Kinshasa School of Public Health between March and April 2014. Data had been 
collected in the provinces of Equateur, Kasai Occidental, Maniema, Province Orientale 
and Kasai Oriental. Following discussions between the consultants implementing the 
World Bank study and researchers affiliated with Tulane University, it was ensured that 
the areas sampled in Equateur for the World Bank study would not overlap with those 
included in the DFID study. In order to maximise the value of the findings from both 
studies, where possible, similar data would be collected by the World Bank study that 
could then be compared to data from the DFID study.      
 
Aim of the report 
 
This short report aims to provide a descriptive comparison of the revenues of health 
workers in eight provinces in the DRC, using data from the World Bank study and the 
DFID study. Although the scope and methodology of the two studies are different, 
presenting similar data derived from these studies together yields a much broader 
geographical coverage thereby offering a more comprehensive picture of health worker 













The objectives of this report are to describe provincial-level variation of: 
 
1. The proportion of health workers in health centres receiving the following types 
of revenue: salaries, primes de risque user fees, per diems, payments from 
partners, informal payments, and private practice.  
2. The average amount received by health workers in health centres for the following 
types of revenue: salaries, primes de risque, user fees, per diems, payments from 
partners, and informal payments.  
3. The proportion of health workers engaging in income-generating activities which 




This report concerns the revenues of personnel working in public sector primary care 
facilities. These included health centres or centres de santé (CS), and reference health 
centres or centres de santé reference (CSR).  
 




Data were collected through a quantitative, cross-sectional survey of a sample of health 
workers at the facility level. Facilities sampled included: health centres or centres de 
santé, reference health centres or centres de santé reference. Data were also collected from 
health zone teams, reference hospitals and some private health centres but the analysis of 
this data is presented elsewhere.16 
 
Survey tools  
 
The original survey consisted of two separate questionnaires: (i) an institutional 
questionnaire administered to one person only per facility/structure, and (ii) an individual 
questionnaire administered to the individual health workers present in the 
facility/structure on the day of the survey (see below for choice of respondents within 
facility). Data collection was carried out using electronic tablets and questionnaires on 
the Open Data Kit (ODK) Android application. Results included in the joint report draw 
exclusively from the individual questionnaires. The questionnaire focused on the socio-
demographic information of the respondents (sex, age, marital status, province of origin, 
etc.), their education and career within the health sector, including current post, title and 
status, as well as the details of the different components of their remunerations. Answers 
on all incomes were allowed in either US dollars or Francs Congolais (FC), while the 
recall period depended on the type of question asked, varying from “last amount received” 
(for salaries, primes de risque, primes de partenaires and user fees), to “last three months” 
(for per diems) to “last month” (for informal payments, private work and non-clinical 
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income generating activities). The electronic data collection permitted creating a series of 
“loops” for some questions which allowed a varying number of answers to be included, 
for example for per diems which are often received concurrently by health workers. 
Additionally, for remuneration components considered particularly sensitive, a technique 
called “unfolding brackets” was applied. The unfolding bracket technique is used in 
economic studies to reduce missing data in quantitative questions.17 If a respondent fails 
or refuses to answer a question, he/she is asked whether the quantity of interest lies above 
or below a pre-specified level. This question is then pushed further depending on the 
answer, asking the respondent if the true value lies below or above another value lying in 




Four provinces were purposefully selected: Bandundu, Katanga, South Kivu, and the 
southern part of Equateur. In Bandundu and South Kivu, 16 health zones were randomly 
sampled. Within these 16 health zones, 8 health zones were purposefully chosen based 
on criteria of logistic feasibility and security. In Equateur, a subset of accessible and safe 
zones,i which were not already sampled by the DFID study, was proposed by the World 
Bank’s Projet d'Appui à la Réhabilitation du Secteur de la Santé (PARSS) team in 
Mbandaka, and 8 health zones were randomly sampled within them. A drawback of these 
constraints is that in Equateur, all the selected zones have been receiving support from 
the PARSS, which limits the generalizability of the findings for Equateur. In Katanga, a 
subset of health zones distant of less than 400 km from Lubumbashi was used as a 
sampling frame, and 8 health zones were randomly sampled within them. The sampling 
approach adopted for zone level sampling was a probability proportional to size (PPS), 
where the size of the health zone was defined by the number of health facilities in the 
zone. Within each sampled health zone, 10 health areas were randomly selected, and the 
‘official’ CS or CSR of the health area was included in the survey.  
 
The selection of individual health workers to interview was carried out as follows. Within 
each CS or CSR with less than 12 qualified staff, all health workers present on the day of 
the survey (only level A3ii and above, if available) were to be interviewed. For facilities 
with more than 12 qualified staff, a sample of 3 doctors, 3 nurses A0/A1/L2, 2 nurses A2, 
2 nurses A1 and 2 administrators were selected. If sufficient staff in the higher cadres was 
not available, the surveyor could substitute them with health workers in the immediately 
lower cadre, until the 12 health workers sampling frame was filled. Therefore, a 
maximum of 12 health workers was to be interviewed in each facility. This selection 
process was designed to allow each health facility to be surveyed in one workday. 
Data collection 
 
Data collection was carried out by the Kinshasa School of Public Health between October 
20 and November 14, 2014 in the four provinces, by four teams of ten surveyors and one 
supervisor. Before the interviews, the research was explained to the health workers who 
i An Ebola Virus Disease epidemic was ongoing in the ZS of Boende (Equateur) at the time of sampling 
and data collection. 
ii A0/L2 level is the most senior level of nurse, followed by A1, then A2, and finally A3. A0/L2 and A1 
nurses have attained Post-secondary education while A2 and A3 nurses have attained secondary level 
education. 
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were given an information sheet. Informed consent was signed electronically on the 
tablets.  
While 320 CS or CSR were to be surveyed, 288 facilities were included (90%) in total. 
Most of the facilities not surveyed were excluded for security reasons (in Katanga and 
South Kivu). Others were excluded based on unavailability of health workers during the 
day planned for the survey.  
The uploaded data was extracted through ODK Briefcase and exported in .csv format. 
Data was then analysed with the statistical software R. All monetary values were 
standardized to US dollars. Outliers that seemed implausible or with an order of 






The DFID study on health worker revenues was nested within a larger baseline evaluation 
of DFID’s “appui globale” programme ASSP (Accès aux Soins de Santé Primaires) which 
is implemented by IMA World Health. ASSP is working in 56 health zones in Equateur, 
Orientale, Kasai Occidental, Maniema, and South Kivu provinces and its interventions 
have been designed to strengthen the government’s priority pillars as outlined in the 
National Health Development Plan for the period 2011-2015. Data were collected through 
a quantitative, cross-sectional survey of a sample of health workers at facility level. 
Facilities sampled included CS and CSR. Although the ASSP project also supports 




The full evaluation of ASSP involves baseline and end-line survey data collection from 
households, health facilities and health workers in areas covered by the ASSP programme 
as well as areas which are not covered by the programme (“control” areas). The results 
included in this report refer only to data collected on health workers.  
 
A health worker questionnaire was administered to individual health workers present in 
either the CS or CSR sampled on the day of the survey. The survey was adapted from the 
Health Worker Incentive Survey19 and included questions on demographic variables (sex, 
cadre, qualifications, marital status etc.), and sources and amounts of different types of 
health worker revenue. Answers on all incomes were in FC, while the recall period 
depended on the type of question asked, varying from “last month received” for all 
incomes with the exception of per diems which was asked for the “last year”. Health 
worker income was not the only focus of the questionnaire; items inquiring about levels 
of supervision, services rendered, health worker motivation and satisfaction were also 
included but the results are not presented in this report. The questionnaire had been piloted 
in two health facilities in Kinshasa and one facility in Bas Congo prior to implementation 







The sampling of health facilities was determined by the village sampling method for the 
household survey of the baseline evaluation. This method employed PPS and yielded a 
total sample of 210 villages. The official CS or CSR designated for serving the 
administrative health area in which the village was located was then selected. Hospitals 
and private facilities were not included in the sample. All workers providing clinical 
services and on duty in these sampled health centres during the baseline evaluation were 
interviewed. For more detail on the sampling strategy of the impact evaluation of ASSP, 
please refer to the ASSP baseline protocol.20   
Data Collection 
 
The Kinshasa School of Public Health (KSPH) in collaboration with Tulane University 
were contracted to manage the fieldwork for this study. These institutions recruited and 
trained personnel to: pre-test the survey instruments, supervise the fieldwork, and oversee 
data entry. Data collection was carried out between April and May 2014 by data collectors 
hired from each of the provinces to ensure appropriate language skills and familiarity with 
the cultural context.  
 
Participation of health workers in the interview was voluntary. To minimise the potential 
for social desirability bias, the interviewer explained the purpose, confidentiality and 
anonymity of the study to each provider before seeking consent to begin the interview.  
 
Data collected from the surveys were then double entered into the computer database 
CSPro for verification and checked for any erroneous values. All data were imported into 
and analysed in STATA v. 13.0. Outliers which seemed implausible or with an order of 





















Health zones sampled for World Bank and DFID study 
 
The map in Figure 1 illustrates the coverage of the two studies by health zone.  




Where the two studies sampled the province of Equateur, the World Bank only sampled 
facilities in the South while the DFID study had sampled facilities in the North. It should 
be noted that although the DFID study sampled more health zones, the World Bank study 
sampled more health areas and therefore more facilities within each health zone compared 










Results of World Bank and DFID studies 
Facilities selected by World Bank and DFID studies 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the number of facilities sampled in each study by province and urban-
rural status. Although 210 facilities were sampled by the DFID study, three of these 
facilities were excluded from the analysis as they were not health centres supported by 
the state and so did not meet the study inclusion criteria. The uneven number of facilities 
sampled in provinces of the DFID study were due to the fact that facility survey was 
designed to be linked to a population-based household survey in the same study areas – 
as part of a larger impact evaluation of the ASSP programme.  
The World Bank study included 288 facilities. However, 22 facilities were excluded from 
the analysis presented here as they were private facilities. Many of the private facilities 
which were excluded were in Katanga province. Therefore, in total, 266 state-approved 
facilities were in the World Bank sample. As shown in Figure 2, the World Bank study 
sampled overall proportionately more in urban areas compared to the DFID study (21% 
versus 11% respectively).  
In addition, the World Bank sampled proportionately more CSR facilities compared to 
the DFID study. Twenty-three percent of facilities sampled by the World Bank were CSR 
compared to only 15% in the DFID study. The number of CS and CSR sampled are given 
in Table 1.  





Characteristics of staff interviewed in health facilities 
 
Table 1 and Figure 3 give information on the number of workers interviewed and the 
proportion of workers identified in each cadre for each province. In total, the World Bank 










































nine respondents were excluded from the analysis as they were working in facilities that 
did not meet the DFID inclusion criteria, leaving data from 476 workers for the analysis. 
It can be seen from both Table 1 and Figure 3 that nurses were the most common cadre 
interviewed in health facilities. Both studies identified very small numbers of personnel 
for cadres other than nurses in comparison to the number of facilities sampled. On account 
of the small number of workers in cadres other than nurses, the results in the report will 
focus predominantly on interpreting results for nurses and total workers. The small 
numbers of workers in other cadres limit the generalizability of the findings. 
In general, a higher proportion of laboratory workers were identified in the World Bank 
study provinces compared to the DFID study provinces, however, the number of 
laboratory workers in facilities was still very low. In Kasai Oriental, no laboratory 
workers were identified, however, the number of facilities sampled from this area was 
less on account of the sampling strategy. The category “other” included those positions 
which did not fit into the other cadres specified in the table and were unqualified 
personnel. In the DFID study they included receptionists, traditional birth attendants and 
non-qualified personnel conducting clinical activities e.g. nurse assistants or auxiliary 
staff. Doctors, pharmacy workers and administrators are officially designated to work in 
hospitals rather than health centres yet some workers in these cadres were still identified 
by both studies.21 
 
The average number of workers per facility was only two in the provinces of North 
Equateur, Kasai Occidental, Kasai Oriental and Province Orientale. However, in 
Maniema, Katanga and Bandundu, the health facilities appeared to be better staffed with 
an average of six personnel per facility. 
 
Table 1: Number of health workers interviewed by cadre, province, and facility  
















Administrator 9 4 7 12 0 0 0 3 0 
Nurse 314 162 157 198 93 127 24 115 52 
Lab worker 19 8 21 26 0 2 0 5 2 
Doctor 6 5 16 3 0 0 0 4 0 
Pharmacy 
worker 
5 10 14 19 0 1 0 0 1 
Other 88 11 28 39 11 10 5 9 12 
          
Total number 
of workers 
441 200 243 297 104 140 29 136 67 
Number of CS 51 63 24 68 88 114 29 96 54 
Number of 
CSR 















Figure 4 below indicates the proportion of female workers by province for the two studies. 
Male workers outnumbered female workers in every province. North Equateur had the 
lowest proportion of female workers at only 17%. However, the gender distribution of 
workers in Katanga was almost equal, with 48% of health workers being female.  




Salaries received by health workers 
 
Table 2 illustrates the proportion of workers in each cadre and province receiving salaries. 
The proportions in the cells have been displayed as a heatmap in order to facilitate 
comprehension of the data. In general, there was a lot of variation between the provinces. 

























































For instance, 40% of nurses reported receiving salaries in Kasai Occidental compared 
with only 7% in South Kivu. 
 
Table 2: Proportion of workers receiving state salaries  
 
NA: Not applicable as no health workers in those categories were identified 
 
0%  50%  100% 
 
Figure 5 indicates the overall proportion of workers for each province receiving a salary. 
Again, provincial variation was high with workers less likely to receive salaries if they 
were in South Kivu (5%) compared to Kasai Occidental (39%).  
 
Figure 5: Overall proportion of workers interviewed receiving salary 
 
Table 3 illustrates the averageiii amount of salary earned by each cadre each month in 
$US.iv In general, workers in Katanga were higher paid compared to workers in any of 
iii World Bank supplied data as averages (raw data from the World Bank study was not available to the 
author). 

































the other provinces. Nurses earned $34 on average in Province Orientale to $173 in 
Katanga. There was a lot of variation in the average payment of other specified cadres.  
Table 3: Average amount of monthly salary earned by workers (amounts in 
$US) 


















NA NA 93.17 89.60 NA NA NA NA NA 
Nurse 91.99 75.27 172.81 76.21 63.41 45.0
2 
78.01 92.42 34.04 
Lab 
worker 
71.84 NA 131.42 73.67 NA 65.0
0 
NA NA 232.39 
Doctor 75.84 NA 311.92 NA NA NA NA 59.59 NA 
Pharmac
y worker 
NA 74.27 235.03 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Other 73.76 41.53 127.57 NA 26.78 32.2
3 
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NA: Not applicable as no workers in those cadres identified as receiving salaries or no workers identified 
in those cadres 
Primes de risque received by health workers 
Table 4 illustrates the proportion of workers by cadre and province receiving a prime de 
risque. Again, there was a lot of variation within studies and between the studies for each 
cadre. For instance, 29% of nurses received a prime de risque in Kasai Oriental compared 
with 71% of workers interviewed in Province Orientale. In all other provinces, the 
proportion of nurses receiving a prime de risque varied between 32% and 61%. 
Table 4: Proportion of workers receiving a prime de risque 
NA: Not applicable as no health workers in those categories were identified 
0%  50%  100% 
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Figure 6: Proportion of workers receiving salaries or a prime de risque 
In general, as illustrated in Figure 6, primes de risque were either as often or more often 
received than salaries, the exception being in provinces Kasai Occidental and Kasai 
Oriental. 
Table 5 below illustrates the average amount of prime de risque earned by each cadre 
each month in $US. Nurses could earn an average of $13 in Katanga and $72 in North 
Equateur. Doctors in Maniema could earn $546 on average but were earning only $98 on 
average in Katanga, although these figures are based on a small number of doctors in each 
province. 
Table 5: Average amount of monthly prime de risque earned by workers 
(amounts in $US) 

















NA 43.07 21.67 13.83 NA NA NA 10.29 NA 
Nurse 15.77 19.54 13.63 14.78 71.88 46.20 30.45 15.87 18.39 
Lab worker 11.22 21.67 20.21 17.58 NA NA NA 14.98 22.86 
Doctor NA NA 97.51 NA NA NA NA 546.05 NA 
Pharmacy 
worker 
NA 20.26 12.80 12.63 NA NA NA NA NA 




441 200 243 297 104 140 29 136 67 
NA: Not applicable as no workers in those cadres identified as receiving salaries or no workers identified 








































Prime de risque Salary
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User fees or “prime locale” received by health workers 
 
Overall, the proportion of workers receiving revenue from user fees was high, as can be 
seen in Figure 7. This indicated that most workers received their income from the facility.  
 
Figure 7: Proportion of workers receiving user fees 
 
 
Table 6 indicates the proportions of workers receiving user fees for each worker category. 
In Maniema, most cadres profited from user fees. In South Kivu and Bandundu, over 90% 
of nurses received income from user fees.  
 
Table 6: Proportion of workers receiving income from user fees by worker 
cadre 
 
NA: Not applicable as no health workers in those categories were identified 
 
 
0%  50%  100% 
 
Table 7 illustrates the income earned by workers from user fees in the past month. There 
was a quite a lot of variation observed between cadres; for example, nurses in Maniema 
made on average $15 from user fees a month while nurses in North Equateur made $190. 
This result was driven by some nurses receiving a very high income from user fees in this 
province. Doctors appeared to make the most; in South Kivu they made on average $213 

































Table 7: Monthly income from user fees earned by workers (amounts in $US) 

















66.26 52.00 42.57 124.9
2 
NA NA NA 23.11 NA 
Nurse 21.21 19.14 47.87 68.89 190.55 76.68 46.88 15.04 19.75 
Lab worker 29.41 24.38 39.72 63.17 NA 91.01 NA 18.20 264.36 
Doctor 140.44 148.81 68.47 213.3
3 
NA NA NA 120.53 NA 
Pharmacy 
worker 
31.53 12.93 26.68 50.49 NA NA NA NA 5.42 
Other 11.32 8.44 111.52 39.59 90.65 29.02 60.67 5.92 30.34 
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NA: Not applicable as no workers in those cadres identified as receiving salaries or no workers identified 
in those cadres 
 
Income from per diems 
 
Workers in both studies were asked whether they received per diems. However, the recall 
periods for the two studies were different; the World Bank asked whether workers had 
received per diems in the past three months while the DFID study asked whether workers 
had received per diems in the past year. Amounts were then standardized by month. For 
the DFID study, it can be seen that nurses, doctors, lab workers and pharmacy workers 
were more likely to receive per diems compared to those in the “other” category. For the 
World Bank study, there was a lot of variation between provinces for the “other” category; 
21% received per diems in Katanga while 90% received per diems in Bandundu. 
 
Table 8: Proportion of workers receiving per diems by worker cadre 
 
NA: Not applicable as no health workers in those categories were identified 
 
0%  50%  100% 
 
In general, the average amount received per month in per diems was not very high; the 
maximum amount earned on average was almost $33 per month. Where doctors were 
identified in the facilities as receiving per diems, they usually earned the most compared 
to other cadres. 
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Table 9: Monthly income from per diems earned by workers (amounts in $US) 

















5.00 NA 11.53 3.13 NA NA NA NA NA 
Nurse 7.40 7.30 9.11 10.2
2 
17.04 5.45 4.03 5.43 4.02 
Lab 
worker 
3.91 32.99 13.73 4.15 NA NA NA NA 2.44 
Doctor 18.78 28.33 13.42 16.6
7 
NA NA NA 15.17 NA 
Pharmacy 
worker 
6.29 3.46 4.93 6.79 NA NA NA NA NA 
Other 4.71 4.24 14.21 5.73 2.56 3.16 NA NA 1.22 
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NA: Not applicable as no workers in those cadres identified as receiving salaries or no workers identified 
in those cadres 
 
Income from informal payments 
 
In both studies, workers were asked whether they received informal payments or 
“cadeaux” (gifts) from patients which were not part of the user fee. However, given the 
sensitivity of this question, the World Bank used a method called “unfolding brackets” to 
reduce non-response; this method was not employed by the DFID study. The higher 
proportion of health workers admitting informal payments and higher amounts declared 
found in the World Bank study are likely to be due to the different methods of questioning 
used. The results show that only 8% of nurses in North Equateur reported receiving 
informal payments compared to 76% of nurses in Bandundu. Figure 8 shows that, with 
the exception of Bandundu, less than 50% of workers overall in all other sampled 
provinces reported receiving any informal payments. There was also a lot of provincial-
level variation in the proportion of workers reporting receiving this revenue. 
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Table 10: Proportion of workers receiving informal payments in last month by 
worker cadre 
 
NA: Not applicable as no health workers in those categories were identified 
 
0%  50%  100% 
 
Figure 8: Proportion of workers receiving informal payments 
 
 
Workers admitting to informal payments in general received low amounts. However, 
doctors again seemed to receive the highest amounts of informal payments, with some 









































Table 11: Monthly income from informal payments earned by workers 
(amounts in $US) 

















0.13 48.75 12.27 2.41 NA NA NA 24.38 NA 
Nurse 9.60 8.04 17.60 5.33 16.87 11.85 3.03 7.60 5.02 
Lab worker 3.99 7.40 8.89 6.28 NA NA NA NA 0.98 
Doctor 19.11 188.52 252.71 7.71 NA NA NA 54.17 NA 
Pharmacy 
worker 
7.62 27.36 14.63 2.35 NA NA NA NA 1.08 
Other 11.35 NA 7.40 5.23 27.30 7.04 13.54 NA 4.33 
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NA: Not applicable as no workers in those cadres identified as receiving salaries or no workers identified 
in those cadres 
 
Income from private practice 
 
Private practice was conducted by a minority of workers in all provinces. In Katanga, just 
over one fourth of workers reported working privately while between 0 and 4% worked 
privately in Kasai Oriental, Province Orientale, North Equateur, South Kivu and 
Bandundu. Amounts of revenue received are not presented here given the very small 
numbers receiving income from this source.   
 
Figure 9: Proportion of workers in each province reporting private medical practice 
 
 
Table 12 also indicates the prevalence of private practice across cadres for the two studies. 
It indicates that private clinical work was not conducted by all cadres in each province, 
with the exception of in Katanga. Particularly in the DFID study, private practice was 
reported very rarely and not at all in Kasai Orientale. The large proportion for lab workers 
in Maniema and Province Orientale, however, should be interpreted with caution as very 
































Table 12: Proportion of workers engaging in private work by worker cadre 
 
NA: Not applicable as no health workers in those categories were identified 
 
0%  50%  100% 
 
The pie charts in Figure 10 below compare the location of private practice between the 
two studies. The results have been aggregated across the two studies on account of the 
small number reporting private practice. It can be seen that for both studies, those workers 
engaging in private practice mainly delivered this in their own home, the patient’s home 
or a private clinic.  
Figure 10: Location of private practice in the World Bank and DFID study (% of all 




Income from performance primes or "primes des partenaires” 
 
Overall, as can be seen in Figure 11, Maniema had the highest proportion of workers 
overall receiving performance payments at 56%. This was closely followed by South 
Kivu and South Equateur (both 55%). The lowest proportions of workers receiving 




























Figure 11: Proportion of workers in each province receiving a performance prime 
Table 13: Proportion of workers receiving payments from partners by worker 
cadre 
NA: Not applicable as no health workers in those categories were identified 
0%  50%  100% 
When looking at the amounts received by workers from partners, doctors seemed to 
consistently be paid more within each province compared to other cadres. In addition, the 
amounts gained on average could be much higher on average than either a salary or a 

































Table 14: Monthly income from performance payments earned by workers 
(amounts in $US) 

















7.71 6.10 97.51 12.8
8 
NA NA NA 9.21 NA 
Nurse 10.38 24.07 67.75 33.2
3 
67.22 55.91 84.30 18.86 25.42 
Lab worker 6.81 11.91 26.82 21.1
6 
NA NA NA 17.33 NA 
Doctor NA 46.45 360.02 20.4
2 
NA NA NA 99.36 NA 
Pharmacy 
worker 
5.00 7.95 26.50 17.8
9 
NA 5.42 NA NA NA 
Other 8.79 30.10 363.06 35.5
5 
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NA: Not applicable as no workers in those cadres identified as receiving salaries or no workers identified 
in those cadres 
Supplemental income gained by health workers from non-health activities 
Types of income-generating activities practiced were fairly similar across the two studies. 
According to the pie charts below in Figure 12, the majority of workers gained 
supplemental income from keeping livestock, hunting or agricultural activities. The 
second most common source of income identified by both studies was income derived 
from trade or commerce. Teaching or renting of property was much less practiced. In the 
World Bank study, a small number of workers chose not to report how they gained any 
extra income outside the health facility.  
Figure 12: Sources of supplemental income for workers in the DFID and World Bank 
study (% of workers conducting non-clinical activities) 
Table 15 illustrates the proportion of workers engaging in any supplemental activity by 
cadre in each of the sampled provinces. There does not appear to be any discernible 



























Table 15: Proportion of workers engaging in supplemental income activities by 
worker cadre 
 
NA: Not applicable as no health workers in those categories were identified 
 
0%  50%  100% 
 
It can be seen from Table 16 that a substantial amount of revenue can be derived from 
supplemental activities. Revenue was particularly high amongst doctors and nurses in 
Katanga, and doctors in South Equateur.  
 
Table 16: Monthly income from supplemental activities (amounts in $US) 

















76.92 NA 65.01 198.1
1 
NA NA NA 18.06 NA 
Nurse 52.23 61.87 200.73 76.55 46.13 37.50 14.36 21.00 128.81 
Lab worker 89.88 48.75 120.70 45.12 NA NA NA 9.75 13.84 
Doctor NA 379.20 333.87 131.5
9 
NA NA NA NA NA 
Pharmacy 
worker 
31.50 105.39 83.99 76.91 NA NA NA NA 4.88 
Other 47.97 29.79 147.95 66.89 3.15 9.75 165.50 45.38 34.76 
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NA: Not applicable as no workers in those cadres identified as receiving salaries or no workers identified 
in those cadres 
 
Figure 13 illustrates the total income of each health worker by cadre and aggregated 
across both the DFID study and the World Bank study. Table 17 also indicates the 
proportion of each income within the total revenue.  Median values as opposed to mean 
values have been used to calculate the proportions in Table 17 and Figure 13. 
 
It can be seen from Figure 13 that doctors clearly earn more than any other health worker 
cadre in health centres. Doctor’s salaries seem to be several times higher than the salaries 
received by other cadres. Table 17 also indicates that most workers across all cadres in 
both the DFID and World Bank study gained a substantial portion of their income from 
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supplemental non-health activities. User fees appeared to make up the majority of income 
for most cadres (with the exception of doctors) in the World Bank study.  
Figure 13: Annual median amounts for components of income for cadres in DFID and 

























Median income USD $
DFID study
Salary Prime de risque Prime de partenaire User fees
Per diems Informal payments Private practice Supplemental income







Median Income USD $
World Bank study
Salary Prime de risque Prime de partenaire User fees
Per Diems Informal payments Private practice Supplemental income
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Table 17: Proportion of each income in contribution to total income by cadre 
 
Main source of income in bold 
 
 
Government: includes salary and prime de risque 
Partners: includes per diems and primes des partenaires 
User fees: income from user fees 
Exterior: includes private practice and supplemental income activities 





Although there has been anecdotal evidence on the variation of health worker incomes in 
the DRC, this report is one of the first to attempt to quantify the extent of this variation. 
Both studies found that incomes of health workers are made up of a variety of sources 
and revenues. Indeed, remunerations from governmental sources, such as salary and 
prime de risque, are received by a minority of health workers and often do not constitute 
a substantial source of their overall income. Additionally, revenues from external 
partners, such as per diems and primes des partenaires can be a significant source of 
income for a number of health workers, although there is much variability between 
provinces and between individual workers. Overall, incomes such as user fees from 
patients and activities outside of the health sector emerge as an important source of 
revenue across cadres and provinces. This highlights the importance of reflecting not only 
on the formal and relatively well-known sources of incomes, but also on all other 
components of what is termed the ‘complex’ remuneration of health workers.22 Further 
analytical work to examine the causes at individual, facility and provincial level of the 
differences between health workers, both in terms of overall income and for each 
component, is necessary to better understand their incentives, motivation and 
performance. For some reflections on this, see the full reports for the DFID and World 
Bank studies.23,24  
 
  DFID study 
Worker Cadre Government Partners User fees Exterior Informal 
payments 
Administrator 11% 10% 23% 29% 26% 
Nurse 33% 11% 10% 45% 2% 
Lab worker 34% 8% 10% 48% 1% 
Doctor 70% 9% 14% 1% 6% 
Pharmacy worker 0% 32% 32% 29% 6% 
Other 30% 9% 8% 58% 5% 
      
 World Bank study 
 Government Partners User fees Exterior Informal 
payments 
Administrator 11% 7% 49% 30% 3% 
Nurse 17% 17% 32% 26% 8% 
Lab worker 16% 14% 38% 27% 5% 
Doctor 49% 9% 19% 20% 3% 
Pharmacy worker 20% 12% 35% 31% 3% 
Other 13% 13% 33% 34% 8% 
350
The most recent standards issued by the DRC Ministry of Health specify that health 
centres should be staffed by at least four nurses, a lab technician, a receptionist and a 
maintenance worker.25 Given the number of facilities sampled, the results indicate very 
few laboratory workers were interviewed; this may be because they were not present the 
day of the survey or that there is a dearth of laboratory workers in health centres for both 
studies. The World Bank study did also sample more CSR than the DFID study. These 
higher level facilities would be expected to have more staff than a CS, which may partly 
account for the differences in the number of personnel interviewed in each study. 
However, the majority of staff interviewed in CS or CSR were nurses which is consistent 
with Ministry of Health standards. It is interesting to note that cadres that are not specified 
to work in CS or CSR were also detected in these facilities; this finding suggests that 
there is poor management and deployment of the current workforce. In addition, a large 
number of workers in both studies belonged to the “other” category which tended to be 
composed of non-qualified personnel, suggesting a fair proportion of the primary 
healthcare workforce may lack the necessary skills to deliver quality care. There also 
appears to be some provincial variation in the staffing of facilities; there tended to be 
more workers present on the day of the survey in Katanga and Bandundu compared to 
any of the other provinces sampled. Nonetheless, the overall low number of workers per 
facility seems to indicate that facilities are not overstaffed, somewhat contrary to some 
anecdotal reports. This may be because the majority of facilities sampled were in rural 
areas, and that the overstaffing may be more of an issue in urban areas.  
The higher frequency of male workers compared to female workers in all provinces is not 
surprising and may reflect the on-going disparity in access to education; according to the 
2010 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, the gender parity index for secondary school is 
0.81, indicating that less girls than boys attend secondary school.26 As a result, females 
are less likely to become health workers as it requires them to reach attain a certain level 
of education.  
Overall, the proportion of workers receiving salaries was low across all provinces. This 
could be explained by several factors. Firstly, many workers qualifying after 2006 would 
not have been registered onto the payroll as this was the last time a full census of health 
workers was conducted to update the payroll.27 Secondly, the process for being recruited 
or “affecté” for a health post by the Ministry of Public Reform in Kinshasa is long and 
bureaucratic lasting several months, and in some cases, several years. Consequently, 
many qualified workers are recruited locally by the province rather than in Kinshasa in 
order to bypass this lengthy process. However, workers recruited directly by the province 
will not be added to the payroll to receive a salary. In addition, salaries continue to be 
disbursed to many workers who are now of retirement age. These workers are not being 
removed from the payroll as there is currently no pension system in existence. Within the 
already constrained health budget it therefore becomes difficult to pay for any new 
employees or “nouvelles unités”.  
More workers appeared to receive a prime de risque compared to a salary. Although these 
are both government payments, they are not overseen by the same Ministry; salaries are 
controlled by the Ministry of Public Reform which holds the payroll while the prime de 
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risque is issued using the declarative list or “liste déclarative” controlled by the Ministry 
of Health. These lists are not identical, and the different budgetary rules and the complex, 
political dynamics behind those lists may explain the differences observed between the 
proportions receiving salaries and primes in each province. In addition, the “liste 
déclarative” is more regularly updated that the payroll which may account for the higher 
proportion of workers receiving primes de risque. 
 
In general, the amount of money gained from a salary seemed to be more than that gained 
from the prime de risque, with one or two exceptions. However, across all provinces the 
average amount received for either salaries or primes de risque was highly variable. This 
may have been influenced by the grade and experience of the respondent in each cadre; 
in general, A0 nurses should earn more than A3 nurses, as they are more highly qualified. 
In addition, although all workers interviewed receive their salary payment directly from 
the bank, they receive their prime de risque in cash from the health zone office. This 
creates more opportunities for diversion of payments thus altering the amount eventually 
received by the health worker.  
 
In some cases, the prime de risque was lower than the salary while in other cases it was 
higher than the salary. However, this is not altogether surprising as according to the 
official pay-scale or “barème” (see annexe 1), the prime de risque is higher than the salary 
for doctors, surgeons and dentists, but it is lower than the salary for other health workers. 
Most workers received some sort of income from user fees. Usually, once some of the 
monthly revenue from user fees has been allocated towards paying for the running costs 
of the facility, a decision is made by the head of facility locally on the “prime locale” to 
be apportioned to each worker. In most cases, a small portion of the user fee revenue is 
also returned to the health zone office. The absolute amount received by each worker is 
expected to be variable as it is linked to the total number of patients seen by the facility 
each month.  
 
It would also be expected that the money received by workers from per diems is highly 
variable as it is linked to programmatic activities undertaken which are often sporadic and 
without a regular schedule, e.g. workshops or vaccination campaigns. The amounts 
received per month are also likely to be small because activities linked to per diems are 
unlikely to occur every month but rather a few times per year. The results here indicate 
that those in more high profile jobs, e.g. doctors, were more likely to receive per diems. 
This concurs with evidence from some recent interviews with health workers who felt 
that more senior staff took advantage of such opportunities rather than allowing more 
junior staff to participate.v 
 
In terms of performance payments or partner payments, the varying results can be 
explained by the differential presence of donor and non-governmental organisation 
programmes in provinces. For instance, in Maniema, the ASSP programme had been 
phasing out performance payments paid in a previous DFID programme. Many workers 
would still have been receiving these while the study was conducted. The PARSS World 
Bank programme employs performance-based financing; in South Equateur due to 
logistic issues, only PARSS-supported health zones were sampled explaining the high 
proportion of these payments being reported for this province. In conflict-affected South 
v Recent qualitative research as yet unpublished as part of an ASSP operational research study on health 
worker motivation 
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Kivu, the presence of numerous non-governmental organisations and humanitarian actors 
may also explain the high number of payments from partners. In some cases, partner 
payments did not appear to differ greatly in terms of amounts earned compared with 
salaries and prime de risques. Nonetheless, doctors in Katanga and nurses in Kasai 
Occidental could earn more from partner payments than either a salary or prime de risque, 
and therefore these payments have the potential to distort worker incentives.  
The recent dictatorship of Mobutu joked about Article 15, a supposed article of the 
constitution urging state employees who were rarely paid to “help themselves” 
(“débrouillez-vous”) in order to survive.28 From the results, it would appear that this has 
been taken seriously by most workers; as many do not receive any form of payment from 
the state, a large proportion of workers conduct private practice, supplement their income 
through non-clinical activities and even receive informal payments from patients.  
Doctors tended to receive the highest amounts of informal payments. This could be due 
to that fact that doctors will have more interactions with patients compared to laboratory 
workers or pharmacy workers for example, and so increasing opportunities to extort 
money from patients. In addition, their status is usually the most senior in the facility, 
thus allowing them to demand more from patients compared to other cadres. It is possible 
that patients willingly pay more than the user fees owed as a way of thanking workers for 
treatment but given 60% of the population live on less than $1.25 per day,29 this seems 
unlikely as most patients would struggle to pay the user fees alone. 
Across all provinces, private practice did not seem to be that common. This may have 
been a function of sampling as private clinics are more common in urban areas compared 
to rural areas, and the majority of the samples for both studies were facilities in rural 
areas. However, there is no legal impediment to public sector health workers working in 
private facilities as well. The separate DFID report which conducted some qualitative 
work around remuneration gives some reflections as to the reasons why private work may 
not be commonly practiced.  
Many workers in all provinces admitted to gaining supplemental income from non-
clinical activities. The majority derived this income from agriculture, livestock/hunting. 
This could be because most workers interviewed lived in rural areas where this is the most 
accessible supplemental activity. There was no obvious pattern between the cadres and 
practice of supplemental activity; practice may vary according to the local opportunities 
available to do so. Also, doctors who practiced supplemental activity seemed to make the 
most money from this compared to all other cadres. This was perhaps because they 
generally earned more than other cadres for clinical work and so they could afford to 
invest more capital into other activities to make them more lucrative. 
In terms of overall income, the DFID study found that all cadres with the exception of 
doctors, made the most of their revenue from supplemental non-clinical activities. On the 
other hand, the World Bank study suggested that user fees made up most of total income 
for these cadres. Half of the areas sampled by the DFID study were in the location of the 
ASSP programme which has a policy to heavily subsidise user fees and so this may 
account for the difference observed.  
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Differences between the studies 
 
Given that the results presented here have been derived from two different studies, it is 
important to acknowledge that differences in the sampling and methods of each study 
may explain some of the variation observed. The World Bank included a higher 
proportion of CSR facilities, which tend to have more staff than CS facilities as they 
provide a slightly broader range of services. The DFID study also included a higher 
proportion of facilities in rural areas; according to the national standards or “normes”, CS 
or CSR in rural areas require less staff compared to urban areas.  
 
Another difference between the studies related to inquiry around sensitive sources of 
income such as informal payments or “cadeaux”. In the DFID study, respondents were 
asked to report the amount received and were reassured that their response would be 
confidential and not linked to them in the final report. On the other hand, the World Bank 
employed a technique called “unfolding brackets” in order to mitigate non-response to 
this question. This technique may have succeeded in yielding higher response rates for 
these items, thus limiting the possibility to compare results between the two studies. Also 
the two studies have different ways to ask amounts received from informal sources, each 
way yielding potential and different biases. Direct questioning used by DFID could lead 
to underestimation of these amounts, due to socio-desirability bias. On the other hand, 
semi-structured amount prompts used in unfolding brackets may be subject to ‘anchoring 
effects’, which could bias individual estimates, even if the effect on the aggregate 




Differences in the studies aside, there are also limitations applicable to both studies. 
Firstly, both studies recruited workers present on the day of the survey. It is possible that 
the sources and amounts of revenue of workers who are likely to be present in facilities 
differs from that of workers who are less frequently working in facilities. However, the 
extent of this selection bias could not be measured in either study. Both studies also 
sampled a high number of nurses but far smaller numbers of other cadres, and so the 
results for these other cadres will be less generalizable. In particular, the results for cadres 
other than nurses in the DFID study are less reliable given the much smaller sample size. 
However, this is an interesting finding in itself, as it indicates that certain provinces may 
lack a diversity of personnel and may even be understaffed. However, it is important to 
note that both studies only interviewed personnel present on the day of the survey and did 
not attempt to describe the total number of personnel in facilities, so it is difficult to truly 
know whether facilities were understaffed.  
 
Secondly, both studies were susceptible to the phenomenon of recall bias, a systematic 
error caused by differences in the accuracy or completeness of answers recalled by 
participants regarding events in their past. Ideally, responses would have been checked 
against a register on revenues if possible, however, robust formal documentation of this 
does not currently exist in CS or CSR. Thirdly, neither study could accurately define 
whether workers were receiving what they were supposed to receive according to the 
Ministry of Health pay-scale. This is because the pay-scale only stipulates administrative 
position as opposed to the qualification of the worker; neither study requested information 
on the worker’s administrative position.  
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Many of the workers in the study did not fit easily into one of our pre-defined categories 
and so were included in the group “other”. This is likely to be a heterogeneous group of 
individuals and it is difficult to know whether these workers were official personnel or 
not. It is also possible there was an element of misclassification bias in either or both 
studies, with workers misreporting their job titles. However, workers were also asked 
about qualifications in order to verify job status and the workers in this category were not 
formally qualified; this alone is an interesting finding and may highlight the need for more 
qualified personnel in these facilities. 
  
Finally, given the different methods employed by both studies (in terms of sampling, 
questioning etc.) it was not possible to conduct a combined extensive analysis of the data. 
However, it is hoped that this descriptive report will give stakeholders an overview of the 
variation of health worker remuneration in primary care facilities over a large number of 
provinces. For more extensive analyses, please refer to the separate DFID and World 




A key strength of this analysis is that it has generated a wealth of information on health 
worker revenues from eight out of the eleven provinces in the DRC. This has only been 
possible through the co-operation of researchers from the two studies and is an excellent 
example of partnership working and co-ordination between different agencies. The other 
benefits of this collaboration have been the sharing of lessons learned, particularly around 
methodological approaches and logistics of data collection. The studies have also sought 
to build local capacity within the Kinshasa School of Public Health, which has been the 
institution responsible for data collection in both studies. 
 
Another strength is that the information collected by both studies is reasonably 
comparable. Both studies gathered data from facilities of the same profile, and 
respondents were selected in a similar way. It was also fortunate that the World Bank 
study could incorporate similar variables to the DFID study thereby enhancing 
comparability. In addition, both studies sampled facilities at random thereby resulting in 
a non-biased sample of health workers in each province.  
 
Finally, both studies were implemented in 2014 and so it is unlikely that not much change 




In conclusion, these are the first studies in several years to quantify the average levels and 
the extent of the variation in health worker revenues in the DRC. It can be seen from the 
results that there is an urgent need to review the current policies around the payment of 
salaries and primes de risque. This study provides strong evidence for this, particularly 
for the remuneration of nurses who make up the majority of the primary health care 
workforce. In addition, payments from partners are sometimes larger than government 
payments. Co-ordination between all partners involved in paying health workers is 
therefore necessary to avoid distorting health worker incentives. It is also apparent that 
informal payments continue to occur in facilities; such payments pose barriers to 
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accessing healthcare given the poverty of the population. The inadequacy of revenue 
gained by health workers in state facilities is also diverting many workers into activities 
outside of the health profession, which could impact negatively on their commitment to 
clinical responsibilities. Providing adequate financial incentives would remove pressures 
to tend to supplemental income-generating activities.  
 
Annexe 1  
Barème actuel des agents et fonctionnaires de l’état du ministère de la santé 
publique 
N° GRADES ADMINISTRATIFS PROSANTE MEDECINS CHIRURS, 
PHICIENS ET L2 
FP SANTE SALAIRE PRIME SALAIRE PRIME SALAIRE PRIME SALAIRE PRIME 
1 SG EN CHEF 5     
EN CHEF 4 
98.879 — 105.147 203.000 105.147 919.949 105.147 — 
2 DG EN CHEF 3 
EN CHEF 2 









3 DIRECTEUR EN CHEF 1     
EN CHEF 









4 CD INSPECTEUR 94.430 98.100 95.177 123.300 95.177 631.054 95.177 458.360 
5 CB CHEF CLIN     
CHEF SCE 










6 ATB1 DH2 88.564 61.000 90.187 81.200 90.187 504.470 90.187 347.750 
7 ATB2 DH1 86.956 47.000 89.187 58.000 — — 89.187 286.474 
8 AGB1 DHA 85.692 32.500 87.591 52.127 — — — — 
9 AGB2 HOSP1 84.894 26.500 86.195 38.204 — — — — 
10 AA1 HOSP2 84.256 21.200 85.197 27.402 — — — — 
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